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CHAPTER I 
 
BOARD STRUCTURE AND MONITORING: NEW EVIDENCE FROM CEO 
TURNOVER 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Are independent directors more effective than inside and grey directors in monitoring the 
CEOs? Do board and board committee independence, as measured by the proportion of 
independent directors, matter for board monitoring? These are fundamental questions in corporate 
governance. The conventional wisdom is that independent directors are more effective. By 
definition, independent directors have no familial or economic ties to the CEO and the firm they 
monitor other than that through their directorship and ownership. Thus they are believed to be 
more willing to challenge CEOs than other directors who could be unduly influenced by the CEO 
due to career concerns and other ties to the CEO. In addition, Fama (1980) argue that outside 
directors have incentives to develop their reputations as decision control experts in the labor 
market for directors, which provides them with incentives to monitor more carefully. This view 
has greatly influenced regulators and investors. For example, NYSE and Nasdaq issued new 
listing rules following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that require boards in listing 
companies to meet certain independence standards. CALPER, a large pension fund, recommends 
that an ideal board should be consisted of all independent directors except the CEO. TIAA-CREF, 
another large pension fund, states in their policy statement on corporate governance that “the 
board should be composed of a substantial majority of independent directors.” However, 
arguments have also been made which suggest that independent directors may not be more 
effective at monitoring. First, as pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), a director 
reputation of not making trouble for CEOs can also be potentially valuable to independent 
directors. This can offsets the reputation benefits to directors of close monitoring of CEOs 
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described in Fama (1980). Second, independent directors often face severe limitations on their 
access to firm specific information, which can seriously undercut their ability to effectively 
monitor the CEO (Jensen, 1993). In fact, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that having better 
informed inside directors who hold outside directorships at unaffiliated firms appears to benefit 
shareholders more than greater board independence. Third, independent directors typically have 
small equity stakes in the firm they monitor, so they lack strong financial incentives to carefully 
monitor the CEO. Lastly, increasing the number of independent directors on the board aggravates 
the independent director’s free-rider problem (Harris and Raviv, 2008). As a result, the net 
benefit of monitoring by independent directors is theoretically ambiguous and ultimately an 
important empirical question.  
Empirical evidence thus far on the effectiveness of monitoring by independent directors 
is mixed and inconclusive. This mainly reflects the empirical challenge of addressing the problem 
of endogeneity of board structure. This endogeneity problem has plagued the interpretation of 
results in most prior studies. Coefficients estimates on key explanatory variables in these studies 
are likely to be biased because the endogeneity of board structure is usually not directly 
accounted for in these studies (See discussions in Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Thus, solving this endogeneity problem is crucial to assessing the importance 
of director independence. Recently, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie, Sokolowsky 
and Wan (2010) use the mandatory change in board structure required by the new NYSE and 
Nasdaq listing rules of 2003 to examine the effect of board and compensation committee 
independence on CEO compensation1,2
                                                     
1 This question is first studied by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009). Guthrie et al. (2010) revisit the results in 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and find different results. Given the outlier issues in the Chaochharia and Grinstein 
(2009) paper, I mainly discuss the results in the Guthrie et al. (2010) paper. 
. They find that CEO compensation did not significantly 
2 Other studies that have directly addressed the endogeneity problem include Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010)  and 
Linck, Netter and Wintoki (2011). Duchin et al. (2010) uses “exogenous” shocks from regulatory changes between 
1999 and 2002 in the U.S. to study the relation between board independence and firm performance. They find that 
independent directors can have a positive effect on firm performance in firms with low information costs, but a 
negative effect in firms with high information costs. Linck et al. (2011) use a dynamic model to address endogeneity. 
They find that there is no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance. Unlike us, these 
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change in  firms that were forced to have a majority of independent directors on the board and, 
surprisingly, CEO total pay actually increased in firms that were forced to adopt a fully 
independent compensation committee, relative to firms that were not affected by these new 
exchange listing rules. Given the enormous growth in CEO pay before SOX that has drawn 
intense public criticism, this evidence raises further questions about the effectiveness of 
independent directors in monitoring CEOs. 
 In this study, I shed new light on these questions by examining changes in sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnovers to firm performance in publicly listed U.S. firms before and after the 
issuance of new NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules following the passage of SOX. In an agency 
setting, the strength of the relation between forced CEO turnover and firm performance provides 
a relativley clean and direct measure of the effectiveness of board monitoring. A higher 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is widely taken to be an indication of 
more effective board monitoring (Weisbach, 1988; Lel and Miller, 2008; Jenter and Lewellen, 
2010; Kaplan and Minton, 2011). In contrast, although a higher level of CEO compensation could 
indicate less effective monitoring by the board, it can also be consistent with models of optimal 
contracting. For example, in the model of Hermalin (2005), an increase in intensity of board 
monitoring reduces the CEO’s job stability, which in turn requires higher CEO pay due to the rise 
in CEO risk bearing. Here, higher CEO pay is a consequence of more intensive monitoring rather 
than an indication of less effective monitoring. This highlights the importance of examining CEO 
turnover, rather than relying solely on evidence on CEO compensation, before we draw any 
conclusions about the effectiveness of independent director monitoring.   
To overcome the well-known problem of endogeneity of board structure, I use the 
issuance of new NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements following the passage of SOX as an 
exogenous shock and examine how sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
                                                                                                                                                              
authors examine the net effect of board’s monitoring and advising roles. My results help to shed light on one potential 
mechnism that is at work. 
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changes in firms that were affected by the new exchange listing rules relative to firms that were 
already in compliance with the new exchange listing rules in a difference-in-difference (DD) 
setting.  Unlike prior studies such as Dahya et al. (2002), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), and 
Guthrie et al. (2010), I match treatment and control firms based on Fama-French 48 industry and 
a propensity score before performing the DD analysis to mitigate the bias that could result from 
violation of the common temporal trend assumption of this method.  
 To see the importance of using “exogenous” shocks to study the causal relation between 
board structure and CEO turnover, we can consider a modified version of the Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) model in which the board learns about CEO ability from prior firm 
performance, while the CEO bargains with the board over new director nominations. A CEO 
wants to nominate directors with whom they have close ties, while the board of directors wants 
the opposite. As perceived CEO talent increases, so does the bargaining power of the CEO. 
Hence, more talented CEOs are on average associated with less independent boards. At the same 
time, it takes a bigger drop in firm performance for the board to change their belief in a CEO’s 
ability from positive to negative, given strong prior performance. As a result, the empirically 
observed positive cross-sectional relation between board independence and sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance can be actually driven by the fact that boards act more slowly in 
firing a highly talented CEO in response to poor short-run performance. The endogenous relation 
between board independence and turnover-performance sensitivity can also arise for other 
reasons. For example, if independent directors, for example, out of concern for their reputations 
on the directors market, choose to serve on boards that conduct more effective monitoring, then 
this will lead us to observe a stronger relation between firm performance and CEO turnover in 
firms with more independent boards. However, this relation is really driven by independent 
directors choosing to sit on boards that are more effective at monitoring to begin with not by 
board independence. It would be misleading if we conclude from this correlation that increasing 
board independence leads to improved board monitoring. In reality, the endogenous relations 
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between board (committee) independence and board decisions can be quite complicated. Since 
the omitted variables that drive the endogenous relations are usually unobservable, using 
exogenous shocks that substantially alter board structure represents an effective way to overcome 
this endogeneity problem. 
In 2001 and 2002, major scandals occurred in the U.S. at a number of prominent public 
companies such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, which shocked investors and highlighted 
serious shortcomings in the oversight of US public firms by boards of directors and external 
auditors. To bolster investor confidence and “strengthen corporate governance practices of listed 
companies”, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  Pursuant to SOX and at 
the SEC “urging”, the NYSE and Nasdaq proposed new listing rules in August and October of 
2002 respectively that set specific requirements on board and committee independence. The SEC 
approved these new listing rules on November 4, 2003 with minor changes. The main provisions 
of the approved new listing rules for corporate boards require the board of each listed company to 
have (i) a majority of independent directors, (ii) nominating, compensation, and audit committees 
composed entirely of independent directors, and (iii) regular executive sessions attended solely by 
non-management directors3,4
I identify three new exchange listing rules that are likely to have significant impacts on 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance in affected firms. The first is the rule that 
requires a majority of independent directors on the board. If the net benefit of independent 
director monitoring is positive, then I expect that compliance with this rule leads to an increase in 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance in affected firms. The second is the rule 
that requires a fully independent nominating committee. One major task of the nominating 
committee is to select nominees to stand for director election. When the nominating committee is 
.  
                                                     
3 “Controlled” companies are exempt from the requirements for a majority independent board and fully independent 
compensation and nominating committees. A controlled company is a company of which more than 50% of the voting 
power is held by an individual, group or another company.  
4 Nasdaq allows a majority of independent directors or a fully independent nominating committee to nominate 
directors. Similarly, Nasdaq allows a majority of independent directors or a fully independent compensation committee 
to set CEO compensation. 
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not fully independent or when the firm does not have a nominating committee, the CEO is almost 
always involved in the nominating process and usually has significant say on whom to be 
nominated (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). This can reduces the willingness of even 
independent directors to challenge the CEOs because unsuccessful challenges may greatly reduce 
their chances of being nominated to the board again. The influence of the CEO is reinforced by 
her ability to appointing directors who have close ties to her. One important implication of the 
requirement for fully independent nominating committee is that the CEO is excluded from the 
process of nominating directors for election. This can be crucial to board monitoring and the 
dynamics of board decision making. Now, even the incumbent independent directors can become 
more effective at monitoring because they need to concern less about CEO displeasure with their 
queries hurting their chance of being re-nominated to the board. Furthermore, delegating the 
director selection process to independent directors reduces the chance that the CEO can game the 
regulation by appointing gray directors who fit the definition of independence under the 
regulation, but are strongly connected to the management in other ways. Hence, I expect to 
observe an increase in turnover-performance sensitivity in firms forced to move to fully 
independent nominating committees. The third is the rule that requires firms to have fully 
independent audit committees. I epxect that compliance with this ruel lead to an increase in 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnvoer to firm performance especially accounting performance in 
affected firms. This is because the move to fully independent audit committee may improve the 
quality of reported accounting numbers. If the board consequently puts higher weight on the 
firm’s accounting performance when making CEO turnover decisions then there should be an 
increase in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to acccounting performance. If the effect of higher 
quality of reported accounting numbers spills over to reduce the noise in stock prices, then there 
may be even an increase in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock performance. It is worth 
noting that, unlike my first two hypotheses, the effect of change in audit committee composition 
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on turnover-performance sensitivity is hypothesized to be through its effect on quality of reported 
accounting numbers rather than on director incentives.  
Consistent with the first two hypotheses, I find firms forced to adopt a majority 
independent board experienced a significantly larger increase in sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance after SOX than firms that before SOX already had a majority 
independent board. Similarly, I find firms forced to adopt a fully independent nominating 
committee also experienced a significantly larger increase in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover 
to firm performance after SOX than firms before SOX already had a fully independent 
nominating committee. However, I find no evidence that firms that were noncompliant prior to 
SOX with the rule that requires a fully independent audit committee experienced any significant 
change in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance after SOX relative to firms that 
were previously compliant with the rule. The results hold regardless of whether I measure firm 
performance by market-adjusted stock return or industry-adjusted change in ROA or whether I 
include just one treatment effect or all three treatment effects simultaneously.  
In terms of economic significance, my estimates suggest that, for an average firm that 
was forced to adopt a majority independent board, the increase in implied probability of a CEO 
being fired for a drop in market-adjusted stock return (industry-adjusted change in ROA) from the 
75th to the 25th percentile of the sample is about 3 times (14 times) higher post-SOX than pre-
SOX.  For an average firm that was forced to adopt a fully independent nominating committee, 
the corresponding increase in the implied probability of a CEO being fired is about 2 times (9 
times) higher post-SOX than pre-SOX. The evidence supports the view that independent directors 
conduct more intensive internal monitoring than insiders and gray directors ceteris paribus. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that having fully independent nominating committees is 
important to board monitoring even in firms that previously had a majority of independent 
directors.  
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To see if the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity in affected firm after SOX can 
be interpreted as evidence of more effective monitoring, I first examine change in firm 
performance around forced CEO turnovers. Consistent with more effective monitoring, I find that 
on average stock performance and operating performance improve following forced CEO 
turnovers in affected firms in the post-SOX period. Also, there is some evidence that treatment 
firms experience a smaller decline in firm performance prior to and a quicker recovery after a 
forced CEO turnover in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.  
Then, I compare stock market reactions to forced CEO turnover announcements in the 
pre- and post-SOX period in affected firms to see if quicker firing in the post-SOX period leads to 
a significant increase in making type I errors and thus outweighs the potentially positive effect of 
more intensive monitoring on firm value. Theoretically, the increase in performance sensitivity of 
CEO turnover can potentially have two effects on firm value – one positive and the other 
negative. On the positive side, the higher sensitivity provides stronger incentives to the CEO to 
work harder. At the same time, more rapid termination of poorly performing CEOs shortens the 
period of performance decline prior to CEO turnover and allows a firm to avoid severe damage to 
its competitive position. On the negative side, a quicker termination of a poorly performing CEO 
can increase the probability of making type I errors, i.e. prematurely firing an otherwise talented 
CEO, who happens to realize a bad performance draw. Both effects should be impounded in the 
stock returns upon the news of the CEO turnover. If the premature firing effect dominates in the 
post-SOX period, I expect to observe less positive or more negative market reactions to CEO 
turnover announcement in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.   
My empirical results show that the abnormal stock returns around forced CEO turnover 
announcements are on average higher in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period in firms 
that are affected by either the rule requiring a majority of independent directors on board or the 
rule requiring a fully independent nominating committee, though the difference is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that the quality of CEO firing decisions is at least as good in the post-
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SOX period as in the pre-SOX period in affected firms, if not better. This finding is inconsistent 
with the premature firing hypothesis. Since higher turnover-performance sensitivity should 
always increases CEOs’ incentives to work harder, the lack of evidence of premature firing 
suggests that board and nominating committee independence appears to lead to more effective 
monitoring of CEOs.  
This study makes three contributions to the corporate governance literature and policy 
debates on regulation of boards of directors. First, I provide the most credible statistical evidence 
to date on a causal relation between overall board independence and CEO turnover. Weisbach 
(1988) is the first to establish a correlation between overall board independence and CEO 
turnover. He finds that CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance in firms with an 
outsider-dominated board (more than 60% outside directors) than in firms with an insider-
dominated board (less than 40% outside directors). Taking a different approach from Weisbach, 
Dahya et al. (2002) examine change in CEO turnover in U.K. firms following the issuance of the 
Cadbury Commission recommendations, which recommended that each firm to have at least three 
nonexecutive directors and a separate CEO and Chairman. They find U.K. firms that adopted the 
Cadbury Commission recommendations increased their sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance in the following years. Since the adoption of Cadbury Committee recommendations 
is not mandatory, the shock to board composition they study is not as “exogenous” as the shock in 
this study where compliance with new exchange listing rules is mandatory for firms wishing to 
keep their exchange listing. I also use more rigorous econometric techniques than Dahya et al. 
(2010)  to address the endogeneity of board structure5
Neither Weisbach (1988) nor Dahya et al. (2002) examines the relation between board 
committee independence and CEO turnover. This leads to my second contribution. To my 
.  
                                                     
5 Dahya et al. (2002) does not use a difference-in-difference approach. Their approach does not allow a statistical test 
on whether the change in sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in the adoption firms is driven by change in 
board composition or by a common temporal trend in all firms. I replicated their approach by estimating separate 
regressions for firms in the treatment and control groups of my sample and comparing changes in sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance before and after SOX. I find that their approach does not always give me the same 
inferences as the difference-in-difference approach because it does not control for time trend in CEO turnover.  
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knowledge, this is the first study to document a relation between nominating committee 
independence and forced CEO turnover. While it is exactly the obervation that management has 
control of the board selection process that leads Berle and Means (1932) and more contemporary 
authors like Jensen (1993) to question the effectiveness of board monitoring, existing corporate 
governance literature has largely focused on how the outcome of this selection process – i.e. the 
insider-outsider ratio – affects board oversight. Surprisingly, it pays little attention to the more 
important question of who selects the board of directors and how this arrangement affects board 
monitoring. Hence, this study fills an important gap in existing literature6
Lastly, I document an important mechanism through which the stock exchanges’ new 
listing rules seem to have benefited shareholders. While the intent of the new exchange listing 
rules is clear, its ultimate effects are much less so. First, it is doubtful whether board 
independence can be truly increased by setting numerial targets for representation of independent 
. The evidence is 
especially important to the current debate on board reforms and it has important policy 
implications. Opponents of board reforms often point out that inside directors play important 
advisory roles on boards, hence mandatory increases in the percentage of independent directors 
on boards may push firms away from their optimal inside-outside director ratio and thus be value 
decreasing (Boone et al., 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). 
Based on the typical advisory roles that insiders play, it appears that, although this advisory 
function may be important in major decisons that requires the entire board to participate, it is 
much less so in decisions such as nominating directors for election to the board. One policy 
implication of my evidence is that one way to avoid the cost associated with one-size-fits-all 
board regulations while still improve monitoring is to mandate nominating committee 
composition, but leave the decision on the composition of the overall board to the firms 
themselves.  
                                                     
6 Berle and Means (1932 p.87): “… control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy committee and by 
whom, the election of directors for the ensuing period will be made. Since the proxy committee is appointed by the 
existing management, the latter can virtually dictate their own successors.” 
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directors. After all, firms can offset the intended effects by appointing directors who are 
independent by definition, but have other strong ties to the management, such as close social ties 
or ties through interlocking boards (Hallock, 1997; Hwang & Kim, 2009). For example, in 
commenting on board reforms, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) observe that “requiring a specific 
fraction of the board to be outsiders would result in an outsider-dominated board, but not 
necessarily one that is more independent than the insider-domianted board that would otherwise 
prevail – the CEO and board members will have latitude in the selection process to offset 
whatever benefits are created by exogenously imposed “independence.” This statement 
emphasizes the distinction between “policies that will affect the bargaining process and those that 
will not.” Hermalin and Weisbach argue that as long as the bargaining process between the CEO 
and the board is itself not affected by the reforms, then board monitoring will be little affected. In 
this sense, whether the new exchange listing rules on board structure has actually affected the 
“bargaining process” is an important, unanswered empirical question. Second, cristics are quick 
to point out that the new board rules may forced firms to adopt suboptimal board structures and 
thus, hurt shareholders. My evidence confirms that at least some of the intended benefits of the 
new exchange listing rules are realized and its effects have not been all negative. To the extent 
that the passage of SOX placed increased pressure on stock exchanges to issue stricter corporate 
governance rules than they would do otherwise, this is also an indirect benefit of SOX.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data, sample and variables. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results. Section 5 reports robustness checks. Section 6 examines performance changes around 
turnover events and stock market reactions to forced CEO turnover announcements. Section 7 
concludes.  
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2. Empirical Methodology 
 
2.1. Difference-in-Difference (DD) specification 
To measure the treatment effect of the new exchange listing rules on sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance, a challenge is to establish a counterfactual, i.e. what would 
the pattern of forced CEO turnover be in the absence of the new listing rules in noncompliant 
firms. One simple approach is to use the pre-SOX period as the counterfactual. We can simply 
compare the turnover-performance sensitivity in pre- and post-SOX period and see if there are 
any differences. The strong assumption behind this approach is that a board’s CEO firing decision 
does not change over time for reasons other than change in board structure. However, this is 
probably violated in my sample period because the passage of SOX and the issuance of new 
exchange listing rules are themselves prompted by high-profile corporate scandals in the U.S. that 
shook investor confidence in 2001 and 2002. The broader shift in public attitude toward corporate 
governance issues in U.S. publicly listed firms around these events could have affected forced 
CEO turnover in all firms even without the implementation of the new exchange listing rules. To 
control for this temporal shift, I therefore adopt a difference-in-difference (DD) approach. I use 
firms that were previously in compliance with the new exchange listing rules as control firms and 
identify the effect of board structure on forced CEO turnover by the difference in increase in 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance from before to after SOX between the 
treatment and control firms. Here, the change in turnover-performance sensitivity in control firms 
is used to benchmark a common time trend. 
To implement this DD approach, I estimate variants of the following logit regression: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛼0 + 𝛼1 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼12 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽0 × 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 × 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝛽12 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+ 𝛾1 × 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 × 𝛿𝑡 + γ2 × δk + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)
               (1.1) 
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where 𝑖 indexes firm, 𝑗 indexes the three exchange listing rules being studied, 𝑘 indexes industry 
and 𝑡 indexes year. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 equals to one if there is a forced CEO turnover 
in year 𝑡 + 1 in firm 𝑖 and equals zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 equals to one if firm 𝑖 was 
noncompliant with exchange listing rule 𝑗 in year 2001 and zero otherwise. For treatment firms, 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 equals to one if firm 𝑖 becomes compliant with exchange listing rule 𝑗 before or in year 𝑡 
and zero otherwise. For control firms, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 equals to one when 𝑡 is after 2003 (inclusive) and 
equals zero otherwise. Firm performance, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡, is measured either by market-adjusted stock 
return or industry-adjusted change in ROA. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of control variables. 𝛿𝑡 is a vector of 
year fixed effects and 𝛿𝑘 a vector of industry fixed effects based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification.  
In Equation (1.1), 𝛼1 measures the difference in rate of CEO turnover between the 
treatment and control firms in the absence of the treatment, where treatment refers to the change 
in board structure imposed by the particular new exchange listing rule. Similarly, 𝛽1 measures the 
difference in sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance between the treatment and control 
firms in the absence of the treatment. 𝛽2 captures change in sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance from pre- to post-SOX period. The effect of the new exchange listing rule on forced 
CEO turnover is captured by 𝛼12 and  𝛽12 , where 𝛼12 captures the differential effect on the rate 
of CEO turnover and 𝛽12 captures the differential effect on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance. If the new exchange listing rule leads to an increase in the rate of CEO turnover in 
treatment firms, then I expect to observe a positive and statistically significant 𝛼12. Similarly, if 
the new exchange listing rule leads to an increase in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance, I expect that estimate for 𝛽12 to be negative and statistically significant. 
For the time being, I only consider the treatment effect of a single listing rule. However, 
some firms were noncompliant with more than one new exchange listing rules before SOX. To 
better isolate the treatment effect due to each listing rule when a firm was noncompliant with 
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more than one new exchange listing rules, I estimate specifications in which I simultaneously 
include the treatment effects of all three listing rules that I study in this paper. This is done by 
adding two new sets of terms that are the same as those between coefficients 𝛼1 and 𝛽12 in 
Equation (1.1) except I replace  𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗 and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 by indicator variables that correspond to 
each of the other two listing rules. The treatment effect of individual listing rule is identified by 
cross sectional and time series variations in compliance with the three listing rules.  
 
2.2. Propensity-Score Matching 
The difference-in-difference approach allows for heterogeneity in treatment and control 
firms, which in my case means that treatment and control firms can have different sensitivities of 
forced CEO turnover to firm performance both before and after SOX. However, the difference-in-
difference effect is identified by assuming a similar temporal trend in the turnover-performance 
relation in the period from before to after SOX in both the treatment and control firms in the 
absence of treatment, again the treatment here refers to the change in board structure imposed by 
the new exchange listing rule. To the extent that firm characteristics that determine the 
endogenous choice of board structure before SOX also affect the time trend, the difference-in-
difference estimates can be biased due to difference in the time trend in the treatment and control 
firms. To mitigate this bias, I match treatment and control firms along a variety of firm 
characteristics that are suggested by recent theories of corporate boards influence the choice of 
board structure. Specifically, for each of the three new exchange listing rules I study, I estimate a 
probit model to predict the likelihood that a firm was noncompliant with the rule in 2001 using 
data before 2001. The estimated likelihood is called the propensity score. I then match each 
treatment firm in year 2001 to one or more control firms that satisfy the following conditions: (1) 
the control firms are in the same Fama-French 48 industry group as the treatment firm; (2) the 
propensity scores of the control firms fall within a predefined neighborhood of the propensity 
score of the treatment firm. This is known as Radius Matching in the propensity score matching 
15 
 
literature. The choice of the radius is based on a tradeoff between two considerations. On the one 
hand, a smaller radius increases the quality of the match. On the other hand, it also increases the 
probability that a match will not be found. For my main analysis, I choose a radius (i.e. 
neighborhood) of 0.10. In unreported robustness checks, I also try radius of 0.15 and found 
qualitatively similar results. The matched treatment firms and control firms are then pooled 
together to form the matched sample for the particular new exchange listing rule. This process is 
repeated for all three new exchange listing rules I study to obtain three matched samples. One 
limitation of this matching procedure is that I can only match firms on observable characteristics, 
thus treatment firms may still differ from control firms on some unobservable characteristics. 
However, I believe that performing a matching procedure is still better than not doing it because 
this procedure at least helps to mitigate biases due to observable differences between treatment 
and control firms, which linear controls may be unable to fully adjust for in a multivariate 
regression framework. 
 
3. Data, sample and variables 
 
3.1. Data and sample 
 In this section, I discuss the construction of the full sample, the propensity score 
matching procedure and the construction of the matched sample for each of the three new 
exchange listing rules I study. 
 
3.1.1. Construction of full sample 
I obtain my CEO turnover sample from the Execucomp database from 1996 to 2008. This 
database contains information on annual compensation for up to five top executives in firms in 
the S&P 1500 index currently or from 1992 onward. The database allows me to track a firm’s 
CEO identity over time and thus, identify a CEO turnover when there is a change in CEO from 
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one fiscal year to another. Since I associate each CEO turnover with the year prior to the turnover 
announcement, my sample period is from 1996 to 2007, where year 1996 is the first year that 
boards of directors data is available from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) and year 2007 is the last 
year I have information about CEO turnovers announced in the following year. This CEO 
turnover sample is then combined with the no CEO turnover years of these firms to form a panel 
data from 1996 to 2007. I then merge this data with the boards of directors data from 
RiskMetrics. I use the boards of directors data reported at the last meeting date of each fiscal year 
to represent board characteristics prior to a CEO turnover that occurs in the following year. The 
information that is most important to me is whether a director is independent and which 
committees she serves on. Lastly, I add stock return data from the CRSP database and firm 
financial data from Compustat to data.  
To ensure that my results are not driven by firms entering and exiting the sample around 
the issuance of the new exchange listing rules, I require that all sample firms to (i) have non-
missing director data on RiskMetrics in fiscal year 2001 and (ii) be listed on NYSE or Nasdaq 
from 2001 until at least 2004. This reduces my final sample to 14,151 firm year observations 
from 1996 to 2007, which are associated with 1,280 firms in existence in 2001. Since not all firms 
enter the sample in 1996 and exit the sample in 2007 and also some variables may have missing 
values in certain firm-years, there are some variations in the number of firms with data available 
across the sample period. For each of the three new listing rules I study, I divide the 1,280 sample 
firms in existence in 2001 into a treatment group and a control group based on whether they were 
in compliance with that particular new listing rule in 2001, where the treatment group consists of 
firms that were noncompliant with that new exchange listing rule in year 2001 and the control 
group includes the rest of the firms.  
I use board structure in fiscal year 2001 to classify firms into treatment and control 
groups for the following reasons. According to the NYSE and Nasdaq, firms are required to 
comply with the new exchange rules during their first annual meeting after January 15, 2004, but 
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no later than October 31, 2004. For firms with classified boards, the deadline for compliance is 
the second annual meeting after January 15, 2004, but no later than December 31, 2005. 
However, both anecdotal and time series evidence suggest that firms began to make board 
structure changes as early as the dates that the NYSE and Nasdaq proposals are first made public 
in 20027 and many firms became compliant with the new exchange rules between 2002 and 2003 
– before the 2004 deadlines. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that the largest 
increase in the percentage of firms having a majority of independent directors occurs between 
2002 and 2003. Thus, they use a firm’s board structure in year 2002 to determine which firms are 
affected by the new exchange rules. However, I use year 2001 for this purpose for two reasons. 
First, board data in fiscal year 2001 represent the most recent board structures that were clearly 
not influenced by the new listing rules since early compliance could occur in fiscal year 2002 for 
firms with fiscal year-end months after August. Second, even for board structure changes in year 
2002 which occur prior to when the new exchange proposals were publicly announced, they are 
likely to be affected by the major corporate scandals and heightened public concerns about 
corporate governance quality that led to the passage of  SOX and the new exchange rule 
proposals in 2001 and 2002. Hence, I believe that board structure in fiscal year 2001 is more 
representative than that in fiscal year 2002 of the equilibrium board structure over the years prior 
to the implementation of the new exchange rules.8
 
  
3.1.2. Estimating propensity scores 
As I discussed in Section 2.2, I match treatment and control firms by industry and 
propensity score before conducting the difference-in-difference analysis to mitigate potential bias 
due to differential temporal trend. In this section, I discuss the specification of the propensity 
                                                     
7 NYSE and Nasdaq sent their proposals for new exchange listing requirements to SEC in August 2002 and October 
2002 respectively. 
8 As a robustness check, I also repeat my analysis on a sample that uses board structure on the last meeting date of 
fiscal year 2002 to classify firms into treatment and control groups. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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score models and report the coefficient estimates and a measure of matching success for these 
models. 
To predict membership in the treatment group defined by the new exchange listing rule 
that requires firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board, I estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a firm had a majority of 
independent directors on the board in year 2001. The explanatory variables are selected to cover a 
wide range of firm and governance characteristics. I include firm size measured by log of total 
assets, growth opportunities measured by Tobin’s Q, fundamental risk measured by volatility of 
earnings, and a list of corporate governance variables which include antitakeover provisions (i.e. 
the GIM index), an indicator variable for CEO-Chairman duality, an indicator for dual class 
firms, an indicator for the presence of a non-employee blockholder on the board, the percentage 
of voting power held by inside and gray directors (including the CEO), an indicator for founder 
and heir CEOs, log of CEO tenure, and CEO age. A non-employee blockholder is defined as a 
non-employee director who holds more than 1% of a firm’s voting power. The non-employee 
blockholder indicator equals to one if at least one non-employee blockholder is on the board. The 
founder and heir information is hand-collected from an extensive search for CEO biographic 
information on firms’ proxy statements, firms’ websites and other electronic news sources, such 
as Factiva, etc. 
To predict membership in the treatment group defined by the new exchange listing rule 
that requires firms to have a fully independent nominating committee or a fully independent audit 
committee, I add to the above probit specification the fraction of independent directors on the 
board as an additional explanatory variable. The reasoning is that, with more independent 
directors on a board, the board is more likely to have a fully independent nominating or audit 
committee because more independent directors are available to sit on these committees and the 
presence of a larger fraction of independent directors on the board are also likely to give 
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independent directors greater bargaining power to push for more independent nominating or audit 
committees.  
Table 1.1 reports the coefficient estimates of the three probit models specified above. 
They are estimated using data from 1996 to 2001, i.e. the time period before the assignment of 
firms to treatment and control groups. Column 1 reports coefficient estimates for the probit model 
used to predict membership in treatment group defined by the rule requiring a majority of 
independent directors on the board. I find that most of the coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the model captures important characteristics 
that are systematically associated with membership in the treatment group. Although a couple of 
variables are statistically insignificant, I still include them because each of them captures a unique 
firm or governance characteristic. For example, earnings volatility captures a firm’s fundamental 
risk. The model has a concordant rate of 80.3%, meaning that among the total number of distinct 
pairs with one case being a treatment firm and the other case being a control firm, the treatment 
firm has a higher predicted mean score than the control firm 80.3% of the time.  
Similarly, column 2 reports coefficient estimates for the probit model used to predict 
membership in the treatment group defined by the rule requiring a fully independent nominating 
committee. I find that except for two variables, namely earnings volatility and the voting power 
of inside and gray directors, all the other predictors are statistically significant. As expected, the 
fraction of independent directors is negatively associated the probability of being in the treatment 
group. The model has a 79% concordant rate. Column 3 reports estimates for the probit model 
used to predict membership in the treatment group defined by the rule requiring a fully 
independent audit committee. Again, the coefficient on fraction of independent directors is 
negative and statistically significant. The model has a 74.7% concordant rate.  
I also tried alternative specifications in which I include additional variables such as board 
size, firm age, etc. in the probit models. However, the concordance rate is not improved.  Hence, 
the models reported in Table 1.1 seem to be the most parsimonious specifications for the 
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Table 1.1: Coefficient estimates of the propensity score models 
The table reports the coefficient estimates of the probit models used to predict membership in the treatment 
group defined by the new listing rules on board independence (Column 1) and on nominating committee 
independence (Column 2) and on audit committee independence (Column 3) respectively.  The dependent 
variable in each column is, from columns 1 to 3, Treat1, Treat2 and Treat3, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The sample consists of all firm years from 1996 to 2001in my full sample. The 
numbers in parentheses are p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. The percent concordant is defined as the percent of distinct pairs of observations with 
one case having a positive response (for example Treat1=1) and the other having a negative response (for 
example Treat1=0) such that observation with the negative response has a lower predicted mean score than 
the observation with the positive response.   
VARIABLES Predict for insider-
dominated board 
Predict for non-
independent Nominating 
Committee  
Predict for non-
independent audit 
committee 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of total assets -0.090*** -0.095*** 0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.014 0.032** 0.025* 
 (0.312) (0.035) (0.058) 
Earnings volatility 0.228 0.117 0.043 
 (0.519) (0.735) (0.450) 
Independent directors (%)  -3.016*** -2.904*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
G-index -0.055*** -0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dual class firm -0.062 0.268*** -0.052 
 (0.472) (0.004) (0.526) 
CEO-Chairman -0.378*** -0.163*** -0.043 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.372) 
Insider-linked voting 0.015*** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.772) (0.128) 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.150*** 0.230*** 0.268*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.203*** 0.174*** 0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.281) 
Founder-Heir CEO 0.238*** 0.278*** -0.190*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
CEO age 0.014*** -0.014*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.716) 
Constant -1.200 4.032 -0.185 
 (0.909) (0.394) (0.983) 
    
Observations 4871 4871 4871 
Chi sq 988.4 1260.5 869.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.184 0.228 0.163 
Percent concordant 80.3 79.0 74.7 
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concordance rate reported. Although imperfect, the concordance rates suggest that these models 
do a reasonable job of predicting membership in the treatment groups. 
 
3.1.3. Construction of matched samples 
Using a pre-specified radius of 0.10, I obtain three matched samples based on propensity 
score matching – one for each of the three new listing rules. For treatment and control firms 
defined by the rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board, I find a total of 789 
matched firms in year 2001, among which 188 are treatment firms and 601 are control firms. I 
then add time series data to these 789 firms to obtain a final sample of 8,782 firm-year 
observations between 1996 and 2007. These firms span 36 of the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
groups, so they represent a wide range of industries. For treatment and control firms defined by 
the rule requiring a fully independent nominating committee, I find a total of 758 matched firms 
in 2001, among which 453 are treatment firms and 305 are control firms. I then add time series 
data to these 758 firms and obtain a final sample of 8,461 firm-year observations. These firms 
span 38 of the Fama-French 48 industry groups. Lastly, for treatment and control firms defined 
by the rule requiring a fully independent audit committee, I find a total of 847 matched firms in 
2001, among which 250 are treatment firms and 597 are control firms. I then add time series data 
to these 847 firms and obtain a final sample of 9,441 firm-year observations. These firms span 34 
of the Fama-French 48 industry groups.  
 
3.2. Variables 
 In this section, I discuss the construction of dependent and independent variables that are 
used in estimating Equation (1.1).  For my main analysis, the dependent variable is an indicator 
for forced CEO turnover. For robustness check, I also define an alternative dependent variable 
which I call involuntary CEO turnover. Both variables are defined in this section. The sample 
period of this paper sees an increasing role played by government in corporate governance 
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matters of firms. A significantly larger number of violation-related CEO turnovers happened 
during this period due to Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) investigation into option backdating, earnings management and other inappropriate 
business practices. In Section 3.2.3, I discuss this special type of forced CEO turnover and 
explain the reason for excluding them from the regression analysis.   
 
3.2.1. Forced CEO turnover 
For my analysis, I am mainly interested in CEO turnovers that are due to the board’s 
disciplinary actions. However, many CEO turnovers occur for reasons like retirements, major 
health problems, deaths, departures for more attractive positions, etc. Consequently, I classify 
CEO turnovers into forced and voluntary following the method used by Parrino (1997). This 
method has been commonly used in recent CEO turnover studies (e.g., Huson, Malatesta and 
Parrino, 2004; Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata, 2009; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010). Specifically, a 
CEO turnover is classified as forced if (i) news articles mention that a CEO was fired, forced out 
or left due to unspecified policy differences; (ii) the CEO is under the age of 60 and the news did 
not mention death, poor health, or the acceptance of another position (within the firm or 
elsewhere) as the reason for the departure; (iii) a reported CEO retirement is not announced at 
least six months in advance.  For this third group, I check a wider range of news to make sure that 
no other articles suggest that the turnover is voluntary in nature. These CEO turnovers are 
reclassified as voluntary if the incumbent takes a comparable position elsewhere or departs for 
reasons previously undisclosed that are unrelated to firm activities. The remaining CEO turnovers 
are classified as voluntary.  
 
3.2.2. Involuntary CEO turnover 
The classification method above relies on news reports to classify CEO turnover types. If, 
in the post-SOX period, reporters become more aggressive at seeking out the true reason for a 
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CEO turnover in non-compliant firms than in compliant firms, or if non-compliant firms are more 
candid about reasons of CEO turnovers than compliant firms in the post-SOX period, then the use 
of this classification could introduce a bias into my results. Thus, to check the robustness of my 
results, I introduce an alternative classification method which does not rely on news reports to 
separate CEO turnovers into what I call involuntary and voluntary turnovers. Specifically, I 
define a CEO turnover as involuntary if (i) the departing CEO leaves office before the age of 65 
(ii) the turnover is unrelated to interim CEOs, co-CEOs, poor health, death, mergers and spin-offs 
and (iii) the departing CEO does not take a CEO position in another S&P 1500 firm within one 
year of the initial CEO turnover announcement. The rationale behind this classification is that 
CEOs usually retire at the age of 65, so after excluding CEO turnovers that are related to interim 
CEOs, co-CEOs, poor health, death, mergers and spin-offs, any CEO who leaves office before 65 
and does not take an equivalent or better position in another firm is likely to have done so 
involuntarily. The advantage of this classification over the forced CEO turnover classification in 
Parrino (1997) is that it is less restrictive, involves less manual coding, and does not rely on news 
reports. Hence, it can capture a larger proportion of the actual forced CEO turnovers and is less 
prone to systematic human errors than is the forced CEO turnover classification. At the same 
time, the disadvantage of the involuntary turnover definition is that it is more likely to include 
some voluntary CEO turnovers than is the forced CEO turnover definition. The purpose of this 
new classification is to provide a robustness check on the results based on forced CEO turnovers.  
 
3.2.3. Violation-related CEO turnover 
The years following the passage of SOX have seen some high-profile investigations by 
regulators and prosecutors into earnings manipulation, option backdating and other inappropriate 
business practices in U.S. public firms. Under SEC pressure, many firms also conducted their 
own internal investigations into these matters. These investigations have resulted in a number of 
firings of top executives including CEOs. Since these CEO turnovers decisions were made under 
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outside pressure, they may not reflect a change in board monitoring. Furthermore, since the main 
reason for removal in these cases is violation not poor firm performance, including these forced 
CEO turnovers in my analysis can potentially lower the estimated sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance. For example, the resignation of Hewlett-Packard Co.'s CEO Mark 
Hurd in 2010 was requested by its board for violation of the company’s business standards. It 
occurred at a time when H-P’s stock outperformed the broad market by 101% over his five-year 
tenure. Obviously, trying to explain this forced CEO turnover by firm performance will be 
seriously misleading. If these violation-related CEO turnovers are evenly distributed among the 
treatment and control firms, then including them won’t affect my inference. However, if they are 
not evenly distributed, then including them may bias my comparison of turnover-performance 
sensitivity between treatment and control firms. To the extent that treatment firms were poorly 
governed before SOX, we could expect to observe a higher percentage of violation-related CEO 
turnovers in treatment firms than in control firms after SOX. This could make it harder to detect 
the differential increase in turnover-performance sensitivity in the treatment and control firms. I 
therefore exclude CEO turnovers that resulted from revealed violations when I conduct my 
difference-in-difference analysis.  
To identify violation-related CEO turnovers, I read news articles around each CEO 
turnover announcement to see if violation is mentioned as a reason for the CEO’s departure. 
Based on this procedure, I identify 16 forced CEO turnovers as being related to violations, all of 
which happened in the post-SOX period. Confirming my suspicion, violation-related CEO 
turnovers account for 25% of the post-SOX forced CEO turnovers in firms that were 
noncompliant with the rule requiring a majority independent board in the pre-SOX period and 
only 8% of the post-SOX forced CEO turnovers in firms that were compliant with the rule in the 
pre-SOX period.  
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3.2.3. Firm performance measures 
The stock performance measure I use is market-adjusted stock return. It is calculated as 
the firm’s monthly stock return minus the return on CRSP value-weighted market index 
cumulated over the 12-month period that ends one month before the CEO turnover announcement 
for firm-years associated with CEO turnovers and over the fiscal year for firm-years associated 
with no CEO turnover. This measure is chosen because recent CEO turnover studies find that 
only highly visible market benchmarks, such as the value-weighted S&P 500 stock return, are 
taken into account in CEO turnover decisions (see Jenter and Kanaan, 2010; Kaplan and Minton, 
2011). Consistent with these studies, in unreported results, I find that industry stock performance 
adjusted for the market is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover in my sample. This finding suggests that the industry component of stock performance is 
not completely filtered out when boards of directors make CEO retention decisions. Kaplan and 
Minton (2011) interpret this evidence as suggesting that boards of directors perform the 
additional role of punishing CEOs for industry-wide underperformance, similar to what happened 
in the takeover markets of the 1980s.    
The accounting performance measure I use is industry-adjusted ROA. ROA is defined as 
the annual earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by lagged total assets. The industry-
adjusted ROA is calculated as the change in a firm’s ROA from previous year to current year 
minus the median change in ROA in the firm’s Fama and French 48 industry over the annual 
period that best reflect the information available to the board when the CEO turnover decision is 
made. If the CEO turnover is announced in the first half of a fiscal year, then change in ROA is 
calculated over the fiscal year prior to the CEO turnover announcement. If the CEO turnover is 
announced in the second half of a fiscal year, then change is ROA is calculated over the year the 
CEO turnover is announced. For brevity, I invariably call the annual period over which the 
market-adjusted stock return or change in ROA is measured the year prior to CEO turnover in the 
paper.  
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3.2.4. Treatment and post dummies 
For each of the three new exchange listing rules I study, a firm is assigned to a treatment 
group if it was noncompliant with the listing rule in year 2001 and to a control group otherwise. 
To indicate membership in the treatment group associated with each of the three listing rules, I 
define three indicator variables Treat1, Treat2, and Treat3 where Treat1 equals 1 if a firm was 
noncompliant with the rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board in 2001 and 
0 otherwise, Treat2 equals to 1 if a firm was noncompliant with the rule requiring a fully 
independent nominating committee in 2001 and 0 otherwise, and Treat3 equals to 1 if a firm was 
noncompliant with the rule requiring a fully independent audit committee in 2001 and 0 
otherwise. Corresponding to each treatment dummy, I define an indicator variable for the period 
after the treatment, i.e. the period after the firm complied with the particular listing rule. For a 
treatment firm, the indicator variable equals to 0 in the years before the firm complied with the 
rule and equals to 1 in the years after the firm complied with the rule. For a control firm, I use 
year 2003 as the breaking year such that the indicator variable equals to 1 after 2003 (inclusive) 
and equals to 0 before 2003. As I discussed earlier, although noncompliant firms are required to 
comply with the new exchange listing rules in year 2004 and 2005, most firm complied with the 
new listing rules between 2002 and 2003. I denote the three indicator variables by Post1, Post2, 
and Post3 where Post1 denotes the period after a firm complied with the rule requiring a majority 
of independent directors on the board as so on. For brevity, I use the term pre-SOX to refer to the 
period before compliance and post-SOX to refer to the period after compliance in this paper.   
 
3.2.5. Control variables 
In this section, I introduce the control variables in Equation (1.1). They are included to 
control for any remaining differences in firm and governance characteristics between treatment 
and control firms and changes in these variables over time. Prior studies show that firm size and 
firm risk are positively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 
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2001; Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2009). So I control for firm size as measured by the natural 
log of sales in millions of dollars and firm risk as measured by the standard deviation of a firm’s 
monthly stock returns over the 12 months before CEO turnover. Denis, Denis, & Sarin (1997) 
argue that board’s monitoring of CEO is affected by a firm’s ownership structure so I control for 
percentage of voting power held by the CEO and a dummy for the presence of non-employee 
blockholders owning 1% or more of the shares on the board. Goyal and Park (2002) find that 
CEOs who are chairmen of the board are less likely to be removed and their removal is less 
sensitivity to firm performance so I control for a dummy for CEO-Chairman duality. CEOs who 
are founders or who are from the founding family usually have large influence over the board and 
also tend to have large ownership in the firm, which may affect the likelihood of CEO turnover 
and turnover-performance sensitivity (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). Hence, I include a 
dummy variable, Founder-heir CEO, which equals to 1 if the CEO is a member of the founding 
family and 0 otherwise. These CEOs are identified by reading firm’s proxy statements and new 
articles and through extensive search over the internet. Dual-class firms tend to have higher 
agency costs (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009) which may affect CEO turnover decisions so I 
include a dummy for dual-class firms. Lastly, I control for CEO age and CEO tenure measured by 
the natural log of one plus CEO tenure in years (Brickley, 2003; Goyal & Park, 2002).  I also 
tried specifications which include board size, industry competition, busy board, etc. However, 
they are insignificant in most specifications so I choose not to include them in the tables I report. 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of firms in my full sample in year 2001, which is 
the year I separate firms into treatment and control groups. The three treatment (control) groups 
in the table correspond to the three new listing rules I study. In this section, I summarize the 
compliance pattern with the three new listing rules of my sample firms in year 2001 and descrisbe 
how board structure changed in these firms over time.  
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for treatment and control firms in year 2001 
The table reports the summary firm and governance characteristics in year 2001 of firms in my full sample. The table is broken down by treatment and control 
firms defined by the new listing rules that require firms to have a majority-independent board (columns 1-3), a fully independent nominating committee (columns 
4-6), and a fully independent audit committee (columns 7-9). The numbers reported are sample means. Column (3), (6) and (9) contain p-values of t-tests for 
differences in means between the treatment and control group. All variables are defined in Appendix A.    
 Majority-independent board Nominating Committee Independence Auditing Committee Independence 
 Control Treatment p-value for 
t-test  
Control Treatment p-value for 
t-test  
Control Treatment p-value for 
t-test  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Total Assets ($ mil) 14362.00 11831.88 0.51 19014.73 11439.03 0.08 11414.17 18955.35 0.09 
Sales ($ mil) 6072.98 4391.18 0.10 8506.27 4417.95 0.00 4987.15 7168.88 0.03 
Tobin’s Q 1.95 2.10 0.09 1.78 2.07 0.00 1.97 2.02 0.57 
Earnings volatility 0.06 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.05 0.07 
G-index 9.57 8.34 0.00 10.06 8.92 0.00 9.34 9.18 0.34 
Dual Class firms 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.24 
Classified board 0.62 0.54 0.02 0.65 0.58 0.04 0.61 0.60 0.92 
CEO-Chairman 0.70 0.59 0.00 0.76 0.64 0.00 0.68 0.66 0.52 
Independent directors (%) 0.73 0.40 0.00 0.77 0.59 0.00 0.70 0.53 0.00 
Board size 9.59 9.04 0.00 10.03 9.20 0.00 9.31 9.78 0.01 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.26 0.46 0.00 0.19 0.36 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.00 
Insider-linked voting (%) 5.73 20.32 0.00 4.08 11.59 0.00 7.96 12.32 0.00 
Founder-Heir CEO 0.14 0.31 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.89 
CEO tenure 6.73 10.12 0.00 5.63 8.42 0.00 7.36 8.01 0.19 
CEO age 54.99 56.22 0.03 55.42 55.23 0.66 54.96 56.03 0.03 
N 966 314  389 891  885 395  
29 
 
3.3.1. Distribution of treatment and control firms 
Table 1.3 reports the distribution of firms by their compliance status with the three new 
listing rules. The table shows that the majority of the sample firms already had a majority of 
independent directors on board in 2001. For example, among the 1280 firms in the sample in 
2001, only 25% of them (314 firms) lacked a majority of independent directors on the board. This 
is consistent with empirical evidence that shows a trend toward more independent boards among 
U.S. public firms throughout the 1990s (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). Also, most firms (69%) 
already had a fully independent audit committee by 2001. This is mainly because NYSE and 
Nasdaq began to require listing firms to have fully independent audit committees in 1999 due to a 
listing rule change in December 1999. However, since the 1999 listing rule has a loose definition 
for independence and gives exemptions to some firms, we still observe a number of firms that did 
not have a fully independent audit committee in 2001. In contrast to the high compliance rate 
with the previous two listing rules, most firms did not have a fully independent nominating 
committee in 2001. According to the table, 70% of the sample firms (891 firms) were 
noncompliant with the rule that requires a fully independent nominating committee in 2001.  
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of treatment and control firms by listing on NYSE or 
Nasdaq. As we can see, a considerably higher percentage of NYSE firms than Nasdaq firms 
already had a majority of independent directors on the board or a fully independent nominating 
committee in year 2001. However, the percentage of firms that had a fully independent audit 
committee in 2001 is quite similar among NYSE and Nasdaq firms. Again, this is probably due to 
the implementation of the 1999 listing rule that required listing firms to have a fully independent 
audit committee.  
 
3.3.2. Change in board and board committee independence over time 
To see how independence of board and board committees changes from before to after 
the issuance of the new exchange listing rules, I plot the proportion of firms that were in
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Table 1.3: Distribution of firms by compliance with the three new exchange listing rules in year 
2001 
This table reports the frequency count (first row), row percent (parenthesis) and column percent (bracket) 
of sample firms by compliance status with three new listing rules – the rule on board independence, the rule 
on nominating committee independence and the rule on auditing committee independence – in year 2001. 
The sample consists of 1280 firms that have board data available on RiskMetrics in 2001 and have survived 
from 2001 through 2004 on the ExecuComp database. Firms without nominating (auditing) committee in 
2001 are classified as non-compliant with the rule on independent nominating (auditing) committee. 
 
  Nominating Committee 
Independence 
Audit Committee Independence Total 
  Compliant Non-compliant Compliant Non-compliant  
B
oa
rd
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
Compliant 
374 592 755 211 966 
(39%) (61%) (78%) (22%)  
[96%] [66%] [85%] [53%] [75%] 
Non-compliant 
15 299 130 184 314 
(5%) (95%) (41%) (59%)  
[4%] [34%] [15%] [47%] [25%] 
       
N
om
in
at
in
g 
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
Compliant 
- - 328 61 - 
- - (84%) (16%) - 
- - [37%] [15%] - 
Non-compliant 
- - 557 334 - 
- - (63%) (37%) - 
- - [63%] [85%] - 
Total  389 891 885 395 - 
  (30%) (70%) (69%) (31%) - 
 
 
Table 1.4: Distribution of firms by membership in treatment and control groups and by listing 
stock exchange in 2011 
This table reports the distribution of NYSE and Nasdaq firms in 2001 in the treatment and control groups 
defined by compliance status with the three new listing rules I study respectively. The sample consists of 
1280 firms that have board data available on RiskMetrics in 2001 and have survived from 2001 through 
2004 on the ExecuComp database. Column 1 and 2 are for the new listing rule on board independence, 
Column 2 and 3 are for the new listing rule on nominating committee independence, and Column 5 and 6 
are for new listing rule on audit committee independence. Number of firms, row percent and column 
percent are reported in each cell with the row percents in parentheses and column percents in brackets. 
 Board Indep Nom Com Indep Audit Com Indep 
 NYSE Nasdaq NYSE Nasdaq NYSE Nasdaq 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control 698 268 323 66 620 265 
 (72%) (28%) (83%) (17%) (70%) (30%) 
 [78%] [71%] [36%] [17%] [69%] [70%] 
       
Treatment 202 112 577 314 280 115 
 (64%) (36%) (65%) (35%) (71%) (29%) 
 [22%] [29%] [64%] [83%] [31%] [30%] 
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compliance with the new exchange listing rules over time in the top panel of Figure 1.1. Since 
board committee data in RiskMetrics is very spotty before year 1998, I begin the plot in year 
1998. As we can see, the proportion of firms with a majority of independent directors on the 
board and with a fully independent nominating, audit or compensation committee increases 
significantly from 1998 to 2008. There is a 5% increase in the proportion of firms with a majority 
independent board and a 14% increase in the proportion of firms with a fully independent 
nominating committee from 2002 to 2003, while the corresponding increase is 2% and 5% 
respectively from 2000 to 2001. As for the proportion of firms with a fully independent audit 
committee, the largest increase (11%) occurs between 1999 and 2000 and the next largest 
increase (5%) occurs between 2002 and 2003. The first increase reflects the change in NYSE and 
Nasdaq listing rules in December 1999 that required all listing firms to have fully independent 
audit committees. The second largest increase in proportion of firms with a fully independent 
audit committee occurred between 2002 and 2003. These findings support the use of year 2003 as 
the breaking year between the pre- and post-SOX period for control firms. In 2005 – the last year 
for mandatory compliance with all new exchange listing rules, the compliance rate with the 
board, nominating, audit and compensation committee rules is 92%, 76%, 85% and 83%, 
respectively. The lack of full compliance in year 2005 is due to two reasons. First, as 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) notice, the RiskMetrics definition of independent directors is 
stricter than that of NYSE and Nasdaq9
                                                     
9 Although affected firms should be determined based on the exchange definition, this is not practical because the size 
of business relations between directors and firms are generally unobservable. 
. For example, NYSE and Nasdaq define former 
employees as independent if three years has passed since their last employment in the firm ended; 
however, RiskMetrics considers all former employees non-independent. The NYSE and Nasdaq 
definition of independence also allows for the existence of “insignificant” business relations 
between independent directors and the firm, while RiskMetrics definition forbids any business 
relations between the director and the firm. Hence, not all independent directors according to the 
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Figure 1.1: Changes in board structure from 1996 to 2008 
The sample consists of all firms on ExecuComp and RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) that have board data for 
2001 available on RiskMetrics and survived from 2001 until at least 2004. The data source is the 
RiskMetrics database. The top panel shows the percentage of sample firms that have majority of 
independent directors on board, fully independent nominating, audit and compensation committees 
respectively from 1998 to 2008. The bottom panel shows the mean percentage of independent directors on 
board from 1996 to 2008 for the full sample and the subsamples of treatment firms and control firms 
classified by whether a firm had a majority of independent directors on board in 2001.  
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NYSE and Nadaq definition are independent according to the RiskMetrics definition. Second, 
under the NYSE and Nasdaq rule, controlled companies are exempted from the requirements for 
having a majority of independent directors on the board and a fully independent nominating and 
compensation committee. To the extent that I misclassify some compliant firms or “controlled 
companies” as treatment firms, this misclassification should bias against my finding significant 
differential effects of change in board structure on turnover-performance sensitivity in the 
treatment and control firms.  
The bottom panel of Figure 1.1 shows the mean percentage of independent directors from 
1996 to 2008 in firms with and without a majority of independent directors on the board in 2001. 
I observe that, in firms without a majority of independent directors on the board, i.e. treatment 
firms, the proportion of independent directors is relatively stable over time before 2001 but has 
increased significantly since 2001. On the other hand, in firms with a majority of independent 
directors on the board in 2001, the proportion of independent directors only has increased slightly 
over the entire sample period. This suggests that the new exchange listing rules have a significant 
effect on board structure change around the passage of SOX.   
 
3.3.3. How noncompliant firms complied with the new exchange listing rules  
To get a sense of how noncompliant firms complied with the new exchange listing 
requirements for board and board committee independence, I report in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 the 
difference ways in which my sample firms complied with the new exchange listing rules that 
require listing firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board and to have a fully 
independent nominating committee. To save space, I only report the pattern of compliance with 
these two listing rules. They are chosen because, as I show later, they have significant effects on 
changes in turnover-performance sensitivity in noncompliant firms.   
Table 1.5 Panel A reports three ways in which my sample firms that did not have a 
majority independent board in 2001 met the requirement by 2005.  I observe that 92% of the 
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firms became compliant by both adding new directors and dropping existing directors, while 5% 
of firms became compliant by retaining existing directors and adding new directors and the 
remaining 3% of firms became compliant by only dropping existing directors. Table 1.5 Panel B 
reports the mean and median number of different types of directors that arrived, remained or 
departed the boards of this sample of firms between 2001 and 2005. I observe that these firms add 
a mean (median) of 2.8 (3) independent directors, 1.2 (1) linked directors and 1.1 (1) employee 
directors.  At the same time, these firms replaced a mean (median) of 1.5 (1) independent 
directors, 1.7 (1) linked directors and 1.9 (1) employee directors. The mean (median) numbers of 
independent, linked and employee directors that remained on the board are 2.6 (3), 2.2 (2) and 2.2 
(2) respectively. Although the mean number of departures of linked and employee directors is 
only slightly higher than the mean number of departures of independent directors, the mean 
number of new independent directors is significantly higher than the mean number of new linked 
and employee directors. To get a sense of how much of a culture change this means for these 
firms, observe that the mean (median) number of new independent directors is similar to the mean 
(median) number of continuing independent directors and larger than the mean (median) number 
of continuing linked or employee directors. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that these changes in 
board composition would result in observable changes in board monitoring if independent 
directors are indeed more effective at monitoring the CEOs than gray and inside directors.     
Table 1.6 Panel A summarizes the different ways in which my sample firms that lacked a 
fully independent nominating committee in 2001 complied with this rule by 2005. Unlike in 
Table 1.5, I use the term “new” here to refer to directors who were new to the nominating 
committee and the term “continuing” to refer directors who continued to serve on the nominating 
committee from 2001 to 2005. These firms fall into two categories: 46% of firms had no 
nominating committee in 2001 and the rest 54% had a nominating committee that was not fully 
independent. Firms in the first category complied by appointing independent directors to a newly
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Table 1.5: How firms complied with the rule requiring a majority independent board between 
2001 and 2005 
The sample consists of 174 firms on RiskMetrics database that did not have majority of independent 
directors on the board in 2001 and survived to 2005. Panel A presents the percentage of firms that complied 
with the rule in different ways. Panel B presents the number, mean and median number of new arrivals, 
continuing directors and departures between 2001 and 2005 per firm. The means and medians are 
calculated over all firms with non-missing data in that category. “New” and “Continuing” are relative to the 
boards in 2001.  
Panel A: Compliance by Arrivals and Departures 
Only arrivals of new directors (%)  5% 
Only departures of existing directors (%)  3% 
Both arrivals of new directors and departures of existing directors (%)  92% 
 
Panel B: Compliance by Director Types 
 Arrival  Continuing  Departure 
Director type N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
            
Independent 163 2.8 3  167 2.6 3  112 1.5 1 
Linked 30 1.2 1  138 2.2 2  106 1.7 1 
Employee 54 1.1 1  168 2.2 2  97 1.9 1 
 
Table 1.6: How firms complied with the rule requiring a fully independent nominating committee 
between 2001 and 2005 
The sample consists of 693 firms on RiskMetrics database that did not have a fully independent nominating 
committee in 2001 and survived to 2005. Panel A presents the percentage of firms that complied with the 
rule in different ways by 2005. Panel B presents the number, mean and median number of new arrivals, 
continuing directors and departures between 2001 and 2005 per firm. The means and medians are 
calculated over all firms with non-missing data in that category.  “New” “Continuing” and “Departures” are 
relative to the nominating committee composition in 2001.  
Panel A: Compliance by Arrivals and Departures 
New nominating committee (%) 46% 
Only departures of existing nominating committee members (%) 3% 
Both new arrivals and departures of existing nominating committee members (%) 51% 
    
    
Panel B: Compliance by Director Type 
 N Mean Median 
Firms without nominating committee in 2001 
               New independent directors 312 3.6 3 
    
Firms with nominating committee in 2001 
               New independent directors 359 2.4 2 
               Continuing directors 319 1.9 2 
               Departures :    
                                   Independent 276 1.7 1 
                                   Linked 210 1.2 1 
                                   Employee 169 1.2 1 
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installed nominating committee. There is a mean (median) arrival of 3.6 (3) independent directors 
joining the nominating committee in these 312 firms as shown in Panel B of Table 1.6. Firms in 
the second category complied with the rule in one of two ways: (i) departures of existing 
committee members (3% of all noncompliant firms) and (ii) arrival of new committee members 
and departures of existing committee members (51% of all noncompliant firms). As Panel B of 
Table 1.6 shows, the mean (median) number of new committee members for this sample of 
noncompliant firms is 3 (3), the mean (median) number of continuing committee members is 1.9 
(2) and the mean (median) numbers of departures of independent, linked and employee 
committee members are 1.7 (1), 1.2 (1) and 1.2 (1) respectively. Again, these noncompliant firms 
went through economically significant changes in the composition of their nominating 
committees from 2001 to 2005.      
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Incidence and rate of CEO turnover by turnover type and pre- and post-SOX periods 
In this section, I describe the CEO turnover sample and provide some preliminary 
comparisons of the rate of CEO turnover in treatment and control firms in the pre- and post-SOX 
periods. The results based on the three matched samples are reported in Table 1.7 Panel A, B, and 
C respectively.  Within each panel, I report the incidences and rates of all CEO turnovers, forced 
CEO turnovers, and involuntary CEO turnovers by treatment and control firms and by pre- and 
post-SOX periods. The rate of CEO turnover is the annualized rate calculated as the incidence of 
CEO turnover divided by the total number of firm-year observations in the time period. I exclude 
CEO turnovers related to interim CEOs, co-CEOs, poor health, death, mergers and spin-offs. The 
pre- and post-SOX period are defined by the three indicator variables Post1, Post2 and Post3. 
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In panel A of Table 1.7, the treatment and control firms are defined by the new exchange 
rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board. I find that, in treatment firms, the 
rates of all three types of CEO turnover increase noticeably from the pre- to post-SOX period, 
while, in control firms, the corresponding rates change little. The rate of forced CEO turnover 
increases from 2.07 percent to 5.06 percent in treatment firms, which is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Likewise, the rate of involuntary CEO turnover increases from 6.29 percent to 8.58 
percent, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. When I compare control firms with 
treatment firms, I find that the rates of all three types of CEO turnover are significantly lower in 
treatment firms than in control firms during the pre-SOX period; however, these differences 
between treatment and control firms decrease and become statistically insignificant during the 
post-SOX period for all CEO turnovers and involuntary CEO turnovers, whereas the rate of 
forced CEO turnover increases significantly in treatment firms that the rate is significantly higher 
in treatment firms than in control firms during the post-SOX period. The evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that having a majority of independent directors improves board oversight. In 
particular, the evidence suggests that board oversight is weaker in treatment firms than in control 
firms in the pre-SOX period, but the treatment firms catch up with the control firms in the post-
SOX period. In fact, treatment firms fire a larger proportion of CEOs than control firms in the 
post-SOX period, which is probably because bad CEOs, who in the past were entrenched, are 
being disciplined in the post-SOX period. However, the evidence is only suggestive because I do 
not know if the increases in rate of CEO turnover are related to poor performance.  
In panel B of Table 1.7, I report results for the rule requiring a fully independent 
nominating committee. I find that the rate of forced CEO turnover increases significantly in 
treatment firms, while it barely increases in control firms. Also, the rate of involuntary CEO 
turnover is significantly lower in treatment firms than in control firms during the pre-SOX period, 
but the difference becomes smaller and statistically insignificant during the post-SOX period.
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Table 1.7: Incidence and rate of CEO turnover (1996-2008) 
The table shows the incidence and rate of CEO turnover in the matched sample defined by the new 
exchange rule on majority of independent directors (Panel A), fully independent nominating committees 
(Panel B) and fully independent audit committees (Panel C) respectively. The pre- and post-SOX periods 
are defined using firm-specific post-SOX indicators as explained in Section 3.2 and Appendix A. Three 
definitions of CEO turnovers are used – all CEO turnovers, forced CEO turnovers and involuntary CEO 
turnovers. Forced CEO turnover is classified using the method in Parrino (1997). A CEO turnover is 
defined as involuntary if the age of the departing CEO is under 65 and she does not take a CEO position in 
another S&P 1500 firm within one year of the initial turnover announcement. I compare the mean rate of 
CEO turnover between the pre- and post-SOX periods within each treatment and control group and use 
superscripts ***, **, * to denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, for t-test of 
difference in the means. I also compare the mean rate of CEO turnover between control and treatment firms 
within each time period and the p-values for t-test of difference in the means are reported in the last column 
of the table.  
  Incidence  Rate  p-values 
Type of turnover Period Control Treatment  Control Treatment  (3) – (4) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
         
Panel A: Majority of independent directors 
         
All CEO turnover Pre-SOX 478 133  11.93 9.84  0.03 
 Post-SOX 322 79  11.87 11.11  0.57 
         
Forced CEO turnover Pre-SOX 132 28  3.29 2.07***  0.01 
 Post-SOX 88 36  3.24 5.06  0.04 
         
Involuntary CEO turnover  Pre-SOX 384 85  9.58 6.29**  0.00 
 Post-SOX 264 61  9.73 8.58  0.33 
         
Panel B: Fully independent nominating committee 
         
All CEO turnover Pre-SOX 263 374  12.66 11.43  0.18 
 Post-SOX 173 199  12.95 11.20  0.14 
         
Forced CEO turnover Pre-SOX 67 90  3.23 2.75*  0.32 
 Post-SOX 46 65  3.44 3.66  0.75 
         
Involuntary CEO turnover  Pre-SOX 202 272  9.73 8.31  0.08 
 Post-SOX 139 159  10.40 8.95  0.18 
         
Panel C: Fully independent audit committee 
         
All CEO turnover Pre-SOX 461 205  11.69 11.02  0.45 
 Post-SOX 317 111  11.85 11.53  0.79 
         
Forced CEO turnover Pre-SOX 111 56  2.82 3.00  0.68 
 Post-SOX 93 32  3.48 3.32  0.82 
         
Involuntary CEO turnover Pre-SOX 348 155  8.83 8.33  0.53 
 Post-SOX 256 85  9.57 8.83  0.49 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that rate of forced and involuntary CEO turnover has 
increased more in treatment firms than in control firms. 
In panel C of Table 1.7, I report results for the rule requiring a fully independent audit 
committee. I find that the rates of all three types of CEO turnover increase slightly from the pre- 
to post-SOX period in all firms, but the increases are not significantly different between treatment 
and control firms. Also, there is no evidence that the rate of CEO turnover is significantly 
different between the treatment and control firms for any of the three types of CEO turnover.  
 
4.2. Regression analysis on rate of forced CEO turnover 
In this section, I carry the univariate analysis in last section one step further by 
conducting a difference-in-difference analysis of the effect of the new exchange listing rules on 
rate of forced CEO in a multivariate setting. For this analysis, I purposely leave out the three 
interaction terms between Treat, Post and firm performance in Equation (1.1) to evaluate what 
the effect on the rate of forced CEO turnover would be if the turnover-performance sensitivity did 
not change. The purpose of this analysis is to gain additional insights into what have changed 
from before to after SOX not to test the main hypotheses of this paper, which I leave to the next 
three sections.  
The dependent variable in these logit regressions is the indicator for forced CEO turnover 
and the key explanatory variable is the interaction between Treat and Post. Since most of the 
violation-related forced CEO turnovers in my sample happened under outside pressure, it is 
unclear if it reflects quality of board monitoring. To be conservative, I exclude violation-related 
forced CEO turnover from this analysis. I control for both stock and accounting performance to 
make sure that any difference in rate of forced CEO turnover between the treatment and control 
firms or any change in rate of forced CEO turnover from pre- to post-SOX period is not simply 
driven by difference or change in firm performance. In addition, I control for a list of other 
variables that have been shown in prior literature to affect the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
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They include firm size, firm risk, CEO voting power, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO tenure, CEO 
founder status, the presence of non-employee blockholders on the board and dual class firms. For 
each of the three new exchange listing rules that I study, I estimate two empirical specifications 
using the matched sample for that listing rule. In the first specification, I only include the 
treatment effect related to the listing rule being studied, for example the treatment due to the rule 
requiring a majority-independent board; however, in the second specification, I also control for 
the treatment effects related to the other two listing rules. The results of these logit regressions are 
reported in Table 1.8. Column 1 shows that the rate of forced CEO turnover increased 
significantly in firms that were forced to adopt a majority of independent directors on the board 
after SOX relative to firms that already had a majority-independent board before SOX. The 
coefficient of the interaction between Treat1 and Post1 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Besides, the coefficient of Treat1 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, 
suggesting firms that did not have a majority of independent directors on the board before SOX 
had a lower rate of forced CEO turnover than firms that did before SOX. In column 2, I also 
control for whether a firm was compliant with the rules that require a fully independent 
nominating and auditing committee before SOX. As we can see, the result still holds with the 
interaction between Treat1 and Post1 being positive and still statistically significant (at the 10% 
level).  In columns 3 and 4, I conduct similar analysis but on the rule that requires listing firms to 
have a fully independent nominating committee. The key coefficient is the interaction between 
Treat2 and Post2. Although it has a positive sign, it is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. In columns 5 and 6, I examine the rule that requires listing firms to have a fully 
independent audit committee. The key coefficient on the interaction between Treat3 and Post3 is 
not statistically significant either. Overall, when turnover-performance sensitivity in treatment 
and control firms are forced to be the same, I find a significant increase in rate of forced CEO 
turnover after SOX in firms that lacked a majority-independent board before SOX. However, no 
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Table 1.8: The effect of the new exchange listing rules on the rate of forced CEO turnover 
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions that examine the treatment effect of three 
listing rules on the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. The dependent variable is an indicator for forced 
CEO turnover in year t, while the independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are all measured in 
year t-1. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the matched sample based on the rule requiring a majority-
independent board, columns 3 and 4 are estimated using the matched sample based on the rule requiring a 
fully independent nominating committee, and columns 5 and 6 are estimated using the matched sample 
based on the rule requiring a fully independent audit committee. I exclude CEOs who were fired for 
violations. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns where industry is defined by Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industry groups. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 Majority of Independent 
Directors 
Fully independent 
nominating committee 
Fully independent audit 
committee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Treat1 -0.515* -0.449  -0.415  -0.213 
 (0.056) (0.110)  (0.242)  (0.443) 
Post1 × Treat1 0.783** 0.756*  0.787  0.573 
 (0.032) (0.056)  (0.125)  (0.153) 
Treat2  -0.259 -0.264 -0.223  -0.222 
  (0.158) (0.154) (0.235)  (0.222) 
Post2 × Treat2  0.119 0.197 0.141  -0.016 
  (0.684) (0.488) (0.632)  (0.955) 
Treat3  0.025  -0.035 0.014 0.103 
  (0.904)  (0.877) (0.939) (0.594) 
Post3 × Treat3  -0.017  -0.142 -0.083 -0.183 
  (0.960)  (0.714) (0.788) (0.579) 
Ret -2.261*** -2.258*** -1.984*** -1.992*** -2.253*** -2.246*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in EBIT -3.770** -3.719** -4.435** -4.332** -4.908*** -4.854*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log of sales 0.053 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.072 0.060 
 (0.354) (0.424) (0.441) (0.439) (0.198) (0.283) 
Stock volatility 5.256*** 5.339*** 6.973*** 7.029*** 4.775*** 4.948*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Age -0.017 -0.017* -0.023** -0.023** -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.107) (0.099) (0.036) (0.043) (0.213) (0.200) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.141*** -1.125*** -1.221*** -1.243*** -1.288*** -1.254*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Log CEO tenure 0.140 0.145 0.201* 0.206* 0.133 0.144 
 (0.230) (0.214) (0.079) (0.073) (0.228) (0.199) 
CEO-Chairman -0.285* -0.297* -0.217 -0.227 -0.356** -0.373** 
 (0.094) (0.079) (0.197) (0.192) (0.028) (0.024) 
CEO voting -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.121*** -0.117*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Non-emp block 0.174 0.193 0.210 0.213 0.247 0.252 
 (0.303) (0.253) (0.222) (0.224) (0.127) (0.126) 
Dual class firm 0.315 0.333 0.346 0.359 0.058 0.091 
 (0.245) (0.219) (0.249) (0.233) (0.838) (0.753) 
Constant -3.383*** -3.195*** -3.632*** -3.617*** -3.891*** -3.653*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 7089 7089 6890 6890 7703 7703 
Chi sq 254.8 257.7 245.6 267.1 268.7 277.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.147 0.148 0.153 0.154 0.157 0.159 
42 
 
such evidence is found in firms that did not have a fully independent nominating or audit 
committee before SOX. The stronger results in columns 1 and 2 are expected because, as shown 
in Table 1.2, 95% of firms without a majority-independent board lacked a fully independent 
nominating committee before SOX, on the other hand, 66% of the firms without a fully 
independent nominating committee already had a majority-independent board before SOX. To the 
extent that board and board committee independence are both important for board monitoring, 
firms without a majority-independent board on average should have poorer governance than firms 
without a fully independent nominating committee before SOX, and consequently the 
improvement in corporate governance is expected to be greater after SOX.  The results provide 
some evidence that increases in board and board committee independence lead to improved board 
monitoring.  
However, it is important to note that the results above only provide corroborating not 
concluding evidence on the main hypotheses of this paper. In particular, lack of evidence of a 
significant increase in rate of forced CEO turnover after SOX does not mean a lack of 
improvement in board monitoring. This is because CEOs anticipating more intensive monitoring 
after SOX may exert more effort after SOX and thus reduce the occurrences of CEO firings that 
would otherwise prevail after SOX. Therefore, in the next three sections, I estimate the full model 
of Equation (1.1) to examine the effect of the new listing rules on change in sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance, which is not affected by change in CEO effort, to test the 
main hypotheses of this paper.  
 
4.3. Majority-independent board and turnover-performance sensitivity 
In this section, I investigate the differential effect of the new exchange rule that requires 
listing firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board on the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance in treatment and control firms. To do this, I estimate the full 
model in Equation (1.1). The coefficient of most interests to us is 𝛽12  because it captures the 
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additional effect of the board structure change on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance 
in treatment firms relative to that in control firms. Firm performance is measured by market-
adjusted return in columns 1 and 2, while it is measured by industry-adjusted change in ROA in 
columns 3 and 4. For each performance measure, I estimate two specifications. The first 
specification only includes the treatment effect of the new listing rule requiring a majority of 
independent directors on the board. In the second specification, I expand Equation (1.1) to also 
include treatment effects of the other two listing rules – the rules on nominating and audit 
committee independence. If the distribution of firms with or without an independent nominating 
committee or audit committee in 2001 is largely random across the treatment and control firms 
defined by the rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board, then estimates 
from the first specification are still unbiased. However, if the distribution of firms with and 
without an independent nominating committee or audit committee is correlated with membership 
in the treatment group, then estimates from the first specification may capture more than one 
treatment effect. The main purpose of estimating the second specification is to check the 
robustness of the results in the first specification to controlling for the effects of the other two 
listing rules. 
The results are reported in Table 1.9. As expected, I find a statistically significant 
negative coefficient on firm performance in all the columns. Furthermore, the coefficient of most 
interest to us – the coefficient on the triple interaction of Treat1, Post1 and Performance – has 
negative sign (negative sign means that the negative relation between firm performance and 
forced CEO turnover is strengthened) in all columns and is statistically significant in columns 1, 
3, and 4 under two-sided tests and in column 2 under a one-sided test. The evidence suggests that, 
after controlling for time trends, forced CEO turnover in treatment firms has become more 
sensitive to firm performance after SOX. Furthermore, this result does not appear to be driven by 
change in the other two listing rules.  
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Table 1.9: The effect of the rule requiring a majority independent board on sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance (1996-2007) 
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator 
for forced CEO turnover in year t. The independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are all 
measured in year t-1. The sample consists of all observations from 1996 to 2007 in the matched sample 
defined by the new exchange rule requiring majority of independent directors on boards. I exclude forced 
CEO turnovers that resulted from punishment for violations because poor firm performance is not the main 
reason for these turnovers and treatment firms contain a disproportionately higher fraction of such type of 
forced CEO turnovers. In column 1 and 2, Performance is measured by market-adjusted stock returns, 
while in column 3 and 4 by industry-adjusted change in ROA, both measures are defined in Appendix A. 
Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns. Industries are defined by Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industry groups. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
VARIABLES Market-adjusted return Industry-adjusted change in ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Performance -2.751*** -3.347*** -7.054*** -10.889*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Treat1 -0.593 -0.535 -0.483* -0.484* 
 (0.125) (0.146) (0.072) (0.080) 
Post1 × Treat1 0.218 0.255 0.378 0.455 
 (0.676) (0.638) (0.364) (0.320) 
Treat1 × Performance -0.133 -0.193 3.211 2.261 
 (0.877) (0.823) (0.510) (0.653) 
Post1 × Performance 1.035 1.199 -6.014** 10.785 
 (0.161) (0.564) (0.049) (0.225) 
Post1 × Treat1 × Performance -2.877* -2.395 -20.858** -21.516** 
 (0.064) (0.135) (0.017) (0.031) 
Treat2  0.078  -0.190 
  (0.761)  (0.332) 
Post2 × Treat2  -0.392  0.053 
  (0.293)  (0.862) 
Treat2 × Performance  1.392*  6.476* 
  (0.052)  (0.064) 
Post2 × Performance  2.589**  8.668 
  (0.046)  (0.271) 
Post2 × Treat2 × Performance  -3.289**  -7.207 
  (0.013)  (0.232) 
Treat3  -0.218  0.071 
  (0.441)  (0.740) 
Post3 × Treat3  0.257  -0.128 
  (0.557)  (0.739) 
Treat3 × Performance  -0.800  -0.232 
  (0.263)  (0.954) 
Post3 × Performance  -1.299  -21.856** 
  (0.511)  (0.031) 
Post3 × Treat3 × Performance  1.259  2.563 
  (0.407)  (0.755) 
Log of sales 0.050 0.051 0.091 0.090 
 (0.393) (0.382) (0.118) (0.125) 
Stock volatility 4.856*** 4.994*** 6.864*** 6.748*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.122) (0.137) (0.152) (0.125) 
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Table 1.9, continued 
Founder-Heir CEO -1.341*** -1.305*** -1.394*** -1.397*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.143 0.140 0.152 0.166 
 (0.229) (0.243) (0.203) (0.169) 
CEO-Chairman -0.313* -0.321* -0.351** -0.374** 
 (0.064) (0.056) (0.036) (0.026) 
CEO voting power -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.118*** -0.113*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.172 0.195 0.256 0.276 
 (0.315) (0.252) (0.136) (0.109) 
Dual class firm 0.345 0.337 0.283 0.271 
 (0.208) (0.222) (0.302) (0.326) 
Constant -3.322*** -3.363*** -3.619*** -3.507*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 7095 7095 7087 7087 
Chi sq 247.0 272.7 245.3 255.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.153 0.160 0.117 0.122 
 
 
For other variables, I find that the coefficient on Treat1 is negative in all columns and is 
statistically significant in columns 3 and 4. The negative sign suggests that the rate of forced CEO 
turnover is lower in treated firms than in control firms during the pre-SOX period. The sign and 
statistical significance of the control variables are in general consistent with prior findings and 
economic intuition. For example, the negative coefficients on stock returns and accounting 
performance suggest that CEOs in firms with poor performance are more likely to be fired 
(Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). The positive coefficient on stock return 
volatility suggests that CEOs in riskier firms are more likely to be fired, probably because a bad 
outcome that would trigger a forced CEO turnover is more likely to occur in these firms. 
Consistent with the view that CEOs who have more power and influence over the board are less 
likely to be fired, I find that CEOs who are founders or heirs of founders are less likely to be 
fired, CEOs who have more voting power are less likely to be fired, and CEOs who are chairmen 
are also less likely to be fired.  
To get a sense of the economic significance of the results, I estimate logit regressions that 
are similar to those in column 1 and 3 of Table 1.9 except I replace year dummies by a post-SOX 
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dummy which equals to one in the post-SOX period and zero otherwise. Based on the parameter 
estimates of these two models, I compute the implied probability of a CEO being fired when 
market-adjusted stock return (industry-adjusted change in ROA) is at the 75th percentile of the 
sample and the 25th percentile of the sample respectively, while holding all other variables at the 
sample means. I find that when the market-adjusted stock return declines from 24% (the 75th 
percentile) to -22% (the 25th percentile), the implied annual probability of being fired in treatment 
firms during the pre-SOX period goes up from 0.47% to 1.67% - a rise of 1.2%. However, in the 
post-SOX period, the implied probability of being fired goes up from 0.6% to 4.46% - a rise of 
3.86%, which is three times the rise in the pre-SOX period. When I measure firm performance by 
industry-adjusted change in ROA, the implied probability of being fired goes from 1.23% to 
1.37% when the accounting performance measure declines from 2.3% (the 75th percentile) to -
1.3% (the 25th percentile) in treatment firms in the pre-SOX period – a change of merely 0.14%. 
In the post-SOX period, the implied probability of being fired goes from 1.19% to 3.11% – a rise 
of 1.92% – for the same drop in accounting performance. These increases in sensitivity are 
economically quite significant relative to those in the pre-SOX period. Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
economic effects using a bar chart.   
 
4.4. Nominating committee independence and turnover-performance sensitivity 
In this section, I study the treatment effect of the new listing rule that requires nominating 
committees to be comprised entirely of independent directors. The sample for this analysis is the 
matched sample of treatment and control firms as defined by the independent nominating 
committee requirement, where the treatment firms are matched to control firms in the same 
industry and with close propensity scores.   
In Table 1.10, I find that the coefficient on the interaction between Treat2 and 
Performance is positive in all the columns and is statistically significant in columns 3 and 4 
where firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted change in ROA. The positive sign is
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Figure 1.2: Economic effects of the rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the 
board 
The following graphs show the implied probability of a hypothetical CEO in the average firm of the sample 
being fired when firm performance goes from the 75th percentile of the sample to 25th percentile by pre- and 
post-SOX period and firm types. The estimates are based on model 1 and 3 in Table 1.8 with year dummies 
replaced by a post-SOX dummy. Treatment and control firms are defined by the rule that requires a 
majority dependent board. Firm performance equals to market-adjusted stock return over the year prior to 
CEO turnover in the top panel and equals to industry-adjusted change in ROA in the bottom panel. 
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Table 1.10: The effect of the rule requiring a fully independent nominating committee on 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance (1996-2007) 
The table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an 
indicator for forced CEO turnover in year t. The independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are 
all measured in year t-1. The sample consists of all observations from 1996 to 2007 in the matched sample 
defined by the new exchange rule on independent nominating committees. I exclude forced CEO turnovers 
that resulted from punishment for violations because poor firm performance is usually not the main reason 
for these turnovers and treatment firms contain a disproportionately higher fraction of such type of forced 
CEO turnovers. In column 1 and 2, Performance is measured by market-adjusted stock returns, while in 
column 3 and 4 by industry-adjusted change in ROA, both measures are defined in Appendix A. Year and 
industry fixed effects are included in all columns. Industries are defined by Fama and French (1997) 48 
industry groups. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
VARIABLES Market-adjusted return Industry-adjusted change in ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Performance -2.728*** -2.509*** -11.484*** -11.366*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treat2 -0.144 -0.019 -0.116 -0.099 
 (0.557) (0.939) (0.557) (0.621) 
Post2 × Treat2 -0.277 -0.354 -0.017 -0.003 
 (0.433) (0.333) (0.957) (0.993) 
Treat2 × Performance 0.651 0.892 8.288** 8.384** 
 (0.324) (0.176) (0.015) (0.013) 
Post2 × Performance 1.677** 2.014 -3.637 6.869 
 (0.037) (0.142) (0.396) (0.348) 
Post2 × Treat2 × Performance -3.172*** -3.246*** -13.012** -9.926* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.089) 
Treat1  -0.904  -0.457 
  (0.206)  (0.186) 
Post1 × Treat1  0.522  0.007 
  (0.568)  (0.993) 
Treat1 × Performance  -1.029  5.601 
  (0.493)  (0.372) 
Post1 × Performance  1.096  19.049** 
  (0.656)  (0.016) 
Post1 × Treat1 × Performance  -2.401  -46.722*** 
  (0.322)  (0.002) 
Treat3  -0.437  -0.041 
  (0.225)  (0.866) 
Post3 × Treat3  0.377  -0.062 
  (0.447)  (0.887) 
Treat3 × Performance  -1.336  -1.626 
  (0.116)  (0.703) 
Post3 × Performance  -1.691  -30.732*** 
  (0.553)  (0.002) 
Post3 × Treat3 × Performance  2.500*  10.159 
  (0.084)  (0.269) 
Log of sales 0.039 0.054 0.080 0.091 
 (0.519) (0.377) (0.187) (0.143) 
Stock volatility 6.843*** 6.784*** 8.124*** 8.069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.022* 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.041) (0.064) 
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Table 1.10, continued 
Founder-Heir CEO -1.473*** -1.466*** -1.616*** -1.814*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.209* 0.208* 0.214* 0.228* 
 (0.073) (0.083) (0.064) (0.054) 
CEO-Chairman -0.226 -0.254 -0.244 -0.290* 
 (0.179) (0.144) (0.141) (0.093) 
CEO voting power -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.122*** -0.115*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.206 0.213 0.264 0.287 
 (0.230) (0.230) (0.129) (0.109) 
Dual class firm 0.343 0.396 0.352 0.318 
 (0.257) (0.198) (0.238) (0.309) 
Constant -3.620*** -3.536*** -3.867*** -4.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 6896 6896 6888 6888 
Chi sq 247.3 282.3 242.1 274.9 
Pseudo R-squared 0.159 0.166 0.133 0.144 
 
 
consistent with forced CEO turnover being less sensitive to firm performance in treatment firms 
than in control firms in the pre-SOX period. The coefficient of most interest to us – the 
coefficient on the triple interaction of Treat2, Post2 and Performance – is negative and 
statistically significant in all the columns, suggesting a larger increase in sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to stock return and accounting performance in treatment firms than in control firms 
during the post-SOX period, and this effect is robust to controlling for the potential confounding 
effects of the other two listing rules. I also find that the coefficient on the interaction of Treat1, 
Post1 and Performance is negative in columns 2 and 4 and is statistically significant in column 4, 
which is consistent with the findings in Table 1.9. All the control variables have expected signs 
and most are also statistically significant. Overall, the evidence shows that the requirement for a 
fully independent nominating committee has significantly increased the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance in firms that lacked a nominating committee or lacked a fully 
independent nominating committee during the pre-SOX period. 
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Figure 1.3: Economic effects of the rule requiring a fully independent nominating committee 
The following graphs show the implied probability of a hypothetical CEO in the average firm of the sample 
being fired when firm performance goes from the 75th percentile of the sample to 25th percentile by pre- and 
post-SOX period and firm types. The estimates are based on model 1 and 3 in Table 1.8 with year dummies 
replaced by a post-SOX dummy. Firm performance equals to market-adjusted stock return over the year 
prior to CEO turnover in the top panel and equals to industry-adjusted change in ROA in the bottom panel. 
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To assess the economic significance of the results, I perform similar analysis as I do in 
last section except this analysis is based on Table 1.9. For the treatment firms in this sample, I 
find that the implied annual probability of being fired during the pre-SOX period goes up from 
0.82% to 2.03% – a rise of 1.21% when the market-adjusted stock return declines from 24% (the 
75th percentile of the sample) to -22% (the 25th percentile of the sample); while the corresponding 
probability of being fired increases from 0.86% to 3.62% in the post-SOX period – a rise of 
2.76%.  When I measure firm performance by industry-adjusted change in ROA, the implied 
probability of being fired goes from 1.5% to 1.64% when the accounting performance measure 
declines from 2.3% (the 75th percentile of the sample) to -1.3% (the 25th percentile of the sample) 
in the pre-SOX period – a change of merely 0.14%. In the post-SOX period; while in the post-
SOX period, the corresponding implied probability of being fired goes from 1.37% to 2.65% – a 
rise of 1.28%. These increases in sensitivity are also economically significant on relative terms. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the economic effects using bar charts. 
 
4.5. Audit and compensation committee independence and turnover-performance sensitivity 
In this section, I study the effects of the new exchange listing rules that require publicly 
listed firms to have a fully independent audit and compensation committee. Unlike change in 
independence of the overall board and the nominating committee, it is less clear how change in 
independence of the audit and the compensation committee would directly affect the board’s 
CEO replacement decisions. However, moving towards a fully independent audit committee may 
have an indirect effect on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance. This is 
because the move may improve the quality of reported accounting numbers. If the board 
consequently puts higher weight on the firm’s accounting performance when making forced CEO 
turnover decisions than they did before the change, then we can expect to observe an increase in 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance. If the effect on quality of reported 
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accounting numbers spills over to the stock market and reduces noises in stock prices, then we 
may even observe an increase in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock performance 
following the change. In this section, I test this hypothesis.  
There is no strong reason to believe that moving towards a fully independent 
compensation committee should systematically affect sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance. Its direct effect should be on CEO compensation. As a matter of fact, Guthrie et al. 
(2010) do find a significant change in CEO compensation associated with the mandatory change 
in composition of compensation committee, though the direction of the change is difficult to 
interpret based on CEO compensation evidence alone. However, I still test the effect of 
independence of compensation committee on turnover-performance sensitivity here. If I do not 
find the rule to have a significant effect on turnover-performance sensitivity, it would reassure us 
that my previous findings are driven by changes in the most relevant aspects of board structure, 
rather than by some unobservable changes in internal governance that happen to be correlated 
with the general change in board structure.         
The logit regressions in this section are estimated using matched samples constructed by 
matching industry and propensity score. I have discussed the matched sample for the rule 
requiring a fully independent audit committee in Section 3.1. Following a similar procedure and 
propensity score model, I construct a matched sample for the rule requiring a fully independent 
compensation committee. To save space, the details are not reported. Table 1.11 reports 
difference-in-difference results on the effect of the mandatory changes in composition of audit 
and compensation committees on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. The 
structure of the analysis is similar to that in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. I denote the treatment associated 
with the rule requiring fully independent compensation committees by Treat4 and the 
corresponding firm-specific post-SOX indicator by Post4.  Treat4 and Post4 are defined similarly 
to Treat3 and Post3. I find that the coefficient on the triple interaction of Post3 (Post4), Treat3 
(Treat4) and Performance is statistically insignificant in all the columns. Hence, there is no
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Table 1.11: The effect of the rules requiring a fully independent audit and compensation 
committee on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance (1996-2007) 
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator 
for forced CEO turnover in year t. Column 1 and 3 examine the rule that requires fully independent audit 
committee, while column 2 and 4 examine the rule that requires fully independent compensation 
committee. In column 1 and 2, Performance is measured by market-adjusted stock returns, while in column 
3 and 4 by industry-adjusted change in ROA, both measures are defined in Appendix A. The independent 
variables are defined in Appendix A and are all measured in year t-1. The sample consists of all 
observations from 1996 to 2007 in the matched sample defined by the new exchange rule on audit 
committee independence. I exclude forced CEO turnovers that resulted from punishment for violations 
because poor firm performance is normally not the main reason for these turnovers and treatment firms 
contain a disproportionately higher fraction of such type of forced CEO turnovers. Year and industry fixed 
effects are included in all columns. Industries are defined by Fama and French (1997) 48 industry groups. 
The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively.      
VARIABLES Market-adjusted return Industry-adjusted change in ROA 
 Audit Compensation Audit Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Performance -2.565*** -2.309*** -7.255*** -7.570*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Treat3 -0.071  0.088  
 (0.797)  (0.653)  
Post3 × Treat3 -0.132  -0.291  
 (0.773)  (0.412)  
Treat3 × Performance -0.244  0.811  
 (0.736)  (0.828)  
Post3 × Performance 0.040  -11.010***  
 (0.955)  (0.001)  
Post3 × Treat3 × Performance -0.319  -3.972  
 (0.864)  (0.607)  
Treat4  -0.206  0.019 
  (0.510)  (0.922) 
Post14× Treat4  0.514  0.224 
  (0.207)  (0.467) 
Treat4 × Performance  -0.250  4.721 
  (0.752)  (0.202) 
Post4× Performance  -0.404  -8.612*** 
  (0.565)  (0.007) 
Post4 × Treat4 × Performance  0.942  -3.790 
  (0.538)  (0.572) 
Log of sales 0.065 0.052 0.113** 0.098* 
 (0.255) (0.318) (0.049) (0.064) 
Stock volatility 4.507*** 4.937*** 6.666*** 6.439*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.013 -0.019* -0.012 -0.018* 
 (0.188) (0.050) (0.250) (0.077) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.527*** -1.378*** -1.552*** -1.395*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.135 0.060 0.144 0.071 
 (0.230) (0.579) (0.194) (0.514) 
CEO-Chairman -0.357** -0.249 -0.405** -0.279* 
 (0.026) (0.121) (0.012) (0.080) 
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Table 1.11, continued 
CEO voting power -0.132*** -0.102*** -0.132*** -0.104*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.252 0.180 0.314* 0.244 
 (0.118) (0.222) (0.054) (0.106) 
Dual class firm 0.058 0.337 0.059 0.325 
 (0.839) (0.190) (0.836) (0.229) 
Constant -3.666*** -3.198*** -4.101*** -3.555*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 7709 8093 7701 8085 
Chi sq 256.7 258.3 267.2 254.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.158 0.145 0.129 0.115 
 
 
evidence that the change in the independence of audit (compensation) committee has any 
significant effect on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, regardless of whether 
firm performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return or by industry-adjusted change in 
ROA. 
 
4.6. Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and independence of audit committee  
The insignificant result in last section rejects my hypothesis about a potential indirect 
effect of change in audit committee independence on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance. In this section, I discuss the interpretation of this result against the regulatory 
background around the mandatory change in audit committee composition.    
First, I note that the new exchange listing rule on audit committee independence is not the 
first such listing requirement for firms listed on NYSE and Nasdaq. Actually, NYSE and Nasdaq 
issued their first listing requirement regarding audit committee independence in December 1999 
in response to SEC’s calls for improvement in the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. 
According to that listing requirement, listed firms are required to maintain audit committees with 
at least three directors "all of whom have no relationship to the company that may interfere with 
the exercise of their independence from management and the company” (NYSE Listed Company 
Manual 303.01 [B][2][a]).  Although the statement implies that each member of the audit 
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committee should be independent, the definition of independence was vague and, more 
importantly, that rule allowed stock exchanges to grant exemptions to some firms under 
“exceptional and limited circumstances”. Compared to the listing requirement in 1999, the new 
exchange listing requirement in 2003 impose a much clearer and stricter definition of independent 
director and limit exemptions to only two special situations – newly-listed companies and 
overlapping board relationships. Thus, the treatment group in the sample of this paper consists 
mainly of firms exempt from the 1999 listing requirement and firms that complied with the 1999 
listing requirement but not all audit committee members meet the stricter independent director 
definition of the new exchange listing rule of 2003. Given this earlier listing requirement, the 
number of potential treatment firms in my sample is greatly reduced and a weaker result is 
partially expected.  
Second, Section 302 of SOX became effective on August 29, 2002, which is before 
changes in most audit committees took place. Section 302 requires CEO and CFO to certify that 
their firm’s financial reports fairly represents, in all material aspects, the financial condition and 
results of operations of the firm, and that their internal “disclosure controls and procedures” are 
effective10
                                                     
10 Section 906 is similar to Section 302 but the scope of the latter is a little wider than the former because it also 
requires CEOs and CFOs to certify the effectiveness of “disclosure controls and procedures”. Section 906 details 
criminal penalties for knowingly certifying fraudulent financial reports, while Section 302 details civil penalties for 
intentional false certification. Section 906 became effective on July 30, 2002, while Section 302 became effective on 
August 29, 2002.  
. The essence of the certification requirements is to make the CEO and CFO be 
ultimately responsible for the quality of a firm’s disclosure controls and financial reporting. 
Section 302 affects all publicly listed firms not just the treatment firms. Its effect on quality of 
reported accounting numbers and consequently the strength of the relation between forced CEO 
turnover and accounting performance might be quite significant such that the subsequent changes 
in audit committee composition only have limited incremental effect. This is another potential 
reason why we could fail to find significant indirect effect of audit committee independence on 
the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance.  
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Interestingly, in Table 1.11, the coefficient on the interaction of Post3 (Post4) and 
Change in ROA is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that during the post-SOX 
period forced CEO turnover is more sensitive to accounting performance in all firms in the two 
matched samples. If implementation of section 302 of SOX is responsible for this observed 
increase in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance in Table 1.11, then I 
should see a structural change in the turnover-performance relation from 2003 onward. Also, 
since Section 302 applies to all publicly listed firms, the structural change should be observed in 
all firms not just the matched treatment and control firms in Table 1.11. To shed some light on 
this conjecture, I estimate a logit regression where the dependent variable is the indicator for 
forced CEO turnover and the explanatory variables are an indicator for the post-2003 period and 
its interaction with Change in ROA using all firms in the full sample. The post-2003 indicator, 
Post2003, equals to 1 in years after 2003 (inclusive) and 0 otherwise. The regression results are 
reported in column 1 of Table 1.12. The coefficient on the interaction of Post2003 and the 
Change in ROA is indeed significantly negative, suggesting an increase in the sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnover to accounting performance after 2003 in all firms. Since many firms also 
changed their board structure in year 2003 to comply with the new listing rules, the evidence in 
column 1 is not sufficient to establish that the change in turnover-performance sensitivity is due 
to the implementation of Section 302 of SOX. In column 2, I run a horse race between Post1 to 
Post3 and Post-2003. I find that Post2003 appears to have the most explanatory power with a p-
value for the interaction of Post2003 and Change in ROA of 0.14, which is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level under a one-sided test, while the other three interaction terms have p-
values ranging from 0.35 to 0.64. Considering the high correlations among the four competing 
post indicators, which make multicolinearity a serious concern, the p-value of 0.14 is quite 
impressive. Hence, it seems that the implementation of Section 302 of SOX is mainly responsible 
for the increase in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance in all firms. 
Since Section 302 became effective before most changes in audit committee composition took
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Table 1.12: Implementation of Section 302 of SOX and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
accounting performance (1996-2007) 
The table shows the results from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for forced 
CEO turnover in year t. Post2003 is an indicator variable that equals to one in years after 2003(inclusive) 
and equals to zero otherwise. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are measured 
in year t-1. The sample consists of all firms in the final sample of this paper from 1996 and 2007.  Year and 
industry fixed effects are included in all columns. Industries are defined by the 17 industry groups11
VARIABLES 
 on Ken 
French’s website. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
(1) (2) 
   
Change in ROA -6.957*** -6.948*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Post2003 × Change in ROA -6.495*** -15.015 
 (0.007) (0.146) 
Post3 × Change in ROA  5.900 
  (0.545) 
Post1 × Change in ROA  5.528 
  (0.357) 
Post2 × Change in ROA  -2.607 
  (0.644) 
Log of sales 0.105** 0.104** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Stock volatility 6.831*** 6.852*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.393*** -1.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.153 0.155 
 (0.122) (0.116) 
CEO-Chairman -0.314** -0.315** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
CEO voting -0.107*** -0.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Non-emp block 0.324** 0.320** 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
Dual Class firm 0.168 0.161 
 (0.454) (0.477) 
Constant -3.098*** -3.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 10518 10518 
Chi sq 260.1 261.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.105 
                                                     
11 Stata output produced missing model fit statistics such as Chi-square when I included industry fixed effects for Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industry groups. 
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place and it has similar effect on quality of reported earnings numbers to audit committee 
independence, the implementation of Section 302 may have made it difficult to discover any 
incremental effect of changes in audit committee independence on quality of reported earnings 
numbers and consequently on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance.    
Overall, further investigation is needed before concluding that change in audit committee 
independence does not affect the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to accounting performance. 
The results in Table 1.11 only say that the incremental effect of audit committee independence 
following the 2003 exchange listing rules is insignificant.   
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
5.1. Using involuntary CEO turnover as the dependent variable 
So far, I have used forced CEO turnover as the dependent variable in all the regressions. 
This variable is coded using the method in Parrino (1997). The method classifies a CEO turnover 
as forced if news reports clearly indicate as much. If the new report is vague about the true reason 
for departure, the classification is based on a elaborate scheme. One concern is that, if in the post-
SOX period, news reporters become more aggressive at seeking out the true reason for a CEO 
turnover in non-compliant firms than in compliant firms, or if non-compliant firms are more 
candid about CEO turnovers than compliant firms in the post-SOX period, then this could 
introduce a bias into my classifications that favors findings previous results. To assess whether 
previous results are sensitive to the specific method that I use to classify forced CEO turnovers, I 
define an alternative dependent variable, which I call involuntary CEO turnover, and use it in 
Table 1.13 to reexamine the main results in this study. The alternative involuntary CEO turnover 
variable is defined in Section 3.2.1. The main advantage of this alternative dependent variable is 
that its value does not depend on news reports. 
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Table 1.13 reports the logit regression results. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the 
matched sample for the rule that requires firms to have a majority of independent directors on the 
board and columns 3 and 4 are estimated using the matched sample for the rule that requires firms 
to have a fully independent nominating committee. For each listing rule, I estimate separate 
regressions using market-adjusted stock return (column 1 and 3) and industry-adjusted change in 
ROA (column 2 and 4) as the firm performance measure. I find that the results in columns 1 and 2 
are very similar to those in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.9, except that the statistical significance of 
the coefficient on the triple interaction of Post1, Treat1 and Performance is somewhat weaker, 
though it remains significant at 10% level in one-sided tests. Similarly, the results in columns 3 
and 4 are very similar to those in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.10, with the coefficient on the triple 
interaction of Post2, Treat2 and Performance being negative and highly statistically significant 
for both stock- and accounting-based performance measures. As expected, the pseudo R-squared 
is lower in Table 1.13 than in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. This may reflect some voluntary CEO 
turnovers being misclassified as involuntary, whose occurrence is not correlated with poor firm 
performance. I conclude that the forced CEO turnover definition is preferable because the logit 
models have higher explanatory power. Nevertheless, the results in Table 1.13 confirm that my 
earlier findings in Table 1.9 and 1.10 are unlikely to be driven by possible changes in media 
coverage.  
 
5.2. Excluding year 2007 
The last year of my sample period is 2007. Since I lag firm-level variables by a year, year 
2007 is associated with CEO turnovers that occurred in the second half of 2007 and the first-half 
of 2008. This is the time period when the most recent Global Financial Crisis was in full swing. It 
is possible that treatment firms faced systematically greater challenges than control firms. One 
potential result is that boards of treatment firms would need to act more promptly to remove 
incompetent CEOs to save their firms from financial distress. If this conjecture is true, then I
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Table 1.13: Robustness check: using involuntary CEO turnover as the dependent variable 
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for 
involuntary CEO turnover in year t. A CEO turnover is defined as involuntary if the departing CEO leaves 
office before the age of 65 and does not take a CEO position in another S&P 1500 firm within one year of 
the initial CEO turnover announcement. The independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are all 
measured in year t-1. Column 1 and 2 are estimated using the matched sample defined by the new listing 
rule on board independence, and column 3 and 4 are estimated using the matched sample defined the new 
listing rule on nominating committee independence. I exclude forced CEO turnovers that resulted from 
punishment for violations because poor firm performance is normally not the main reason for these 
turnovers and treatment firms contain a disproportionately higher fraction of such type of forced CEO 
turnovers. Performance is measured by market-adjusted stock returns in column 1 and 3, while it is 
measured by industry-adjusted change in ROA in column 2 and 4, both measures are defined in Appendix 
A. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns. Industries are defined by Fama and French 
48 industry groups. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
VARIABLES Majority of independent 
directors 
 Fully independent nominating 
committee 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Performance -0.676*** -3.177***  -0.984*** -7.507*** 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Treat1 -0.582*** -0.592***    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Post1 × Treat1 0.204 0.212    
 (0.401) (0.389)    
Treat1 × Performance 0.325 1.983    
 (0.319) (0.440)    
Post1 × Performance 0.085 -0.803    
 (0.794) (0.736)    
Post1 × Treat1 × Performance -1.238 -13.681**    
 (0.126) (0.022)    
Treat2    -0.208* -0.204* 
    (0.056) (0.059) 
Post2 × Treat2    0.005 0.028 
    (0.977) (0.871) 
Treat2 × Performance    0.485* 7.001*** 
    (0.093) (0.001) 
Post2 × Performance    0.801* 1.939 
    (0.060) (0.555) 
Post2 × Treat2 × Performance    -1.551*** -8.094* 
    (0.008) (0.078) 
Log of sales 0.062* 0.070**  0.071** 0.076** 
 (0.064) (0.039)  (0.043) (0.030) 
Stock volatility 4.367*** 4.284***  4.805*** 4.598*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age 0.031*** 0.031***  0.032*** 0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Founder-Heir CEO -0.498*** -0.522***  -0.636*** -0.669*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log CEO tenure 0.377*** 0.380***  0.371*** 0.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-Chairman -0.077 -0.088  -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.443) (0.378)  (0.957) (0.927) 
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Table 1.13, continued 
CEO voting power -0.031** -0.031**  -0.039** -0.038** 
 (0.050) (0.039)  (0.020) (0.018) 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.104 0.122  0.060 0.068 
 (0.313) (0.239)  (0.577) (0.533) 
Dual class firm 0.122 0.108  0.018 0.013 
 (0.486) (0.538)  (0.932) (0.950) 
Constant -5.196*** -5.232***  -5.416*** -5.377*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 7320 7312  7095 7087 
Chi sq 237.8 219.0  238.2 220.1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0558 0.0529  0.0589 0.0560 
 
could observe a larger increase in the rate of forced CEO turnover and a larger increase in the 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance in treatment firms than in control firms.  
Although this conjecture is reasonable, I do not think it is a serious concern in this study 
since I matched treatment firms with control firms so that they have similar characteristics, at 
least on several critical dimensions. For example, in the matched sample defined by the new 
listing rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board, the treatment firms and 
control firms are not significantly different in terms of total assets, sales, Tobin’s Q, earnings 
volatility, percentage of firms with classified boards, and CEO age in 2001. 
  Nevertheless, to more definitively rule out this possibility, I repeat the base regressions 
in Tables 1.9 and 1.10, but exclude observations in year 2007. The results are reported in the two 
panels of Table 1.14. The left panel checks the robustness of the results related to the new 
exchange rule requiring a majority of independent directors on the board; while the right panel 
checks the robustness of the results related to the new exchange rule requiring a fully independent 
nominating committee. Firm performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return in 
columns 1 and 3, while it is measured by industry-adjusted change in ROA in columns 2 and 4. 
Matched samples for the corresponding new exchange rules are used for the estimation. I find that 
the coefficients on the triple interaction of Post1, Treat1 and Performance and those on the triple 
interaction of Post2, Treat2 and Performance remain negative and statistically significant. 
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Table 1.14: Robustness check: excluding observations in year 2007 
The table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator 
for forced CEO turnover in year t. The independent variables are defined in Appendix A and are all 
measured in year t-1. Column 1 and 2 are estimated using the matched sample defined by the new listing 
rule on board independence, and column 3 and 4 are estimated using the matched sample defined by the 
new listing rule on nominating committee independence. Observations in year 2007 are excluded. I also 
exclude forced CEO turnovers that resulted from punishment for violations because poor firm performance 
is normally not the main reason for these turnovers and treatment firms contain a disproportionately higher 
fraction of such type of forced CEO turnovers. Performance is measured by market-adjusted stock returns 
in column 1 and 3, while it is measured by industry-adjusted change in ROA in column 2 and 4, both 
measures are defined in Appendix A. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns. Industries 
are defined by Fama and French (1997) 48 industry groups. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values 
and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
VARIABLES Majority of independent 
directors 
 Fully independent nominating 
committee 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Performance -2.734*** -7.042***  -2.677*** -11.286*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Treat1 -0.593 -0.485*    
 (0.125) (0.072)    
Post1 × Treat1 -0.093 0.154    
 (0.862) (0.735)    
Treat1 × Performance -0.140 3.076    
 (0.871) (0.531)    
Post1 × Performance 0.962 -7.388**    
 (0.220) (0.024)    
Post1 × Treat1 × Performance -3.252* -20.175**    
 (0.059) (0.043)    
Treat2    -0.148 -0.112 
    (0.540) (0.570) 
Post2 × Treat2    -0.337 -0.086 
    (0.357) (0.787) 
Treat2 × Performance    0.628 8.112** 
    (0.337) (0.017) 
Post2 × Performance    1.502* -6.088 
    (0.074) (0.178) 
Post2 × Treat2 × Performance    -3.005** -10.214 
    (0.017) (0.104) 
Log of sales 0.050 0.088  0.041 0.083 
 (0.404) (0.142)  (0.502) (0.182) 
Stock volatility 5.145*** 7.341***  7.424*** 8.750*** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.018* -0.017  -0.024** -0.024** 
 (0.096) (0.136)  (0.037) (0.038) 
Founder-Heir CEO -1.262*** -1.319***  -1.380*** -1.504*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Log CEO tenure 0.131 0.149  0.198 0.208* 
 (0.294) (0.234)  (0.103) (0.083) 
CEO-Chairman -0.229 -0.274  -0.136 -0.159 
 (0.195) (0.116)  (0.434) (0.354) 
CEO voting power -0.135*** -0.136***  -0.145*** -0.142*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 1.14, continued 
Nonemployee blockholders 0.245 0.315*  0.274 0.333* 
 (0.159) (0.071)  (0.114) (0.058) 
Dual class firm 0.316 0.258  0.314 0.327 
 (0.272) (0.367)  (0.319) (0.293) 
Constant -3.521*** -3.852***  -3.945*** -4.226*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 6719 6713  6528 6522 
Chi sq 240.4 240.3  245.1 243.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.158 0.119  0.163 0.137 
 
 
5.3. Investor pressure 
The corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002 have resulted in a dramatic change in public 
attitude toward corporate governance issues in U.S. firms. Investors have become more 
determined to have their voices heard in corporate board rooms. It is possible that treatment firms 
attracted more attention from activist investors during the post-SOX period than control firms 
had. This might reflect more past corporate governance problems in treatment firms. The greater 
pressure on boards of directors in treatment firms from activist investors might then force these 
firms take quicker actions to remove poorly-performing CEOs during the post-SOX period. 
However, when I read news around the CEO turnovers in my sample, I find only a couple of 
cases where investor pressure is mentioned and even these are not all in treatment firms. This 
fraction of cases appears to be too small to affect my results. Someone may argue that activist 
investors mainly influence boards privately so most of their actions are not reported in news. 
However, this seems to be unrepresentative of many well known activist investors, who usually 
like to publicize their agenda in order to generate shareholder support for their causes. Thus, I 
doubt that activist investor pressure is a likely cause of my finding.  
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6. Performance changes around forced CEO turnovers 
 
In this section, I address the question of whether the documented increase in sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnover to firm performance can be interpreted as evidence of more effective 
monitoring. By more effective monitoring, I mean that the more prompt firing of poorly-
performing CEOs is on average beneficial to shareholders. This necessitates two things. First, 
forced CEO turnovers in treatment firms in the post-SOX period should in general be followed by 
improvements in firm performance. Second, the quicker action of firing in the post-SOX period is 
more beneficial to shareholders than does the supposedly slower action in the pre-SOX period in 
treatment firms.  
As to the first point, Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) 
find that forced CEO turnovers are associated with subsequent improvements in operating 
performance. However, since these two studies use data in 1980s and early 1990s, it is unclear if 
their findings apply to the sample period of this paper. More importantly, it is unclear if forced 
CEO turnovers are still followed by improvements in firm performance in the post-SOX period 
when firm performance prior to the turnovers is not as bad as it is in the pre-SOX period.  
Presumably, it is easier to improve firm performance when it is really bad than when it is not so 
bad. Hence, it is important to examine this in my sample.  
As to the second point, higher turnover-performance sensitivity should be beneficial to 
shareholders in the sense that it provides stronger incentives to CEOs to work harder, just as 
higher pay-performance sensitivity does. A large executive compensation literature generally 
concludes that higher pay-performance sensitivity is good for shareholders. Given the low 
turnover-performance sensitivity observed in the data, I believe that there is an improvement in 
CEO incentives in the post-SOX period. Besides, if forced CEO turnovers are actually followed 
by improvement in firm performance in the post-SOX period, then the quicker action to fire unfit 
CEOs is likely to reduce volatility in firm performance, which is another benefit to shareholders. 
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However, the more prompt firing also increases the risk of making type I errors, i.e. firing an 
otherwise good CEO. Given the large costs associated with CEO dismissals, such as severance 
pays, search costs for a new CEO, etc., making type I errors can be quite costly to the firm. 
Although it is difficult to compare the relative magnitude of the positive and negative effects, if I 
find no evidence that CEOs are prematurely fired in the post-SOX period, then quicker firing in 
the post-SOX period is likely to have a positive effect on firm value due to the incentive effect. 
In the following, I examine abnormal stock performance and changes in operating 
performance around forced CEO turnover events in firms that are affected by the rule that 
requires listing firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board and the rule that 
requires listing firms to have a fully independent nominating committees to provide evidence on 
the two criteria of effective monitoring I discussed above.  
 
6.1. Abnormal stock performance around forced CEO turnovers 
In this section, I examine average cumulative abnormal stock return from 12 months 
before to 12 months after each forced CEO turnover announcement. The purpose is to see the 
trend in cumulative abnormal stock return around each turnover event to shed light on the 
question of whether forced CEO turnovers in treatment firms in the post-SOX period are followed 
by improvement in stock performance. I use monthly stock returns from CRSP to estimate market 
models and cumulate the prediction errors from the market model month by month over the 25-
month period around each forced CEO turnover. Market model parameters are estimated over the 
24 month period that ends 12 month before the month of CEO turnover announcement. I measure 
market returns by monthly returns on either the value-weighted or the equal-weighted CRSP 
index and plot the average cumulative abnormal stock return against event time in separate panels 
in Figure 1.4. In Panel A, the treatment and control firms are determined based on whether they 
have a majority of independent directors on the board in the pre-SOX period, while, in Panel B, 
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the classification is based on whether a firm has a fully independent nominating committee in the 
pre-SOX period. The left panels in both Panel A and Panel B show the plots when value-
weighted CRSP index is used as the market index in the market model regression, while the right 
panels show the plots when equal-weighted CRSP index is used as the market index.  
Focusing on treatment firms in the post-SOX period, I find that, in the left panel of Panel 
A, the average abnormal stock return falls to -35% in the month of the turnover announcement 
and then climbs up by 10% to -25% twelve months after the turnover. In the right panel of Panel 
A, the pattern is similar. The average abnormal stock return falls to -42% in the month of 
turnover announcement and then goes up by 12% to -30% twelve months after the turnover. 
Although the increase in abnormal stock return is statistically insignificant, probably due to small 
sample size, the plots clear show that stock performance on average improves following forced 
CEO turnovers. For other subgroup of firms, the pattern of the plots is similar.  
Similarly, in the left panel of Panel B where market return is measured by return on 
value-weighted CRSP index, I find that the mean cumulative abnormal stock return in treatment 
firms in the post-SOX period is -37% in the month of the turnover announcement. It falls to -44% 
in the three months after the turnover announcement and climbs back to -33% at the end of the 
12-month period after the turnover announcement. In the right panel of Panel B where the market 
return is measured by return on equal-weighted CRSP index, the mean cumulative abnormal 
stock return declines by -28% by the time of the turnover announcement. It declines further to -
33% three months after the turnover announcement but recovers by 15% to -18% twelve months 
after the turnover announcement. The continued decline in abnormal stock return in the first 3 
months after the turnover announcement seems to be related to the specific time period because 
we also observe similar decline in control firms. The fact that the abnormal stock return 
eventually reverses course is inconsistent with the view that there is no improvement in firm 
performance following forced CEO turnovers in treatment firms in the post-SOX period.  
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative abnormal stock returns around forced CEO turnover announcements 
The plots show the mean cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) around forced CEO turnover 
announcements by treatment and control firms and by pre- and post-SOX period. Event time is in measured 
in months relative to the announcement month. The abnormal stock return is calculated using a market 
model where market return is measured by value-weighted CRSP index return (Left Panels) or by equal-
weighted CRSP index return (Right Panels). Parameters of the market models are estimated using monthly 
stock returns from 36 to 13 months before each CEO turnover announcement. In Panels A, treatment and 
control firms are defined by whether a firm had majority of independent directors on board in the pre-SOX 
period. In Panel B, treatment and control firms are defined by whether a firm had a fully independent 
nominating committee in the pre-SOX period.  
Panel A: The rule requiring majority of independent directors on board 
  
Panel B: The rule requiring fully independent nominating committees  
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When I compare graphs of cumulative abnormal stock return in treatment firms between 
the pre- and post-SOX period in Figure 1.4, I find that, except in the left panel of Panel B, forced 
CEO turnovers in post-SOX period are on average associated with a smaller decline in abnormal 
stock performance prior to the CEO turnover events and a quicker recovery thereafter than in the 
pre-SOX period. This is especially noticeable when equal-weighted CRSP index return is used in 
the market model. 
 
6.2. Change in operating performance around forced CEO turnovers 
In this section, I examine if there are real improvements in operating performance 
following forced CEO turnovers. If investors are rational and the market is efficient, the observed 
increase in abnormal stock return following CEO turnover events in Figure 1.4 predicts 
improvements in operating income after CEO turnover. I examine change in ROA where ROA is 
calculated as the annual EBIT scaled by lagged total assets. In order to control for influence of 
industry factors, I adjust the change in ROA by industry median change of this ratio where 
industry is defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. Annual data from Compustat 
database are used in the analysis and the industry median is based on all firms with valid data on 
Compustat. The change in ROA is computed from two years before to two years after each forced 
CEO turnover. I require that each firm to have five years of valid data in Compustat around the 
turnover event to be included in the analysis. Panel A of Table 1.15 reports the mean (median) 
change in ROA and its statistical significance by event time for the sample of treatment firms 
associated with the two listing rules. T-test is performed for the means and signed rank test is 
performed for the medians. The left panel is for treatment firms that did not have majority of 
independent directors on the board before SOX. I observe that, in the year prior to the turnover 
announcement, industry-adjusted change in ROA is negative and statistically significant in all but 
one column. In contrast, in the year after the turnover, the change in ROA is positive in all but 
one column. Importantly, during the post-SOX period, both the mean and median changes in 
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ROA in the year after the turnover are positive and the median change is also statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The right panel is for treatment firms that did not have a fully 
independent nominating committee before SOX. I observe that the mean and median change in 
ROA is significantly negative in the year prior to the CEO turnover events, while the mean 
change in ROA is positive and median change in ROA is slightly negative – neither is 
significantly different from zero – in the year after the turnover events. 
 
Table 1.15: Changes in operating performance around forced CEO turnovers 
This table shows the sample means and medians of industry-adjusted change in ROA around forced CEO 
turnovers and the change of it (i.e. second derivative) for the sample of treatment firms defined by the two 
listing rules. Industry is defined by Fama and French 48 industry groups. Industry-adjusted change in ROA 
is calculated as the change in the ratio of annual EBIT divided by beginning of year total assets minus the 
industry median change for this ratio. Event time is measured in years relative to the year of CEO turnover 
announcements. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent statistical significance respectively for two-
sided t-test for means and signed rank test for medians that the annual change in ROA is zero.  
 A Majority Independent Board Rule  Independent Nominating Committee Rule 
Event 
Time 
Pre-SOX 
(N=31) 
Post-SOX 
(N=16) 
 Pre-SOX 
(N=101) 
Post-SOX 
(N=37) 
 Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median 
          
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Change in ROA (%) 
          
-2 -2.37 -2.41 -0.18 -0.01  -1.16 -0.32 -0.41 -0.07 
-1 -7.85* -2.04 -3.44*** -2.13***  -2.50* -1.44*** -1.91** -1.07** 
0 -4.10* -2.23   -1.58** -2.16**  -1.82* -0.72 -1.72 0.15 
1 3.40** 0.78* 1.12 1.69*  0.48 0.34 1.07 -0.02 
2 0.31 -0.74 -1.15 -0.38  0.01 0.24 0.84 1.19 
          
Panel B: Change in Industry-adjusted Change in ROA (%) 
          
-1 -5.48 0.95 -3.27** -1.48***  -1.34 -0.33 -1.499   -1.28** 
0 3.75 1.22 1.86 0.86  0.68 0.03 0.1903 1.50 
1 7.51** 4.60** 2.69** 2.11***  2.30 1.27** 2.7840* 0.34 
2 -3.09 -0.06 -2.27** -1.78**  -0.47 0.08 -0.224 -0.37 
 
 
In panel B of Table 1.15, I report the change in change in ROA which equals to the 
change in ROA in the current year minus that in the prior year (i.e. second derivative). By this 
measure, I want to see if forced CEO turnovers are associated with at least a deceleration in the 
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drop in ROA following the turnover events. For treatment firms that did not have a majority of 
independent directors on the board before SOX, the table shows that both the mean and median 
change in change in ROA are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the first year 
after the turnover. For treatment firms that did not have a fully independent nominating 
committee on the board before SOX, I find that the mean change in change in ROA is 
significantly positive at the 10% level in treatment firms in the post-SOX period, which suggests 
that there is a significant reversal of the momentum in change in ROA from the pre-turnover 
period. 
 
Figure 1.5: Change in operating performance around forced CEO turnovers before and after SOX 
The following graphs show the median (Panel A), average (Panel B) and cumulative industry-median 
adjusted change in ROA (Panel C) around forced CEO turnover events for the subsample of treatment 
firms that did not have majority of independent directors on board (Left Panels) or fully independent 
nominating committees (Right Panels) during the pre-SOX period. Industry is defined by the Fama and 
French 48 industry classification. ROA is calculated as annual EBIT divided by beginning of year total 
assets. Change in ROA equals to the difference between current and lagged ROA. Event time is measured 
in years relative to the year of CEO turnover announcements.   
Panel A: Median change in ROA 
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Figure 1.15, continued 
Panel B: Average change in ROA 
  
Panel C: Median cumulative change in ROA 
  
 
 
These changes are also plotted in Figure 1.5 which show the sample median (Panel A), 
mean (Panel B) and cumulative (Panel C) change in ROA for the two types of treatment firms 
from two years before to two years after each CEO turnover event. The three left panels are for 
firms that were noncompliant with the rule requiring a majority independent board before SOX, 
while the three right panels are for firms that were noncompliant with the rule requiring a fully 
independent nominating committee. The plots of change in ROA in Panel A and B clearly show 
that operating performance improves in treatment firms after turnover events during both the pre- 
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and post-SOX period. The plots of cumulative change in ROA in Panel C show that the line for 
cumulative change in ROA in the post-SOX period is everywhere above that in the pre-SOX 
period. This suggests that forced CEO turnovers in treatment firms in the post-SOX period is 
associated with a smaller drop in operating performance before and a quicker recover after each 
forced CEO turnover than they do in the pre-SOX period. 
 
6.3. Premature firing hypothesis 
To see if the premature firing effect is significant in treatment firms in the post-SOX 
period, I conduct event studies and compare abnormal stock return around forced CEO turnover 
announcements in the pre- and post-SOX periods. In an efficient market, the abnormal stock 
return is supposed to capture the firm value effect of the CEO turnover decisions. However, it is 
also influenced by other factors. Since I compare the abnormal stock return over two periods, I 
need to discuss how these other factors might be different over the two periods and thus affect my 
inference. One factor that might be systematically different between the two periods is the 
amount of negative information being revealed by the CEO turnover announcements. Since 
turnovers in post-SOX period are on average announced at better firm performance than 
turnovers in the pre-SOX period, I expect more negative information to be revealed in the post-
SOX period. Another factor is market anticipation of the turnover events. In terms of firm 
performance prior to CEO firing, the turnover events are likely to be more anticipated in the pre-
SOX period than in the post-SOX period. However, in terms of corporate governance, the 
turnover events are probably more anticipated in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX 
period. Since there is no theoretical reason to believe that the anticipation effect is going to be 
systematically different between the two periods, I assume that this factor has similar effect in 
both periods. Even if there is some systematic difference, as long as the anticipation effect is 
small, my inference will not be significantly affected.  
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I use standard event-study methodology and measure abnormal stock return by prediction 
errors from market models. Specifically, I compute the cumulative prediction errors over the day 
of and the day before the CEO turnover announcement. This event window has been used in prior 
studies by Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004). Market model 
parameters are estimated over the 250-day period ending 250 days before each CEO turnover 
announcement and value-weighted CRSP index return is used for market return. All stock return 
data are from the CRSP database. Since forced CEO turnovers are in general preceded by poor 
stock returns, especially in the year prior to the turnover announcements, I end my estimating 
window 250 days before the turnover announcement to avoid potential biases in market model 
parameter estimates. As before, I exclude forced CEO turnovers that are related to violations. 
Furthermore, I exclude firms that made earnings announcements during the event window to 
make sure that the announcement returns mainly reflect market surprise over the CEO turnover 
announcements.  
Table 1.16 reports the cross-sectional average of cumulative prediction errors, broken 
down by treatment and control firms and by pre- and post-SOX period. The statistical 
significance of the average cumulative prediction error is assessed using cross-sectional t-test to 
control for any change in variance of abnormal returns induced by the turnover events. The top 
panel reports results for the sample of forced CEO turnovers in firms that were forced to maintain 
a majority of independent directors on the board after SOX. 
I observe that the two-day abnormal stock return in treatment firms is significantly 
negative in both the pre- and post-SOX period. On the surface, the negative abnormal stock return 
seems to suggest that the CEO firing decision destroys firm value. But the negative sign could 
also be driven by more negative news being revealed by the turnover announcements. The prior 
evidence on improvement in firm performance following these forced CEO turnovers supports 
the latter explanation. Hence, one reasonable explanation for the negative abnormal stock return 
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is that the turnover decisions themselves increase firm value but the negative information 
revealed more than offset the positive effect in the two-day event window. 
 
Table 1.16: Two-day announcement period abnormal stock returns 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal stock returns over the (-1,0) event window for forced CEO 
turnover announcements, broken down by treatment vs. control firms and pre- vs. post-SOX period. 
Abnormal stock returns are estimated using a market model where market return is measured by daily 
returns on value-weighted CRSP index. Parameters of the market model are estimated using daily stock 
returns from 500 through 251 trading days before each CEO turnover announcement.  The sample consists 
of all forced CEO turnovers in the subsample of treatment and control firms defined by the rule that 
requires listed firms to have majority of independent directors (top panel) and the rule that requires firms to 
have fully independent nominating committee (bottom panel), respectively. Positive equals to the 
percentage of the two-day cumulative stock returns that are positive. The t-statistic from two-sided test that 
the average CAR across CEO turnovers is not significantly different from zero is reported beneath each 
average CAR. N is the number of observations. 
 
  Treatment Control 
CAR (-1,0)  Pre-SOX Post-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
      
Rule that requires majority of 
independent directors 
Mean -0.047 -0.022 0.000 0.000 
t-statistics -2.06 -2.19 0.06 0.02 
Positive 0.37 0.36 0.47 0.49 
N 25 24 119 72 
      
Rule that requires fully 
independent nominating 
committees 
Mean -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 
t-statistics -0.45 -0.36 -0.31 -0.71 
Positive 0.52 0.44 0.40 0.40 
N 81 50 60 37 
 
 
As far as my test of the premature firing hypothesis is concerned, I am only interested in 
the relative magnitude of the abnormal stock returns in the pre- and post-SOX period. I notice 
that the abnormal stock return has actually become less negative in the post-SOX period than it is 
in the pre-SOX period.12
The bottom panel of Table 1.16 reports results for the subsample of firms that were 
forced to have a fully independent nominating committee after SOX. The two-day abnormal stock 
 This suggests that the CEO firing decision in treatment firms in the post-
SOX period is at least as good as it is in the pre-SOX period if not any better, which suggests that 
the premature firing effect is insignificant.  
                                                     
12 The difference is not statistically significant. 
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return in treatment firms is negative in both the pre- and post-SOX period though neither is 
statistically different from zero. Again, there is no evidence that the turnover decisions in the 
post-SOX period is of lower quality than those in the pre-SOX period.  
Since more negative information is likely to be revealed in the post-SOX period than in 
the pre-SOX period, my interpretation of the findings in Table 1.16 is robust to difference in 
amount of negative information being revealed by the turnover announcements. In control firms, 
the two-day abnormal stock return is not significantly different from zero in both panels.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the potential benefits of SOX and the ensuing new 
exchange listing rules and the effectiveness of monitoring by independent directors. Although 
many researchers, regulators and investors believe that increasing the representation of 
independent directors on corporate boards can improve quality of board oversight, empirical 
evidence has been mixed and inconclusive. Recent research even raises doubt about the 
effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring CEOs. Using the change in NYSE and 
Nasdaq listing rules following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a source of exogenous 
variation, I provide the first statistically convincing evidence on a causal relation between board 
and nominating committee independence and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance. Specifically, I find that firms that after SOX moved to a majority independent board 
or to a fully independent nominating committee experience increased sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to performance. This evidence suggests that quality of board monitoring is positively 
related to board independence and nominating committee independence and the causation goes 
from board structure to quality of board monitoring.  
Consistent with the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity representing more 
effective monitoring, I find that forced CEO turnovers are followed by improvements in both 
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stock performance and operating performance in firms that are forced to adopt a majority 
independent board or a fully independent nominating committee. Plots of cumulative abnormal 
stock returns and change in ROA around forced CEO turnovers in these firms show that these 
firms in general experience a smaller decline in firm performance prior to CEO turnover and a 
quicker recovery thereafter in the post-SOX period than they do in the pre-SOX period. Lastly, 
when I compare CEO turnover announcement period abnormal stock returns in the pre- and post-
SOX periods, I find no evidence that the more prompt firing in the post-SOX period significantly 
increases the chances of making type I errors. Since the increase in sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance should in general lead to stronger incentives to CEOs, the lack of 
evidence of premature firing suggests that the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity is a 
reflection of more effective monitoring.  
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
 Dependent variables 
Forced CEO turnover An indicator variable for forced CEO turnover classified 
using the method in (Parrino, 1997). 
Involuntary CEO turnover An indicator variable for involuntary CEO turnover.  A CEO 
turnover is involuntary if the departing CEO leaves office 
before the age of 65 and does not take a CEO position in 
another S&P 1500 firm within one year of the initial CEO 
turnover announcement. 
  
 Firm characteristics 
Log of total assets Natural log of book value of total assets in millions of dollars 
Log of sales Natural log of annual sales in millions of dollars 
Tobin’s Q Book value of total assets minus book value of common 
equity plus the market value of common equity over book 
value of total assets. 
Earnings volatility Standard deviation of annual EBIT scaled by beginning of 
year total assets over the past five years. 
Stock volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the past 12 
months.  
  
Firm Performance  
Return The firm’s stock return adjusted by return on the value-
weighted CRSP index cumulated over the one year period 
prior to the CEO turnover. This variable is winsoried at the 
two 1% tails. 
Change in ROA The firm’s change in EBIT scaled by lagged total assets 
adjusted by the median of this ratio for the firm’s Fama and 
French 48 industry over the year prior to CEO turnover. This 
variable is winsorized at the two 1% tails. 
  
 Governance characteristics 
CEO-Chairman An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the 
Chairman of the board and equals to 0 otherwise. 
Classified board An indicator variable for classified board (also known as 
staggered board).  
Dual class firm An indicator variable for firms with more than one class of 
common shares.  
Independent directors (%) Total number of independent directors divided by total 
number of directors. 
G-index The Gomper, Ishi and Metricks (2003) index which equals to 
the number of anti-takeover provisions a firm has. The 
maximum is 24.  
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Appendix A, continued 
Nonemployee blockholders An indicator variable for the presence of non-employee 
blockholders on board where a blockholder is defined as 
anyone holding more than 1% of the total voting power. 
  
 CEO characteristics 
CEO age CEO age at the time of the CEO turnover announcement. 
CEO voting power The percentage of votes held by the CEO as defined by 
RiskMetrics. 
Founder-Heir CEO An indicator variable for CEOs who are founders or heirs of 
founders.   
Insider-linked voting The percentage of voting power held by insider and linked 
(gray) directors as defined by RiskMetrics.  
Log CEO tenure Natural log of one plus CEO tenure in years. 
  
Post1 
Difference-in-Difference Variables 
An indicator variable for post-SOX period for the new listing 
rule requiring firms to have a majority of independent 
directors on the board. For firms in the control group, it 
equals to 1 in years after 2003 (inclusive) and equals 0 
otherwise. For firms in the treatment group, it equals 1 in 
years after the firm met the new exchange requirement and 
equals 0 otherwise. However, the last year a treatment firm 
can meet the requirement is 2005.  
Post2 An indicator variable for post-SOX period for the new listing 
rule requiring firms to have a fully independent nominating 
committee. For firms in the control group, it equals 1 in years 
after 2003 (inclusive). For firms in the treatment group, it 
equals 1 in years after the firm met the new exchange 
requirement and equals 0 otherwise. However, the last year a 
treatment firm can meet the requirement is 2005. 
Post3 An indicator variable for post-SOX period for the new listing 
rule requiring firms to have a fully independent audit 
committee. For firms in the control group, it equals 1 in years 
after 2003 (inclusive). For firms in the treatment group, it 
equals 1 in years after the firm meets the new exchange 
requirement and equals 0 otherwise. However, the last year a 
treatment firm can meet the requirement is 2005. 
Treat1 An indicator variable for membership in the treatment group 
defined by the new listing rule requiring firms to have a 
majority of independent directors on the board. 
Treat2 An indicator variable for membership in the treatment group 
defined by the new listing rule requiring firms to have a fully 
independent nominating committee.  
Treat3 An indicator variable for membership in the treatment group 
defined by the new listing rule requiring firms to have a fully 
independent audit committee.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
INFORMATION QUALITY AND CEO TURNOVER 
 
1. Introduction 
Hiring and firing CEOs is one of the most important tasks of boards of directors. Not 
surprisingly, understanding CEO turnover decisions is an important research agenda in corporate 
governance research.  Most CEO turnover models assume that boards of directors learn CEO 
ability or matching with the firm from firm performance13. The learning process is typically 
modeled as a Bayesian updating process. One key prediction of the Bayesian updating rule is that 
the board should put less weight on firm performance when it contains more noise. This implies 
that noise in a firm performance measure should affect the boards’ learning about the CEO ability 
from the firm performance measure and thus sensitivity of CEO turnover to the firm performance 
measure. However, existing CEO turnover studies have overwhelmingly focused on the effect of 
corporate governance on the turnover-performance relation and so far overlooked the potential 
effect of information quality on this relation14
                                                     
13 The boards could learn CEO ability or matching with the firm or both. Exactly what the board learns is unimportant 
here. For brevity, I will only say CEO ability in the following.  
. In this paper, I extend the existing literature by 
showing that information quality of stock prices (earnings) has both statistically and economically 
significant effect on the board’s assessment of CEO ability from stock returns (earnings). The 
impact is more significant in firms with recently hired CEOs than in firms with relatively longer-
tenured CEOs. Depending on the source of the noise, this can translate into significant economic 
effect on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. These new findings change the 
commonly-held view that sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is positively 
related to the quality of internal corporate governance unconditionally. Although quality of 
14 See Weisbach (1988), Yermack (1996), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry (1999), 
Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001), and Goyal and Park (2002). 
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internal corporate governance may be more important in explaining the turnover-performance 
sensitivity of relatively longer-tenured CEOs, information quality seems to be more important 
than governance in explaining the turnover-performance sensitivity of recently hired CEOs. 
Overall, the results suggest that information quality puts significant constraints on boards’ ability 
to identify bad CEOs when they make CEO retention decisions. An important policy implication 
of this study is that, as internal corporate governance systems improve over time in U.S. publicly 
listed firms due to new regulations and investor activism, return to further improvement in 
internal governance structure is likely to decline, more attention should probably be given to 
improving information flow to the stock markets and stock market liquidity, especially as average 
CEO tenure declines with the improvement in internal corporate governance.   
In theory, boards of directors remove a CEO when her ability or matching with the firm 
is below some threshold. However, since CEO ability is unobservable, the board can only learn 
CEO ability from other observables, among which publicly observed stock returns and 
accounting earnings should be important sources of information. The large attention paid to 
turnover-performance sensitivity in the CEO turnover literature testifies to the perceived 
importance of firm performance to forced CEO turnover decisions. A rational approach to model 
the board’s learning process is to assume that it follows the Bayesian updating rule. Under this 
setting, the board of directors updates its estimate of the CEO ability every period when new firm 
performance information comes in. If the updated estimate of the CEO ability is below certain 
threshold, the incumbent CEO is removed and a new CEO is drawn from a pool of potential 
CEOs, and the learning process starts anew. Otherwise, the incumbent CEO is retained and the 
learning continues. One prediction from these models is that the weight the board puts on firm 
performance in the updating process is negatively related to the noise in the firm performance 
measure certeris paribus. Here the noise refers to the component of firm performance that is not 
under the control of the CEO. An important implication of this prediction is that, for the same 
drop in firm performance, estimate of CEO ability is adjusted down by less when the firm 
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performance measure contains more noise than when it contains less noise. If everything else is 
the same, this translates into differences in turnover-performance sensitivity. In this paper, I 
develop a framework for measuring noise in stock returns and accounting earnings and 
investigate the impact of noise in firm performance on the board’s updating process in detail 
within the framework of a Bayesian learning model. The main hypothesis that I test is that noise 
in stock (accounting) performance reduces the sensitivity of the board’s updating on CEO ability 
to stock (accounting) performance. 
Stock returns and accounting earnings (scaled by total assets) are the two most often used 
measures of firm performance in existing CEO turnover studies. In this paper, I measure stock 
performance by industry-adjusted stock returns over the 12 months prior to CEO turnover and 
accounting performance by industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) in the year prior to CEO 
turnover, where industry is defined by the Fama and French 48 industry classification. Based on 
the intuition from Bayesian learning models, I define information quality of a firm performance 
measure by the component of it that is not under the control of the CEO (i.e. noise in firm 
performance). Information quality is considered to be higher when this noise component is lower 
and vice versa. I identify two sources of noises that can reduce the information quality of stock 
returns (earnings). The first source of noise is exogenous firm-specific shocks to stock returns 
(earnings) that are not under the control of the CEO. For stock returns, this source of noise is 
measured by the standard deviation of industry-adjusted stock returns over the 12 months prior to 
CEO turnover. For accounting earnings, this source of noise is measured by the standard 
deviation of industry-adjusted ROA over the most recent 5 years. Intutitively, firms that are 
subject to more exogenous firm-specific shocks should have more volatile industry-adjusted stock 
returns (ROA). The second source of noise arise from potential difference between observed firm 
performance and the unobserved true underlying performance. For stock prices, this noise has to 
do with the process through which firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices in the 
stock market. I measure the magnitude of this source of noise by stock liquidity and dispersion in 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts. In the market microstructure literature, stock liquidity is found to be 
positively related to the information content of stock prices (See Chordia, Roll and 
Subraymanyam, 2008). Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast is a widely used proxy for noise 
in stock prices and mispricing (Diether et al., 2002; Gilchrist et al., 2005). For accounting 
earnings, this second source of noise is related to estimation errors in accruals. Thus, I measure it 
by the accrual quality measure (AQ) developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) (DD).  
 To test the main hypothesis, I run logit regressions where I regress an indicator for 
forced CEO turnover in year 𝑡 on firm performance, information quality and an interaction 
between firm performance and information quality, all measured in year 𝑡 − 1. The economic 
interpretation of each coefficient is tied to terms in a simple one-period Bayesian learning model 
of CEO turnover that I develop in the paper. According to this model, the sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the interaction term between firm performance and information 
quality is used to test the main hypothesis that noise in firm performance reduces the weight on 
firm performance in the board’s updating on its estimate of CEO ability. Supporting the main 
hypothesis, I find that the standard deviation of industry-adjusted stock return (for brevity, also 
called stock volatility in the following) (RVOL) and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(DISP) are negatively related to the weight on industry-adjusted stock return in the board’s 
updating process, while stock liquidity is positively related to the weight on industry-adjusted 
stock return in the board’s updating process. The results are statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels in all specifications. As for information quality of earnings, I 
find that standard deviation of industry-adjusted ROA (for brevity, also called earnings volatility 
in the following) (EVOL) and the DD accrual quality measure (AQ) are all negatively related to 
the weight on industry-adjusted ROA in the board’s updating process15
                                                     
15 The AQ measure is inversely related to accrual quality. 
. The effect of earnings 
volatility is statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications, while the effect of AQ is 
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weaker but is still statistically significant at above the 10% level in one-sided test in all 
specifications.  
The accrual quality measure (AQ) I use above captures both unintentional and intentional 
estimation errors in accruals. The former is related to a firm’s business model and operating 
environment so it is often unavoidable, while the latter reflects managerial discretion. The board 
is unlikely to know the exact magnitude of the unavoidable estimation errors in any given year 
except ex post. However, the board may have inside information on the magnitude of the 
intentional estimation errors (i.e. discretionary accruals) in any given year. This is because, as 
insiders, the board should be able to gain access to the internal accounting book to find out the 
discretionary accruals when necessary. As a matter of fact, Hazarika et al. (2009) actually find 
evidence that boards of directors do recognize earnings management by managers and are more 
likely to fire CEOs who engage in earnings management. This difference between unavoidable 
and intentional estimation errors offers an interesting opportunity to examine the board’s use of 
private information and can be used to conduct an additional test on whether information quality 
is important to the board’s CEO retention decisions. If the board has inside information on 
discretionary accruals, then they should be able to undo the errors when they evaluate CEO 
ability based on accounting earnings. In other words, intentional estimation errors are not noise to 
boards of directors.  As a result, discretionary accruals should appear to have no systematic effect 
on the board’s updating on CEO ability in logit regressions. To test this prediction, I decompose 
the AQ measure into its innate component (iAQ) and discretionary component (dAQ) following 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper (2005) and use them to re-run the logit regressions. Like 
AQ, the value of iAQ (dAQ) is positively related to estimation errors in accruals and thus 
inversely related to accrual quality. I find that the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and 
the innate component of AQ is positive and statistically significant (p-value 0.066) but the 
interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and the discretionary component of AQ is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Hence, the weaker results I obtain for AQ 
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previously can be explained by the different effect of the unavoidable and intentional estimation 
errors on the board’s updating process. To check the robustness of the results, I repeat the 
analysis using three additional proxies for discretionary accruals and find that the interaction 
between industry-adjusted ROA and each proxy for discretionary accruals is largely statistically 
insignificant. These tests lend further support to my general argument that boards of directors 
care about information quality when making CEO retention decisions. Not only do directors care 
about the quality of firm performance measures that they are less likely to have private 
information about, they also actively use private information to get more accurate information 
when they are able to. 
Having established the basic results that noise in stock returns (earnings) significantly 
affect the board’s updating on CEO ability based on stock returns (earnings) in the overall 
sample, I next explore how the information quality effect may differ between learning the ability 
of relatively new CEOs and that of relatively old CEOs. Here the new and old are in inference to 
their tenure in the firm not their age. There are several reasons to believe that the information 
quality effect should be stronger for relatively new CEOs than for relatively old CEOs. First, the 
board in general has less private information about new CEOs than old CEOs. Thus, the need for 
learning the CEO ability from firm performance is bigger with new CEOs than with old CEOs. 
Second, the board in general has less precise information about the ability of new CEOs than old 
CEOs. According to the basic Bayesian learning model, the effect of firm performance on the 
board’s update on CEO ability should be larger when the board’s prior information about the 
CEO ability is less precise ceteris paribus. As the weight on firm performance gets bigger in the 
board’s updating process when the board’s prior belief is less precise, the effect of information 
quality on the weight on firm performance is expected to also become more easily detectable. 
Third, noise related to several of my information quality proxies is likely to be amplified in firm 
with new CEOs than with old CEOs. For example, after a new CEO joins a firm, the stock market 
also needs to go through a learning process. During this process, stock prices are likely to be 
89 
 
more subject to the influence of noise traders or market sentiments when stock liquidity is low 
and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is high. As for estimation errors in accruals, a new 
CEO is likely to make larger unavoidable estimation errors than an old CEO under the same 
circumstances because the new CEO is less expert at forecasting.  
To see if the information quality effect is stronger in firms with relatively new CEOs than 
old CEOs, I divide my sample of CEOs into two subsamples based on the median CEO tenure in 
my sample. The new CEO subsample contains CEOs with tenure less than the median (about 5.5 
years), while the old CEO subsample contains CEOs with tenure equal to or above the median. I 
estimate similar logit regressions as before within each subsample and find a stark contrast 
between the two subsamples. In the new CEO subsample, for each of the six information quality 
proxies (including iAQ), the interaction between firm performance and the information quality 
proxy has the predicted sign and is statistically significant. The results actually become 
statistically more significant (lower p-values) than they are in the overall sample for some 
proxies. In contrast, in the old CEO subsample, only the interaction between industry-adjusted 
ROA and earnings volatility is statistically significant. The consistency in results across different 
information proxies, especially between the stock price information quality proxies and 
accounting information quality proxies, is surprising. However, it lends more credibility to the 
interpretation that the board learns CEO ability from firm performance because the differential 
effect of information quality on the board’s learning of ability of new and old CEOs is a 
reasonable implication of the board’s learning of CEO ability from firm performance. It also 
makes any alternative explanation of my results based on the correlation between the information 
quality proxies and the board’s use of private information less convincing because if anything the 
board should have more private information about old CEOs than new CEOs, which often leads 
to the opposite prediction on the differential information quality effect.  
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Obviously, some of my information quality proxies are likely to be endogenous. Among 
the five information quality proxies16
                                                     
16 They are stock volatility (RVOL), stock liquidity (LIQ), dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP), earnings 
volatility (EVOL) and innate component of accrual quality (iAQ). Since I find that the accrual quality effect is mainly 
driven by unavoidable estimation errors for which iAQ is a better measure, I focus on iAQ only here. 
, three of them are especially exposed to endogeneity 
problems. They are the innate component of accrual quality (iAQ), stock liquidity (LIQ) and 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP). The main concern is that innovations in them 
are likely to be correlated with unobservable governance variables. The innate component of 
accrual quality (iAQ) is calculated based on five firm characteristics over a 10-year rolling 
window. The endogeneity concern is that the five firm characteristics are correlated with an 
unobservable corporate governance variable which drives the relation we observe. However, 
given the long-term nature of these firm characteristics, the unobservable corporate governance 
variable and thus its effect should be quite stable over time. This contradicts with the previous 
finding that the iAQ effect is only significant in the new CEO subsample. Hence, I can refute this 
endogeneity concern.  For stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, to 
establish causality, I implement a two-step estimator for probit models with endogenous 
continuous regressors (Woodridge, 2002). Like Fang, Noe and Tice (2009) and Jayaraman and 
Milbourn (2010), I use both lagged value of each firm’s stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ 
earning forecasts) and the median stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ earnings forcasts) of the 
firm’s Fama and French 48 industry as my instruments. Both instruments are correlated with the 
firm’s stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts earnings forecasts) but are uncorrlated with the error 
terms. I find that the interaction term between stock return and stock liquidity (dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts) is negatvie (positive) and statistically significant at above 5% level 
in the overall sample. Furthermore, in subsample tests, I find that the stock liquidity effect is 
mainly driven by the subsample of new CEOs with the coefficient of the interaction term 
statistically significantly at the 10 percent level for new CEOs but statsitically insignificant at 
conventional levels for old CEOs. For dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, the distinction 
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between new and old CEOs becomes less clear cut. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level for both new and old CEOs with the p-value for the 
old CEO subsample slightly larger. The interaction term in the old CEO subsample seemes to 
capture some firm performance effect because the stock return is netgatvie but statistically 
insignificant in the old CEO subsample while it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 
the new CEO subsample. Overall, the effect still seems to be stronger for new CEOs than for old 
CEOs. 
As for the economic significance of the results, since the board’s estimate of CEO ability 
is unobservable, we can only assess the economic significance through its effect on the 
probability of CEO turnover. If everything else is the same, the effect of information quality on 
the board’s update on estimate of CEO ability based on firm performance should translate into a 
same direction effect on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. This is because, for the 
same drop in firm performance, estimate of CEO ability is adjusted downward by a smaller 
amount when information quality is lower than when information quality is higher. However, as I 
show through the link between my empirical model and the simple one-period model of CEO 
turnover, a change in the value of the information quality proxy can affect both the threshold 
CEO ability below which to fire the CEO (main effect) and the board’s update on CEO ability 
based on firm performance (interaction effect). In a nonlinear model like logit, this main effect on 
threshold CEO ability causes a non-parallel shift in the probability of CEO turnover over firm 
performance, so a direct comparison of change in probability of CEO turnover for a certain 
change in firm performance between firms with high and low information quality captures both 
the main effect and the interaction effect. This explains why the marginal interaction effect 
calculated as the cross derivative of probability of CEO turnover with respect to firm performance 
and information quality in logit and probit models may have different sign from the coefficient of 
the interaction term. This is not a problem in linear probability models because the main effect 
causes a parallel shift in probability of CEO turnover over firm performance. Since my 
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hypothesis is about the effect of information quality on the board’s updating process not the effect 
on threshold CEO ability, the economic effect pertinent to my hypothesis should be evaluated by 
fixing the threshold CEO ability.  
Therefore, I adopt a new method to infer the economic effect that is relevant for my 
hypothesis. Basically, I fix the value of the information quality proxy in the main effect term but 
allow the value of the information quality proxy in the interaction term to vary to capture the 
effect of information quality on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance that is 
purely driven by the interaction term. These calculations produce very significant economic effect 
for new CEOs in an average firm17
For comparison, I also calculate the combine effect of information quality on sensitivity 
of forced CEO turnover to firm performance, which includes the effect on both the threshold 
. I find that, when the information quality proxy in the main 
effect term is fixed at the sample median, the difference in increase in probability of forced CEO 
turnover when the information quality proxy is high (the 95th percentile) and when the 
information quality proxy is low (the 5th percentile) for a decrease in stock return from the top to 
bottom decile ranges from 5.6 percent to 14 percent for the three stock price information quality 
proxies. Similar calculations done for accounting information quality proxies and ROA produce 
differences in increase in probability of forced CEO turnover in the range from 0.9 percent to 1.6 
percent, which is much smaller than the numbers above. However, because change in accounting 
performance also has a smaller effect on probability of forced CEO turnover than change in stock 
performance does, the relative magnitude of those differences in increases in probability of forced 
CEO turnover is still economically significant. They are about 45 percent to 60 percent of the 
increase in probability of forced CEO turnover when the accounting information quality is low 
(i.e. value of the information quality proxy is at the 95th percentile).  
                                                     
17 Since the logit regression results show that most of the information quality proxies have statistically insignificant 
effect on the board’s updating process in the old CEO subsample. It is uninteresting to evaluate their economic effects 
for old CEOs.        
 
93 
 
CEO ability and the board’s updating process. This combine effect corresponds to the cross-
derivative of probability of forced CEO turnover with respect to firm performance and 
information quality in Equation (2.14) in the paper. Intuitively, for information quality proxies 
that are not significantly related to the threshold CEO ability, the combined effect would be 
similar to the pure interaction effect. However, for information quality proxies whose effect on 
threshold CEO ability is significant, the combined effect will be different from the pure 
interaction effect. In extreme cases, the direction of the combined effect can even be opposite to 
that of the pure interaction effect. Consistent with this intuition, I find that the estimated 
combined effect is close to the pure interaction effect for stock liquidity (LIQ) and innate 
component of accrual quality (iAQ). The combined effect is weakened to some extent relative to 
the pure interaction effect but is still in the same direction as the pure interaction effect for 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP) and accrual quality (AQ). The combine effect is 
significantly weakened or even reversed relative to the pure interaction effect for stock volatility 
(RVOL) and earnings volatility (EVOL). In summary, noise arising from stock market trading or 
estimation errors in accruals does not significantly affect the threshold CEO ability so their effect 
on the board’s updating process is directly translated into the same direction effect on sensitivity 
of CEO turnover to firm performance across firms with different levels of noise. However, noise 
arising from exogenous firm-specific shocks affects both the threshold CEO ability and the 
board’s updating process so their effect on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance 
across firms with different levels of noise may be different from their effect on the board’s 
updating process.   
This study makes the following contributions to related literatures. First, I extend the 
existing CEO turnover literature by showing that information quality puts significant constraints 
on the board’s ability to quickly identify bad CEOs when they make CEO turnover decisions. In 
the corporate governance literature, the strength of the relation between forced CEO turnover and 
firm performance is often taken to be an indicator of effectiveness of internal governance. This 
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reflects a view that is well expressed by Jensen (1993) who commented in 1993 that the removal 
of CEOs after poor performance came “too late” and the effect was “too small” to meet the 
obligations of the board. Hence, a strengthening of internal corporate governance is expected to 
strengthen the relation between forced CEO turnover and poor performance. The CEO turnover 
literature is dominated by studies that relate board or other corporate governance characteristics 
to the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. However, estimates from this 
literature show only modest difference in sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
between firms with supposedly good corporate governance and firms with supposedly bad 
corporate governance. For example, according to a well-known study by Weisbach (1988) on 
outside directors and CEO turnover, moving from the top to bottom decile of market-adjusted 
stock return increases the probability of CEO turnover by about 6% in firms with more than 60 
percent of outside directors while it increases the probability of CEO turnover by 2% in firms 
with less than 40 percent of outside directors. The difference is only 4%. Attributing the low 
annual rate of forced CEO turnover in the data entirely to agency costs, Taylor (2010) estimates 
that it is consistent with a CEO entrenchment cost of up to 3% firm value, a surprisingly large 
number. These findings raise the suspicion that maybe we have overemphasized the role of 
corporate governance and agency problems in CEO turnover decisions. There could be other 
factors that are simultaneously affecting the turnover-performance relation. This paper examines 
one such factor that has been overlooked by the existing CEO turnover literature. This is 
information quality of firm performance measures. My estimate of economic effect suggests that, 
for removing relatively new CEOs, the cross-sectional impact of information quality on turnover-
performance sensitivity is often larger than that of having a majority of independent directors on 
the board. Taking the information quality proxy with the strongest effect among the five proxies I 
examine – stock liquidity – as an example, I find that moving from the top to bottom decile of 
industry-adjusted stock return increases the probability of forced CEO turnover by about 14 
percent in firms with high stock liquidity (the 95th percentile) while it increases the probability of 
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forced CEO turnover by only about 4 percent in firms with low stock liquidity (the 5th percentile). 
The difference is about 10 percent, which is more than twice the difference found in Weisbash 
(1988) between firms with outsider-dominated boards and firms with insider-dominated boards. 
My results suggest that information quality is likely to be more important than quality of internal 
governance in explaining the turnover-performance sensitivity of relatively new CEOs, while 
quality of internal governance is likely to be more important in explaining the turnover-
performance sensitivity of relatively longer-tenured CEOs.  
Second, I introduce a new framework to interpret interaction terms in logit or probit 
models that are widely used in CEO turnover studies. To my knowledge, this study is the first to 
make the distinction between the effect of a key variable that interacts with firm performance on 
threshold CEO ability below which the board is assumed to fire the CEO and the effect of this 
variable on the board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability based on the firm performance. 
Based on this distinction, I develop a new method to infer the economic effect of the interaction 
term in my logit regressions, which avoids the confusions associated with interpreting interaction 
terms in logit and probit models as pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003) and Powers (2005)18
Third, this study contributes to a growing corporate finance and accounting literature that 
links stock price informativeness to firms’ investment decisions, executive compensation 
decisions and firm value. Using different measures of stock price informativeness, Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) find that more informative 
stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investments. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) 
establish the theoretical foundation for a link between stock liquidity and managerial incentives. 
Jayaraman and Milbourn (2011) find that increase in stock liquidy leads to increase in proportion 
of equity-based pay in total compensation and higher pay-performance sensitity in CEO 
compensation. Fang, Noe and Tice (2009) find that higher stock liquidity leads to higher firm 
. 
                                                     
18 I suspect that most of the papers that are said to have misinterpreted the coefficient of the interaction terms in logit 
and probit models by Ai and Norton (2003) and Powers (2005) probably simply misstated their hypothesis. 
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value as measured by Tobin’s Q. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that stock 
price informativeness as measured by stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts facilitates quicker CEO turnover decisions. This introduces another channel through 
which stock liquidity may increae firm value as documented by Fang, Noe and Tice (2009).  
Lastly, this paper contributes to the accounting literature that studies the consequences of 
earnings quality in various decision contexts. Although this literature is very large, it is relativley 
thin in the area of how earnings quality affects executive turnover decisions (see review by 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). Existing studies mainly focus on the labor market outcomes of 
executives and directors under extremely poor earning quality conditions such as after a firm has 
restated or been found to have misrepresented earnings (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai, Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2006; Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008). Only two existing papers examine the executive 
turnover consequences of earnings quality in less than extreme conditions. Engel, Hayes and Xue 
(2003) study earnings timeliness and the relative weight on stock returns and accounting earnings 
in CEO turnover decisions. Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata (2009) examine CEO turnover after 
less extreme earnings management than those that result in high profile restatements, 
shareholders lawsuits or SEC investigations. To my knowledge, this study is the first to show that 
accrual quality affects the usefulness of earnings in CEO turnover decisions. Furthermore, this 
paper shows that the effect is different for accrual quality related to unavoidable estimation errors 
and accrual quality related to discretionary accruals. While the former has significant impact on 
the usefulness of earnings in CEO turnover decisions, the latter does not.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple Bayesian learning 
model of CEO turnover to guide the development of main hypothesis and the empirical model. It 
also develops a framework to measure information quality of stock prices and accounting 
earnings. Section 3 summaries the sample and explains the details of variable construction. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results and deals with potential endogeneity issues. Section 5 
develops a method for inferring the economic effect of information quality on sensitivity of CEO 
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turnover to firm performance that purely comes from the interaction term in the logit model and 
reports the economics effect of various information quality proxies. Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Hypotheses, empirical specification, and measures of information quality 
 
Most existing CEO turnover models that relate CEO turnover to firm performance are 
built on the idea that the board of directors learns CEO ability (or matching between the CEO and 
the firm), which is unobservable, from observable firm performance19
 
. The board of directors 
then updates its estiamte of the CEO ability following a Bayesian updating process as new firm 
performance information comes in each period. When the updated estimate of the CEO ability is 
below certain threshold, the incumbent CEO is removed and a new CEO is drawn from a pool of 
potential CEOs, and the learning process starts again. When the updated estimate of the CEO’s 
ability is above the threshold, the incumbent CEO is retained and the learning process continues 
but with an updated prior that incorporates what has been learned in the previous periods. One 
intution from these models is that noises in firm performance reduce the effect of firm 
performance on the updates. The second intuition is that the longer the CEO serves, the more 
precise information the boads of directors should have about the CEO ability. In the following, I 
will show a simple one-period model to illustrate these intuitions and use this simple model to 
motivate my hypothesis and empirical specification. I will also develop a framework for 
measuring information quality of stock prices and accounting earings and discuss specific 
information quality measures. 
2.1. A simple learning model of CEO turnover and empirical specification 
At time t=0, a new CEO is hired, the prior distribution of the CEO’s ability is  
𝛼~𝑁(𝑎0, 1/𝜏0)  where 𝜏0 is the precision of the distribution. At time t=1, firm peformance is 
                                                     
19 See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Bushman, Dai and Wang (2010) and Taylor( 2010). 
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realized. Firm performance 𝑥1 is assumed to be related to the CEO ability by the following 
equation: 
 𝑥1 = 𝛼 + 𝜀 (2.1) 
where 𝜀 is a random noise with a distribution of 𝑁(0, 1/𝜏𝜀). The board of directors then updates 
their estimate of the CEO’s ability using the standard Bayesian updating rule. The posterior 
distribution of the CEO’s ability is thus given by 𝛼~𝑁(𝑎1, 1/𝜏1) where: 
 𝑎1 = � 𝜏0𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑎0 + � 𝜏𝜀𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑥1 (2.2) 
 𝜏1 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀 (2.3) 
The CEO is replaced when 𝑎1is below some threshold 𝑎� and retained otherwise. I define 
an indicatior variable Y for CEO turnover, then the CEO turnover decision can be expressed as: 
 Y=1 when 𝑦∗ = 𝑎� − � 𝜏0
𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑎0 − � 𝜏𝜀𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑥1 > 0 (2.4) 
 Y=0 when 𝑦∗ = 𝑎� − � 𝜏0
𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑎0 − � 𝜏𝜀𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜀� 𝑥1 ≤ 0 (2.5) 
where 𝑦∗ represents the difference between the threshold ability and the estimated CEO ability. 
As we can see in Equation (2.2), when the board updates its estimate of the CEO’s ability, the 
weight on firm performance 𝑥1 decreases with noise in 𝑥1 (i.e. 1/𝜏𝜀) and increases with noise in 
prior belief (i.e. 1/𝜏0) ceteris paribus. The first part means that for the same poor performance 𝑥1 
the posterior mean 𝑎1 is adjusted down by less when the noise 1/𝜏𝜀 is high than when the the 
noise 1/𝜏𝜀 is low ceteris paribus. The second part means that if the incumbent CEO is retained in 
the first period, the weight on firm performance in the updating process in second period should 
be smaller than it is in the first period and so on ceteris paribus because, as equation (2.3) shows, 
the prior precision at the beginning of second period is higher than that at the beginning of the 
first period. This illustrates the intuition behind the interplay between noise in firm performance, 
CEO tenure and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance that motivates the research 
investigation of this study. However, given the simplicity of this one-period model, it is ex ante 
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unknown if all predictions will be borne out by the data. However, this model provides a good 
starting point. It suggests that noise in firm performance measures can potentially have significant 
effect on boards of directors’ assessement of CEO ability and, in turn, on the relation between 
CEO turnover and firm performance. The model also makes it clear that noise in firm 
performance for the purpose of evaluating CEO ability is the component of firm performance that 
does not reflects the CEO ability. 
To estimate this noise effect, I parameterize the experession for 𝑦∗ in Equations (2.4) and 
(2.5) by introducing a variable 𝑥2 which is a proxy for noise in firm performance 𝑥1 and 
interacting it with firm performance 𝑥1. Without agency costs, the threshold CEO ability below 
which to replace the CEO, 𝑎�, should be determined by marginal benefits and costs of CEO 
turnover. However, agency theory also suggests that 𝑎� should be affected by agency costs in the 
firm. So I model 𝑎� by a linear function of observables that can potentially affect the threshold and 
an error term. This leads to the following empirical model for 𝑦∗: 
 𝑦∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2 + 𝑍𝛾 + 𝛿 (2.6) 
where 𝑦∗ represents the unobserved difference between 𝑎� and the posterior mean of CEO ability 
𝑎1 .  𝑍 is a vector of observables that may affect the thresh hold 𝑎�. 𝛽1 is the weigh on firm 
performance. 𝛽2𝑥2 captures the potential effect of the information quality proxy  𝑥2 on the 
threshold 𝑎�.  𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2 is the term that operationalizes the idea that the weight on firm 
performance 𝑥1 varies with information quality 𝑥2. I expect 𝛽1 < 0  because poor performance 
should lower the posterior mean of CEO ability and thus increases the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. The key coefficient for this study is 𝛽12 which measures the effect of noise in firm 
performance on the sensitivity of the board’s estimate of CEO ability to firm performance. 
According to the basic intution from the learning model of CEO turnover, I predict that 𝛽12 > 0 
if 𝑥2 increases with noise in firm performance 𝑥1 and 𝛽12 < 0 if 𝑥2 decreases with noise in firm 
performance 𝑥1. 𝛿 is an error term with mean 0. Equation (2.6) is not estimable because 𝑦∗ is 
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unobservable. However, if we assume that  𝛿 has a standardized logistic distribution (with known 
variance of 𝜋2/3),  then the parameters in equation (2.6) can be estimated by a logit regression 
where the probability of CEO turnover is given by:  
 𝑃(𝑌 = 1|𝑋) = Λ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2 + 𝑍𝛾) (2.7) 
where Λ(𝑋𝛽) = exp (𝑋𝛽)
1+exp (𝑋𝛽) is the cumulative distribution function for standardized logistic 
distribution. Here, the assumption of known variance of the logistic distribution is without loss of 
generality because we can always divide both sides of Equation (2.6) by the standard deviation of 
𝛿. 
This derivation makes it clear that the sign and statitical significance of the coefficient 
𝛽12 provides a test of my main hypothesis. The warnings in Ai and Norton (2003) and Powers 
(2005) on interpretation of interaction terms in logit and probit models do not apply because my 
hypothesis is stated with respect to the latent variable 𝑦∗ in Equation (2.6) not the probability of 
CEO turnover. This is not a matter of choice of words but a matter of precisely stating what the 
learning model says. Writing out the model helps me to correctly state the hypothesis. The 
derivation also makes it clear that information quality 𝑥2 potentially has two distinct effects on 
probability of CEO turnover – one through its effect on the threshold ability 𝑎�  (associated with 
the main effect term 𝛽2𝑥2 ) and the other through its effect on estimating CEO ability from firm 
performance (assocaited with the interaction term 𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2).  This distinction has important 
implications for calculating the economic effect of information quality on the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance that I will discuss later.  
 
2.2. Measure of information quality of stock prices 
According to the Bayesian learning model, noise in stock returns for the purpose of 
evaluating CEO ability should be the component of stock return that is not under the control of 
the CEO. Since I measure firm performance by industry-median-adjusted stock returns, most of 
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the market- and industry-wide exogenous shocks have already been filtered out. However, firms 
can still be subject to exogenous firm-specific shocks so the industry-adjusted stock return may 
not completely reflect the CEO ability.  To proxy for the magnitude of noise arising from 
exogenous firm-specific shocks, I use the standard deviation of monthly industry-median-
adjusted stock returns in the 12-month period prior to CEO turnover (for brevity, I call it stock 
volatility in the following). The rationale is that firms that are more exposed to exogenous firm-
specific shocks are likely to have more volatile industry-adjusted stock returns. I predict that 
stock volatility should be negatively related to the weight on stock returns in the board’s updating 
process.  
Besides firm-specific shocks, stock market trading can also generate noises in stock 
returns that are not related to the CEO ability. In theory, stock price reflects the market 
expectation of the present value of all expected future cash flows per share of stock. The market 
expectation is formed when informed traders, trying to profit from their information advantage, 
trade with noise traders and other informed traders in the stock market. In this process, 
information of the informed traders is being revealed and impounded into the stock prices. When 
trading cost is high, it may discourage information production and subdue arbitrage activities in 
the market, the result is less informative stock prices (See Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). I measure this source of noise related to stock market trading and 
arbitrage activities by stock liquidity.  
Stock liquidity is closly related to trading costs and arbitrage activiites in the stock 
market. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) in particular show that greater stock liquidity attracts 
informed traders to the stock and in equilibrium makes the stock price more informative. Hence, 
information quality of stock price should be higher when stock liquidity is higher. I measure stock 
liquidity by the negative of the natural logarithm of the Amihud illiquidity measure. Amihud 
(2002) finds that his illiquidity measure is positively and strongly correlated with the Kyle’s 𝜆 
estimated from intrad day transcations and quotes. Hasbrouck (2009) further finds that the 
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Amihud illiquidity measure is most strongly correlated with the TAQ-based price impact 
coefficient among the daily proxies he examined. I predict that stock liquidity is positively related 
to the weight on stock return in the board’s update on CEO ability based on stock returns. 
Moreover, this source of noise in stock prices can also related to the quality of public 
information. When information about the firms is less precise, stock price is likely to be less 
informative. I measure the noise related to public information by dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Larger dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast indicates larger uncertainty over a 
firm’s future earnings among sophisticated investors and higher level of noises in public 
information about the firm. Hence, information quality of stock price should be lower when 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is higher. Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is 
widely used in prior literature as a proxy for information quality of stock prices and stock 
mispricing (See Diether et al., 2002; Gilchrist et al., 2005). I predict that dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts should be negatively related to the weight on stock returns in the board’s 
updating on estimate of CEO ability.  
 
2.3. Measure of information quality of accounting earnings 
Prior studies have consistently found that forced CEO turnovers are negatively related to 
past stock and accounting performance of firms. This suggests that, beside stock performance, 
boards of directors also consider accounting performance in making CEO retention decisions. 
Since earnings are probably the most important accounting numbers in any measure of a firm’s 
accounting profitability20
Under the framework of this paper, I choose to examine earnings quality that is related to 
exogenous firm-specific shocks and estimation errors in reported earnings. For the former, I use 
, I use measures of earnings quality to proxy for the information quality 
of my accounting performance measure – industry-median-adjusted return on assets (ROA).  
                                                     
20 In a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), they find that the majority of the firms view earnings as a key metric 
for external audiences. 
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volatility of industry-adjusted ROA (for brevity earnings volatility in the following). It is 
calculated as the standard deviaiton of annual earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) deflated 
by lagged total assets over the most recent 5 years. Data for the calculation are from the 
Compustat database. Similar to volatility of industry-adjusted stock returns, I expect that earnings 
volatility to be positively related to exogenous firm-specific shocks to the firm. Hence, I predict 
that earnings volatility should be negatively related to the weight on ROA in the board’s update 
on estimate of CEO ability based on ROA.  
For the latter, I use accrual quality. Accruals are the differences between reported 
earnings and realized cash flows. The objective of using accruals-based accounting rather than 
cash-flow-based accounting is to better reflect a firm’s economic condition and financial 
performance. However, recording accruals requries managers to make forecasts for furture cash 
flows. This introduces estimation errors into accruals. These estimation errors can be 
unavoidable, for example, because a firm’s business model or operating environment makes it 
difficult for managers’ to accurately forecast future cash flow realizations. In this case, the 
estimation errors represent honest reporting errors. On the other hand, managers may 
intentionally introduce estimation errors into accruals in order to achieve certain objectives, often 
for gainning private benefits at the expense of shareholders. These accruals are often called 
discretionary accruals (DA). 
My first measure of accrual quality is based on the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
which I call the DD meaasure of accrual quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002) model accruals as a 
function of past, present and future cash flows because accruals represent anticipations for future 
cash collection or payments and reverse when previously recoganized cash is received or paid. 
The quality of the matching from accruals to cash flows, which is measured by  the standard 
deviation of the error terms from a regression of current accruals on past, current and future cash 
flows, thus gives an indication of the magnitude of the estimation errors in accruals. A smaller 
standard deviation represents higher accrual quality. I predict that the DD accrual quality measure 
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should be negatively related to the weight on ROA in the board’s updating on estimate of CEO 
ability based on ROA.  
The DD accrual quality measure calculated above does not distinguish between 
unavoidable estimation errors related to a firm’s business model or operating environment and 
intertional estimation errors related to manageiral discretion and opportunism. Since the boards of 
directors may have private information about discretionary accruals, they may treat the two types 
of estimation errors differently. My main hypothesis on boards’ learning of CEO ability from 
firm performance clearly suggests that the unavoidable estimation errors should reduce the weight 
on ROA in the board’s updating process; however, the effect of discretionary accruals will 
depend on the boards of directors’ knowledge of the discretionary accruals. If the board is able to 
undo the intentional estimation errors based on their knowledge of them, then empirically 
discretionary accruals should appear to have no systemtic effect on the board’s updating on CEO 
ability based on ROA. To test these two predictions, I decompose the AQ measure into its innate 
component and discretionary component following the procedure in Francis et al. (2005) and re-
run the logit regressions using them as the information quality measure respectively. To check the 
robutness of the results, I also repeat the analysis using two additional proxies for discretionary 
accruals – one based on the modified Jones model and the other based on the performance-
matched approach of Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005).   
 
3. Sample and variable construction 
 
My CEO turnover data is constructed from the ExecuComp database and it covers CEO 
turnovers in S&P 1500 firms between 1992 and 2008. I exclude CEO turnovers that are due to 
mergers and acquistions and spin-offs  as well as turnovers of  interim CEOs and co-CEOs. This 
data is then matched with stock return data from CRSP, firms financial data from Compustat and 
corporate governance data from RiskMetrics, all in the year prior to the CEO turnover 
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announcement, to obtain the base sample. The base sample has 2,936 firms with 23,536 firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2007 and contains 2,471 CEO turnovers that are announced in year 
1993 through 2008.  
I then calculate a series of information quality measures and add them to the base sample. 
Stock liquidity is calculated using CRSP daily stock data, dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts is calculated using data in the First Call database and accrual quality measures are 
calculated using Compustat data.  
 
3.1. Classification of CEO turnover 
CEO turnovers are classified as either voluntary or forced following the method in 
Parrino (1997). Specifically, if news articles mention that the CEO is fired, forced out, or departs 
due to unspecified policy differences, the CEO turnover is classified as forced. Otherwise, if the 
CEO is 60 years old or above, then the CEO turnover is voluntary. For all remaining cases, the 
CEO turnover is classified as voluntary if the CEO departure is due to poor health, death or 
acceptance of another position within the firm or outside or if the CEO is stated to retire and the 
retirement is announced at least 6 months before the succession. The rest of the cases are 
classified as forced. Finally, forced CEO turnover can be reclassified as voluntary if an extensive 
news search finds new information that suggests the CEO departure is unrelated to firm activities. 
This method is designed to sovle the problem that firms rarely admit that they fire CEOs. The 
method has been widely used in CEO turnover studies such as Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001), 
Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata (2009), and Jenter and Kannan (2010), etc. 
The sample has 2,471 CEO turnovers announced from 1993 to 2008, of which 1,791 are 
classified as voluntary and 680 are classified as forced. According to this data, CEO turnovers 
happen in about 12 percent of the firms each year and forced CEO turnovers happen in about 3 
percent of the firms each year in my sample. These values are a little higher than those found in a 
sample of 1,627 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2001 by Jenter and Kannan (2010). In their sample, 
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CEO turnovers happen in about 10 percent of the firms each year and forced CEO turnovers 
happen in about 2.3 percent of the firms each year. The small increase is consistent with a 
strengthening of internal corporate governance in U.S. firms since the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). 
  
3.2. Firm performance 
Prior studies have shown that the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers is negatively 
related to both stock and accounting performance of a firm. I measure stock performance by 
industry-median-adjusted stock return and accounting performance by industry-median-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) in this study. To calculate industry-adjusted stock returns, I subtract from 
each sample firm’s monthly stock return the median return of firms in the same Fama and French 
48 industry and cumulate the difference over the 12-month period that ends one month before the 
CEO turnover announcement in years associated with CEO turnover and over the fiscal year in 
years associated with no CEO turnover. The industry-median-adjusted stock return is winsorized 
at the two 1% tails. To calculate industry-adjusted ROA, I first deflate each firm’s annual 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) by lagged total assets and then subtract from it the median 
ratio of the firm’s Fama and French 48 industry over the fiscal year that best reflects the 
information available to the board when they make the CEO turnover decision. If a CEO turnover 
is announced in the first half of a fiscal year, the appropriate fiscal year is the prior fiscal year. If 
the CEO turnover is announced in the second half of a fiscal year, the appropriate fiscal year is 
the current fiscal year. This measure is not affected by changes in capital structure and tax 
treatments of the firms. It was used in prior CEO turnover studies such as Parrino (1997) and 
Huson, Parrino, & Starks (2001). Another widely used measure of accounting-based performance 
in CEO turnover studies is change in ROA (See Weisbach, 1988; DeFond and Park, 1999; Engel 
et al., 2001). Weisbach (1988) argues that change in ROA should be a better performance 
measure because it captures the unexpected change in performance. I choose to use the ROA 
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measure instead because my information quality measures – earnings volatility and accrual 
quality – directly measure the information quality of annual earnings rather than change in annual 
earnings. The industry-median-adjusted ROA is winsorized at the two 0.5 percent tails. 
 
3.3. Construction of stock price information quality proxies 
Stock volatility (RVOL) is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly industry-
median-adjusted stock returns in the 12-month period over which the stock performance is 
measured.  
Stock liquidity (LIQ) is calculated as the negative of the natural log of the Amihud 
illiquidity measure for the 12-month period over which the stock performance is measured. 
Following Amihud (2002), stock illiquidity in a specific firm-year in my sample is calculated as 
the daily ratio of absolute daily stock return over daily dollar trading volume averaged over the 
year. Data on stock returns and trading volumes come from CRSP database. The average ratio is 
then multiplied by a factor of 106 to give the measure an interpretation of average daily price 
change associated with per million dollar trading volume. Intuitively, it is a measure of the 
average daily price impact of trade. Higher Amihud illiquidity means higher price impact of trade 
and thus lower stock liquidity. The following is the formula used to calculate the Amihud 
illiquidity for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑦: 
 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑦 = 106× 1𝐷𝑖𝑦 � |𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑|  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑦𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑦𝑑=1  (2.8) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑 is the daily return of stock 𝑖 in year 𝑦 on day 𝑑, 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑦𝑑 is the corresponding daily 
trading volume in dollars, and 𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of trading days in the year. Following Fang, Noe 
and Tice (2009), I require that at least 200 days of trading data be availabel and stock price be 
above $5. 
It is well known that trading volume for Nasdaq stocks is overstated relative to NYSE 
and AMEX stocks because inter-dealer trades are included in calculation of trading volume on 
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Nasdaq but not on NYSE and AMEX. To make the Amihud illiquidity measures for Nasdaq 
stocks and NYSE stocks comparable, I follow a practice widely used in the literature by cutting 
the Nasdaq trading volume by half when calculating Amihud illiquidity for Nasdaq stocks (See 
Loughran and Marietta-Westberg, 2005).     
The Amihud illiquidity measure in my sample has a skewness of about 28 and a kurtosis 
of about 1074. To reduce the skewness of the stock illiquidity measure and the influence of 
extreme values, I take natural logarithm of the calculated Amihud measure and add a negative 
sign in front to convert it to a continuous measure of stock liquidity.   
The dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is calculated using data from the First Call 
Historical Database (FCHD). FCHD contains a history of First Call’s Real Time Earnings 
Estimates (RTEE) as far back as 1990 over 9,700 securities, among which 8,500 are U.S. 
securities. To construct my measure of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for a firm-year 
in my sample, I first scale the standard deviation of analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecasts 
issued in that year by the corresponding mean earnings forecasts. Then, this ratio is averaged over 
all one-year-ahead earnings forecasts issued in that year. Data on the mean earnings forecasts and 
the standard deviations of earnings forecasts are from the summary statistics file of FCHD. 
Unlike I/B/E/S database in which the summary statistics are calculated using all outstanding 
forecasts, the FCHD summary statistics are calculated using only the most recent estimate of each 
broker, so we do not have to worry about the stale forecasts problem that researchers have met 
when using I/B/E/S. All estimate and actual data are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. 
To reduce the skewness of the measure and the influence of extreme observations, I take the 
natural log of the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts calculated above and use it as the 
measure of information quality of stock prices (DISP).  
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3.4. Construction of accounting information quality proxies 
I follow Francis et al. (2005) to calculate the DD accrual quality metric. Francis et al. 
(2005) augment the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) by including growth in revenue and 
PP&E in the model of normal accruals because McNichols (2002) shows that adding these two 
terms significantly improves the explaining power of the model and thus reduces measurement 
errors. Specifically, using all firms in the Compustat database, I estimate the following cross-
sectional regression for each industry-year with valid data for at least 20 firms, where industry is 
defined by the Fama and French 48 industry classification: 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑏4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑏5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.9) 
where 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total current accrual and it equals to total accrual 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 plus depreciation and 
amortized expenses 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  is operating cash flow from continuing operations, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is 
annual revenue growth and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross property, plant and equipment. All variables are 
deflated by the average total assets in year 𝑡.  Hribar and Collins (2002) recommend to use the 
statement of cash flows data to calcualte accruals to avoid measurement errors. Hence, I use the 
statement of cash flow approach to calculate accruals. In this approach, total accrual 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐼𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  where 𝐼𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is earnings before exordinary items and discontinued operations 
and 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is operating cash flow from continuing operations which is calculated as the 
difference between 𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 (net operating cash flow) and 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (cash flow from exordinary 
items and discontinued operations). All items are from the statement of cash flows.  
To reduce the influence of potential outliers, I truncate my sample at the two 1% tails of 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 before running the regression. The accrual quality metric (AQ) for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is then 
calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regressions over years 𝑡 − 4 through 
𝑡, i.e. 𝐴𝑄𝑖.𝑡 = 𝜎(𝜐𝑖,𝑠) where 𝜐𝑖,𝑠 is the residual from the regression in year 𝑠. Since the estimation 
of AQ in year 𝑡 requires information on cash flow in year 𝑡 + 1, I use the AQ calculated for year  
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𝑡 − 1 to proxy for potential estimation errors in year 𝑡 because it represents the best estimate the 
boards of directors can have in year 𝑡. Note that the AQ metric is negatively related to accrual 
quality, i.e. high AQ means low accrual quality and vice versa. I predict that AQ should be 
negatviely related to the weight on ROA in the board’s updating on estimte of CEO ability based 
on ROA. 
To decompose the AQ measure into its innate component and discretionary component, I 
follow the procedure in Francis et al. (2005) to regress the DD accrual qualit metric AQ on the 
five firm characteristics identified by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to affect a firm’s propensity to 
make unavoidable estimation errors. Specifically, I run the following annual cross-sectional 
regressions using all firms in the Compustat database for each year in  my sample period: 
 
𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆2𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆3𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜆4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆5𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  (2.10) 
where  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is firm size measured as the natural log of total assets, 𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 is the standard 
deviation of firm 𝑖’s sales revenues. 𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of firm 𝑖’s cash flow 
from operations. 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the log of firm 𝑖’s operating cycles, calcualted as 
360/(Sales/Average Accounts Receivables) + 360/(Cost of goods sold)/(Average Inventory) in 
year 𝑡. 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the incidence of negative earnings, i.e. income before extraordinary items < 
0. Besides firm size, each variable is measured on a firm-specific basis over 10-year rolling 
windows (I require at least five valid observations in each window). The predicted value from 
Equation (2.10) is the estimate of the innate component of  firm 𝑖’s accrual quality in year 𝑡 
(iAQ): 
 
𝑖𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?2𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?3𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡+ ?̂?4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?5𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (2.11) 
I use the value of iAQ in year 𝑡 − 1 to be my proxy for potential unavoidable estimation errors in 
the reported earnings in year 𝑡. Since the right-hand-side variables change slowly over time, I 
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expect this to be a good proxy for unavoidable estimation errors in year 𝑡. The residual from 
Equation (2.10) is the discretionary component of AQ, denoted by dAQ in this paper, i.e. 
𝑑𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡.  
There is a shortcoming with the discretionary accruals measure dAQ calculated above for 
measuring discretionary accruals in a given year. Strictly speacking, dAQ is a measure of 
discretionary accruals over the period it is being estiamed. It does not measure the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals in the year it is caclucated for. Whether high discretionary accruals in the 
past five years imply high discretionary accruals in the current year is uncertain. This is especially 
true if the current year operation is under a new CEO. To addresses this shortcoming and check 
the robustness of my results to different discretionary measures, I estimate two alternative 
measures of discretionary accruals.  
The first discretionary accruals measure is based on the modified Jones model as shown 
in Equation (2.12) (see Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995).  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0,𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗,1 � 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡� + 𝜙𝑗,2�Δ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡� + 𝜙𝑗,3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 (2.12) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals and is calculated using data from statement of cash flows as I 
discussed before. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is average total assets, Δ𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is change in accounts receivable, 
Δ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual revenue growth and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is net plant, property and equipments. All variables 
except the inverse of average total assets are deflated by the average total assets in year 𝑡. To 
reduce the influence of outliers, the sample is truncated at the two 1% tails of 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡. 
I run annual cross-sectional regressions of Equation (2.12) for each Fama and French 48 
industry with valid data for 20 or more firms on Compustat over 1992 to 2007. The estimated 
discretionary accrual for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡  is simply the residual  𝜐�𝑖,𝑡 in the equation. Since large 
positive and negative 𝜐�𝑖,𝑡’s all indicate high abnormal accruals and low accrual quality, I use the 
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absoluate value of  𝜐�𝑖,𝑡  as the unsigned discretionary accrual measure from the modified Jones 
model.  
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argue that the residuals from the Jones and modified 
Jones model may be correlated with firm performance so they recommend to control for the 
normal level of accruals conditional on firm performance where firm performance is measured by 
ROA (annual net income divided by average total assets).  My second discretionary accruals are 
based on this performance-matched apporach. Specifically, I identify a firm from the same Fama 
and French 48 industry with the closest ROA to the sample firm as the control firm and then 
deduct the residual from Equation (2.12) for the control firm from that for the sample firm to get 
the performance-matched discretionary accruals for the sample firm. It is important to note that 
this measure can actually add noise and reduce the power of test when performance is not an 
issue (see Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010).    
Controlling for firm performance can also be done under a linear regression approach, 
though according to Kothari et al. (2005) the performance-matched approach above should 
perform better because it allows for nonlinear effect of firm performance on discretionary 
accruals. However, for comparison with results in Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata (2009) who use 
the linear regression approach to calculate discretionary accruals of Kothari et al. (2009), I also 
estimate a discretionary accruals measure where I control for firm performance by adding the 
current year ROA to the modified Jones model in Equation (2.12) as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0,𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗,1 � 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡� + 𝜙𝑗,2�Δ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡�+ 𝜙𝑗,3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑗,4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 (2.13) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on assets calculated as the net income in year 𝑡 devided by average total 
assets in year 𝑡. All other variables are defined as in Equation (2.12). Unlike Hazarika et al. 
(2009) who match on the prior year 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1, I use current year 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 because Kothari et al. 
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(2005) find that matching based on current year 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 peforms better than matching on prior 
year 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1.  
 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Panel A reports statistics of 
firm and corporate governance variables, while Panel B reports statistics of information quality 
variables. Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of firm and governance characteristics by 
new and old CEOs, where the new CEO subsample consists of CEOs whose tenure is below the 
sample median (about 5.5 years) and the old CEO subsample consists of CEOs whose tenure is at 
or above the sample median. As we can see, firm characteristics such as total assets, sales, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, etc. are very similar between the two subsamples. However, there do seem 
to be some differences in corporate governance characteristics between the two subsamples. A 
higher percentage of firms in the new CEO subsample have a majority-independent board, a 
separate CEO and Chairman and a non-founder-related CEO. Also, new CEOs are on avearge 
younger and hold lower fraction of voting power. The average (median) tenure of new CEOs is 
2.67 (2.58) years while that for old CEOs is 12.89 (10.50) years. Table 2.3 reports descriptive 
statistics of information quality variables by new and old CEOs. As we can see, they are very 
similar across the two subsamples. Table 2.4 reports the correlations among the information 
quality variables. The Spearman correlation coefficients, which measure correlations in ranks of 
the variables, are highly significant for all pairs of variables, while the Pearson correlation 
coefficients, which measure linear correlations, are highly significant for all pairs except two. 
Although these variables are highly correlated, I find that they have quite different economic 
effects on turnover-performance sensitivity based on coefficient estimates from regressions where 
they are included one at a time.   
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 2,936 firms on ExecuComp database from 1992 to 2007 with a total of 23,536 firm-
year observations. Total assets, Sales, Market value and Net PPE are in $ millions. N is the number of 
observations with non-missing values. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated as the sum of debt in current 
liabilities plus long term debt divided by total assets. Independent board is a dummy variable that equals to 
one if more than half of the directors are independent. CEO duality is a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the board. Founder is a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
CEO is a founder or is from a founder’s family. CEO voting is the percentage of voting power held by the 
CEO. Hceoown is a dummy variable that equals to one if CEO voting power is above 3 percent. 
Nonemployee block is a dummy for the presence of a nonemployee blockholder on the board. Return is the 
industry-median-adjusted stock return in the year prior to CEO turnover. ROA is the industry-median-
adjusted ROA in the year prior to CEO turnover. Industry is defined by the Fama and French 48 industry 
classification. RVOL is the standard deviation of monthly industry-adjusted stock returns in the year prior 
to CEO turnover. LIQ is the negative of the natural logarithm of Amihud illiquidity over the year prior to 
CEO turnover. DISP is the natural logarithm of dispersion in analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in 
the year prior to CEO turnover. EVOL is the standard deviation of annual industry-adjusted ROA in the 5 
years prior to CEO turnover. AQ is the accrual quality measure calculated based on the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) (DD) model using the most recent 5 years of data. iAQ is the innate component of AQ. dAQ is the 
discretionary component of AQ. MJ_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals in the year prior to 
CEO turnover calculated based on the modified Jones model. PM_DA is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals in the year prior to CEO turnover calculated using the performance-matched approach of Kothari 
et al. (2005). LN_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals in the year prior to CEO turnover 
calculated based on the linear regression approach of Kothari et al. (2005).  
  
 Mean Std Dev P1 Median P99 N 
Panel A: Firm and governance variables 
Total assets 12105.04 61502.91 51.32 1541.28 194716.00 22197 
Sales 4861.21 14080.56 18.52 1240.70 56434.00 22191 
Market Value 6901.01 22330.25 35.20 1470.29 100240.30 22161 
Net PPE 1821.19 5598.31 1.70 294.11 22801.00 21708 
Tobin’s Q 2.07 2.40 0.79 1.51 9.16 22158 
Leverage 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.85 22111 
Board size 9.64 2.85 5.00 9.00 18.00 14574 
Independent Board 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 14574 
CEO duality 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 14574 
CEO age 55.44 7.42 39.00 56.00 75.00 21957 
CEO tenure (years) 7.78 7.45 0.50 5.42 35.92 22198 
Founder 0.14 0.35 0 0 1 22198 
CEO voting 3.48 9.36 0.00 0.00 52.60 14161 
Hceoown 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 22198 
Nonemployee block 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 14574 
Return 0.05 0.39 -0.71 -0.01 1.78 21258 
ROA 0.07 0.14 -0.27 0.04 0.57 21577 
Panel B: Information quality variables 
RVOL 0.094 0.057 0.022 0.079 0.324 21258 
LIQ 5.812 2.095 0.763 5.901 10.282 20791 
DISP -3.039 1.245 -5.015 -3.295 0.862 15576 
EVOL 0.054 0.060 0.003 0.034 0.347 19417 
AQ 0.048 0.047 0.005 0.035 0.258 13951 
iAQ 0.047 0.030 0.008 0.040 0.157 13769 
dAQ 0.001 0.036 -0.073 -0.003 0.137 13769 
MJ_DA 0.059 0.072 0.001 0.039 0.327 20228 
PM_DA 0.080 0.089 0.001 0.054 0.425 20228 
LN_DA 0.049 0.056 0.001 0.034 0.259 20228 
115 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of firm and governance characteristics by new and old CEOs 
This table is the same as Table 2.1 except the sample is broke up at the median CEO tenure. The new CEOs 
subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median, while the old CEOs subsample 
contains CEOs whose tenure is equal to or above the sample median. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 Mean Std Dev P1 Median P99 N 
Panel A: New CEOs       
Total assets 13324.96 70251.49 43.11 1686.30 219232.00 11112 
Sales 5332.28 14687.18 15.01 1344.10 59917.00 11107 
Market Value 7064.39 22322.09 24.82 1480.29 99744.79 11088 
Net PPE 1997.06 5780.97 1.50 318.08 23640.00 10890 
Tobin’s Q 2.03 2.81 0.77 1.48 9.19 11088 
Leverage 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.92 11071 
Board size 9.79 2.72 5.00 10.00 18.00 7252 
Independent Board 0.83 0.38 0 1 1 7252 
CEO duality 0.51 0.50 0 1 1 7252 
CEO age 53.40 6.62 38.00 54.00 69.00 10990 
CEO tenure (years) 2.67 1.45 0.42 2.58 5.42 11112 
Founder 0.06 0.23 0 0 1 11112 
CEO voting 1.13 4.46 0.00 0.00 20.80 6941 
Hceoown 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 11112 
Nonemployee block 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 7252 
Return 0.04 0.39 -0.71 -0.01 1.74 10468 
ROA 0.06 0.14 -0.31 0.03 0.57 10782 
       
Panel B: Old CEOs       
Total assets 10882.15 51229.78 56.38 1402.78 188874.00 11085 
Sales 4389.15 13429.34 22.69 1154.83 51794.00 11084 
Market Value 6737.40 22338.24 48.61 1465.26 103341.30 11073 
Net PPE 1644.15 5402.69 1.91 266.32 22029.00 10818 
Tobin’s Q 2.11 1.90 0.81 1.55 9.16 11070 
Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.78 11040 
Board size 9.50 2.96 5.00 9.00 19.00 7322 
Independent Board 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 7322 
CEO duality 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 7322 
CEO age 57.48 7.62 40.00 58.00 79.00 10967 
CEO tenure (years) 12.89 7.54 5.58 10.50 39.50 11086 
Founder 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 11086 
CEO voting 5.74 11.93 0.00 1.80 63.82 7220 
Hceoown 0.57 0.50 0 1 1 11086 
Nonemployee block 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 7322 
Return 0.05 0.39 -0.70 0.00 1.79 10790 
ROA 0.07 0.14 -0.22 0.04 0.58 10795 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of information quality variables by new and old CEOs 
The new CEOs subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median, while the old CEOs 
subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is equal to or above the sample median. All variables are defined 
in Table 2.1. 
 Mean Std Dev P1 Median P99 N 
Panel A: New CEOs       
RVOL 0.095 0.059 0.022 0.078 0.324 10468 
LIQ 5.872 2.106 0.847 5.963 10.370 10202 
DISP -2.985 1.295 -5.011 -3.259 0.961 7676 
EVOL 0.054 0.060 0.004 0.034 0.347 9473 
AQ 0.050 0.050 0.005 0.036 0.266 6834 
iAQ 0.047 0.031 0.008 0.040 0.158 6757 
dAQ 0.003 0.037 -0.072 -0.002 0.149 6757 
MJ_DA 0.061 0.079 0.001 0.039 0.352 10143 
PM_DA 0.080 0.092 0.001 0.053 0.437 10143 
LN_DA 0.050 0.059 0.001 0.034 0.266 10143 
       
Panel B: Old CEOs       
RVOL 0.093 0.055 0.023 0.079 0.317 10790 
LIQ 5.754 2.082 0.615 5.842 10.143 10589 
DISP -3.091 1.193 -5.027 -3.317 0.760 7900 
EVOL 0.055 0.060 0.003 0.034 0.347 9944 
AQ 0.047 0.045 0.005 0.035 0.247 7117 
iAQ 0.047 0.028 0.009 0.041 0.157 7012 
dAQ 0.000 0.035 -0.074 -0.004 0.119 7012 
MJ_DA 0.057 0.065 0.001 0.039 0.299 10085 
PM_DA 0.080 0.086 0.001 0.055 0.407 10085 
LN_DA 0.049 0.052 0.001 0.034 0.254 10085 
 
Table 2.4: Correlation coefficients between information quality variables 
All variables are defined in Table 2.1. Pearson correlations are reported above the main diagonal and 
Spearman correlations are reported below the main diagonal. All correlations are statistically significant at 
above 1% level except for the Pearson correlations between DISP and dAQ and between iAQ and dAQ 
which are statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  
 RVOL LIQ DISP EVOL AQ iAQ dAQ MJ_DA PM_DA LN_DA 
           
RVOL  -0.30 0.34 0.44 0.35 0.48 0.05 0.34 0.24 0.27 
LIQ -0.36  -0.25 -0.11 -0.09 -0.29 0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 
DISP 0.30 -0.28  0.26 0.23 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.14 
EVOL 0.44 -0.11 0.28  0.48 0.61 0.11 0.29 0.21 0.28 
AQ 0.37 -0.12 0.20 0.53  0.64 0.77 0.29 0.21 0.28 
iAQ 0.51 -0.36 0.35 0.58 0.60  0.00 0.29 0.20 0.28 
dAQ -0.05 0.20 -0.08 0.07 0.57 -0.22  0.12 0.09 0.12 
MJ_DA 0.26 -0.08 0.12 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.07  0.47 0.72 
PM_DA 0.17 -0.05 0.06 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.27  0.52 
LN_DA 0.21 -0.06 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.39 0.31  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Stock price information quality effects 
Table 2.5 presents the main results on the effect of stock price information quality on the 
board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability based on industry-adjusted stock returns. Here, stock 
volatility is used to proxy for exogenous firm-specific shocks that are not under the control of the 
CEO, and stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts are used to proxy for noise 
in stock prices due to trading and imprecise information. Since board data on RiskMetrics was not 
available until 1996, I estimate two specifications for each information quality proxy – one 
without controls for board characterstics and the other with them. The former is estimated using 
data from 1992 to 2007, while the latter is estimated using data from 1996 to 2007. In the former 
specification (columns 1, 3 and 5), I only control for firm size and CEO age in order to maximize 
the number of observations. In the latter specification (columns 2, 4 and 6), I add controls for 
board independence, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO voting power, CEO founder status, 
nonemployee blockholders on board and the interaction between board independence and stock 
return21
In panel A of Table 2.5, I report results estimated by including year and Fama and French 
48 industry fixed effects. The results show that coefficient on stock return is negative and 
statistically significant in all specificaiton, indicating that stock return is negatively related to the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Consistent with my main hypotheses, the interactions between 
stock return and stock volatility and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts are positive and 
statistically significant at above 5% significance levels in all specifications, suggesting a negative 
relation between the weight on stock return in the board’s updating process and stock volatility 
and dispersion in analyst’s earnings forecasts. Similarly, the interaction between stock return and 
stock liquidity is negative and statistically significant at above 5% significance levels in all
. 
                                                     
21 Adding additional control variables such as Tobin’s Q, leverage, number of antitakeover provisions, and interaction 
terms between CEO voting right, dual CEO, founder CEO and stock returns does not change the results. 
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Table 2.5: Stock price information quality effects 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an 
indicator for forced CEO turnover and the key explanatory variables are the information quality proxy, 
Info, and the interaction between stock return and information quality, Return*Info. The particular 
information quality proxy used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 
2.1. For each proxy, I show two specifications with different sample sizes. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are 
estimated using data from 1992 to 2007, while columns 2, 4 and 6 are estimated using data from 1996 to 
2007 because corporate governance data is unavailable until 1996. Year and industry fixed effects are 
included in all columns. In Panel A, industry fixed effects are controlled at the Fama and French 48 
industry level. In panel B, industry fixed effects are controlled at the Fama and French 17 industry level 
and standard errors are clustered by firm.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively in two-sided tests.  
Panel A: Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects  
 RVOL  LIQ  DISP 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Return -3.837*** -3.780***  -1.620*** -1.636**  -1.954*** -1.971*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Info 7.155*** 7.506***  -0.114*** -0.148***  0.271*** 0.304*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Return*Info 9.490*** 7.502***  -0.188** -0.225**  0.254** 0.341** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.015) (0.025)  (0.028) (0.013) 
Logat 0.090*** 0.101***  0.153*** 0.152**  0.052 0.052 
 (0.002) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.025)  (0.152) (0.245) 
Age -0.031*** -0.028***  -0.035*** -0.032***  -0.029*** -0.018* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.055) 
Indepboard  0.145   0.108   0.137 
  (0.390)   (0.545)   (0.522) 
Return*  Indepboard  0.257   0.079   0.078 
  (0.535)   (0.875)   (0.886) 
CEO duality  -0.330***   -0.354***   -0.391*** 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Founder  -1.322***   -1.457***   -1.182*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Hceoown  -0.543***   -0.562***   -0.707*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Nonemployee block  0.165   0.077   0.128 
  (0.154)   (0.535)   (0.343) 
Constant -3.203*** -19.462***  -2.273* -
18.090*** 
 -1.208 -
18.008*** 
 (0.006) (0.000)  (0.051) (0.000)  (0.330) (0.000) 
         
Observations 22081 14665  21057 14141  15727 11036 
Chisq 665.0 559.4  484.0 473.4  469.6 426.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 0.142  0.0964 0.133  0.118 0.148 
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Table 2.5, continued 
Panel B: Fama and French 17 industry fixed effects and clustered errors by firm 
 RVOL  LIQ  DISP 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Return -3.830*** -3.757***  -1.576*** -1.659*  -1.963*** -2.054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.051)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Info 7.689*** 8.175***  -0.081* -0.106*  0.275*** 0.296*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.055) (0.067)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Return*Info 9.426*** 7.581***  -0.206** -0.233*  0.262** 0.335** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.042) (0.095)  (0.033) (0.026) 
Log total assets 0.097*** 0.106***  0.106** 0.102  0.052 0.146 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.036) (0.116)  (0.150) (0.515) 
CEO age -0.034*** -0.032***  -0.039*** -0.038***  -0.032*** 0.104 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.865) 
Indepboard  0.149   0.092   0.048 
  (0.390)   (0.630)   (0.261) 
Return*Indepboard  0.206   0.060   -0.023*** 
  (0.640)   (0.920)   (0.002) 
CEO duality  -0.353***   -0.384***   -0.412*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002) 
Founder  -1.299***   -1.427***   -1.159*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Hceoown  -0.533***   -0.551***   -0.671*** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Nonemployee block  0.158   0.051   0.112 
  (0.160)   (0.665)   (0.385) 
Constant -3.210*** -2.962***  -2.085*** -1.990***  -1.295** -1.767** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.043) (0.013) 
         
Observations 22075 14686  21054 14157  15728 10962 
Chisq 542.5 441.7  343.1 329.7  401.4 314.3 
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.133  0.0874 0.121  0.108 0.135 
 
 
specificaitons, suggesting a positive relation between the weight on stock returns and stock 
liquidity. As for the control variables, log of total assets is positively related to forced CEO 
turnover and is statistically significant in four out of the six specification. This is consistent with 
findings in Huson, Parrino, & Starks (2001) who find that larger firms tend to have more 
independent boards, lower CEO ownership and higher institutional ownership. Hence, the log of 
total assets in the parsimonious specifications in columns 1, 3 and 5 also serve as a control for 
corporate governance. CEO duality, Founder, and the high CEO ownership dummy are all 
negatively related to forced CEO turnover, suggesting that CEOs who are Chairmen of the board, 
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who are founders or who are from the founders family, or who have larger voting powers are less 
likely to be forced out (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Goyal & Park, 2002).    
In unreported results, I also estimate logit regressions similar to those in Table 2.5 but use 
clustered standard errors by firm. I find that the coefficient estimates and their statistical 
significance are similar to those in Table 2.5 but for unknown reasons the model-fit Chi-square 
statistics are missing in Stata outputs when Fama and French 48 indusry fixed effects are 
included. Hence, in Table 2.6, I report results estimated using industry fixed effects at the Fama 
and French 17 industry level and clustered standard errors by firm. As we can see, the coefficients 
on the interaction between stock return and stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts) are negative (positive) and statistically significant at the 5% level across the columns 
except in column 4 where the use of clustered standard error reduces the statistical significance of 
the interation between stock return and stock liquidity from the 5% level to the 10% level.   
 
4.2. Accounting information quality effects 
Table 2.6 presents the main results on the effect of accounting information quality on the 
board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability based on industry-adjusted ROA. Here, earnings 
volatility is used to proxy for exogenous firm-specific shocks that are not under the control of the 
CEO and the DD accrual quality measure, AQ, is used to proxy for estimation errors in accruals. 
Similar to Table 2.5, I estimate two specifications for each proxy – one with controls for only 
firm size and CEO age and the other with additional controls for board and CEO characteristics. 
The former is estimated using data from 1992 to 2007 while the latter is estimated using data 
from 1996 to 2007. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns where industry is 
defined by the Fama and French 48 industry classification.  
First, we note that prior year industry-adjusted ROA is negatively related to the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover in all columns. This is consistent with findings in prior studies 
that CEOs in firms with poor accounting performance are more likely to be removed. Turning to 
121 
 
earnings volatility and AQ, we observe that the interaction between ROA and earnings volatility 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications (columns 1 and 2), the positive 
sign of the coefficient is consistent with a lower weight on ROA when earnings volatility is 
higher. The interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and AQ is statistically significant at the 
5% level in column 3 but becomes statistically insignificant (p-value 0.15) in column 4 when the 
sample size is reduced and other control variables are included, though the sign of the interaction 
is consistent with my hypothesis in both columns. Overall, the results are highly significant for 
earnings volatility but are somewhat weaker for AQ in the full sample.  
As I explained previously, the AQ measure captures both unavoidable estimation erros 
and intentiaonal estimation errors. If the board of directors cannot distinguish the two types of 
errors, I expect the two types of errors to have similar effect on boards’ learning of CEO ability 
from accounting earnings. The weaker results for AQ above would imply that estimation errors in 
accruals only have weak effect on the board’s learning of CEO ability from earnings. However, if 
the board of directors has inside information about the magnitude of intentional estimation errors, 
then they should be able to undo the intentional estimation errors, and as a result, intentional 
estimation errors should appear to have no systematic effect on the board’s learning of CEO 
ability from accounting earnings. In this case, the weaker results for AQ above are likely to be 
driven by its inclusion of intentional estimation errors.  
To test if the board of directors treats the two types of estimation errors differently and 
the differential effects of the two types of errors are driving the weaker results for AQ above, I 
decompose the AQ measure into its innate component and discretionary component following 
Francis et al. (2005) and repeat the logit regressions in columns 3 and 4 for AQ by using the two 
components of AQ as the information quality proxy respectively. The innate component of AQ, 
iAQ, is a proxy for unavoidable estimation errors and the discretionary component of AQ, dAQ, 
is a proxy for intentional estimation errors or discretionary accruals. The regression results are 
reported in columns 5 through 8 in Table 2.6. Consistent with the board treating the two types of
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Table 2.6: Accounting information quality effects 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for forced CEO turnover and the key 
explanatory variables are the information quality proxy, Info, and the interaction between ROA and information quality, ROA*Info. The particular 
information quality proxy used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. For each proxy, I show two specifications 
with different sample sizes. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are estimated using data from 1992 to 2007, while columns 2, 4 and 6 are estimated using data from 
1996 to 2007 because corporate governance data is unavailable until 1996. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all columns where industry 
fixed effects are controlled at the Fama and French 48 industry level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively in two-sided tests.  
 EVOL  AQ  iAQ  dAQ 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
ROA -5.651*** -6.167***  -4.748*** -4.850***  -6.113*** -5.725***  -4.081*** -4.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Info -0.547 -0.692  0.722 -0.271  -3.622* -4.718*  2.240** 1.170 
 (0.484) (0.525)  (0.434) (0.843)  (0.091) (0.096)  (0.047) (0.450) 
ROA*Info 12.569*** 18.516***  8.205** 9.118  21.335*** 17.586*  2.297 2.237 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.037) (0.147)  (0.007) (0.093)  (0.682) (0.786) 
Log total assets 0.030 0.047  0.052 0.066  0.013 0.035  0.045 0.062 
 (0.320) (0.224)  (0.145) (0.134)  (0.745) (0.473)  (0.204) (0.161) 
CEO age -0.038*** -0.030***  -0.044*** -0.036***  -0.046*** -0.038***  -0.045*** -0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Indepboard  0.019   0.010   0.024   0.023 
  (0.881)   (0.942)   (0.861)   (0.867) 
ROA*Indepboard  -0.429   -0.474   -0.618   -0.592 
  (0.631)   (0.622)   (0.528)   (0.537) 
CEO duality  -0.245**   -0.271**   -0.263**   -0.278** 
  (0.028)   (0.026)   (0.032)   (0.023) 
Founder  -1.282***   -1.301***   -1.330***   -1.304*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Hceoown  -0.479***   -0.549***   -0.504***   -0.511*** 
  (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
Nonemployee block  0.170   0.108   0.131   0.133 
  (0.148)   (0.406)   (0.317)   (0.311) 
Constant -1.534* -17.181***  -1.473 -17.414***  -0.431 -16.825***  -0.925 -17.393*** 
 (0.096) (0.000)  (0.198) (0.000)  (0.715) (0.000)  (0.420) (0.000) 
Observations 19591 13727  13907 10849  13735 10724  13735 10724 
Chisq 346.4 321.0  291.3 277.8  289.9 280.7  282.8 276.5 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0656 0.0864  0.0725 0.0904  0.0731 0.0920  0.0713 0.0906 
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estimation errors differently, I find that the interaction between ROA and the innate component of 
AQ is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level or better in both specifications. In 
contrast, the interaction between ROA and the discretionary component of AQ is statistically 
insignificant in either specification. Hence, the effect of AQ in columns 3 and 4 is completely 
driven by the innate component of AQ. It is worth to note that Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata 
(2009) also find that the board has inside information about discretionary accruals. 
In unreported results, I also cluster standard errors by firm and find that the statistic 
significance of the interaction terms actually becomes stronger. However, somehow, the reported 
model fit Chi-square statistic from Stata is missing when clustered errors are used together with 
Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects so I do not report these results. Unlike the case with 
stock price information quality proxies, it is important to maintain the Fama and French 48 
industry fixed effects when accrual qulity is used as the information quality proxy because the 
AQ measure is estimated by running annual cross-sectional regressions within each Fama and 
French 48 industry. Some of the variations in AQ therefore reflect varying degree of model fit 
across industry and year rather than mismatch between accruals and cash flows so it is important 
to remove them from the AQ by using the right industry fixed effects. 
 
4.3. Information quality effects in the new and old CEO subsamples 
So far, I have shown that my full sample results are consistent with the predictions of 
Bayesian learning models of CEO turnover. In this section, I explore a further implication of the 
board’s learning about CEO ability from firm performance to better understand the board’s 
learning process and its implications for turnover-performance sensitivity.  
If the board does learn CEO ability from firm performance as I have shown above, then 
there are several reasons to believe that the effect of information quality on the board’s learning 
process should in general be stronger for newly hired CEOs (I call them new CEOs in the 
following) than for relatively longer-tenured CEOs (I call them old CEOs in the following). First, 
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the board usually has less precise information about the ability of new CEOs than old CEOs. 
According to the intuition from the basic Bayesian learning model I present in Section 2.2, this 
means that the board’s update on CEO ability is likely to be more sensitive to firm performance 
for new CEOs than for old CEOs and thus the effect of information quality on the updating 
process is more easily identifiable for new CEOs. Second, publicly observable stock and 
accounting performance is likely to be a more important source of information to the board of 
directors in firms with new CEOs than in firms with old CEOs because the board of directors has 
yet to acquire more private information about the newly hired CEO. As a result, the board is 
likely to pay more attention to noise in stock and accounting performance in firms with new 
CEOs than in firms with old CEOs. Stock performance can also be more important for evaluating 
new CEOs than old CEOs because stock market and boards of directors are more or less on equal 
footing in terms of information about newly hired CEOs. In this situation, the aggregation role of 
stock market gives the stock market an advantage over the boards of directors because it can 
aggregate information from far more sources and thus potentially produce more accurate 
information about the newly hired CEO. Third, the same levels of stock liquidity and dispersion 
in analysts’ earnings forecasts are likely to be associated with larger noise in stock prices in firms 
with new CEOs than in firms with old CEOs because the stock market has less precise prior on 
the CEO ability and is thus subject to greater influence by noise traders and market sentiments in 
firms with new CEOs. For accounting information quality, the same firm characteristics-driven 
propensity for making unavoidable estimation errors is also likely to be associated with larger 
estimation errors in accruals in firms with new CEOs than in firms with old CEOs because the 
new CEO is less expert at forecasting. Overall, the arguments for differential effects for new and 
old CEOs are stronger for stock price information quality proxies than for accounting information 
quality proxies and are stronger for noise related to discrepancy between observed performance 
and true underlying performance than for noise related to exogenous shocks to firm performance.   
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To test the differential effects of information quality of stock prices in firms with 
relatively new and old CEOs, I separate CEOs in my sample into two groups based on their 
tenure. The new CEO group consists of CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median, which is 
about 5.5 years, while the old CEO group consists of CEOs whose tenure is equal to or above the 
sample median22. I then re-estimate the logit regressions before using each of the two subsamples 
of CEOs. The use of median tenure ensures that the two subsamples have similar sample sizes so 
that any difference in statistical significance between the two subsamples is unlikely to be driven 
by differences in sample size. The median CEO tenure of 5.5 years also seems to be a good cutoff 
point in itself because five-year intervals are often used by individuals and institutions to classify 
career stages. Table 2.7 reports the subsample results for stock volatility, stock liquidity and 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts separately. The information quality variable being tested 
is shown on top of each column and is denoted by info collectively in the list of independent 
variables. Fama and French 17 industry and year fixed effects are included in all columns. Also, 
standard errors are clustered by firm in all columns23
A clear contrast emerges from results in Table 2.7:  the coefficient estimates of the 
interaction between information quality and industry-adjusted stock return are statistically 
significant at the 5% level for new CEOs across the three proxies of stock price information 
quality but are statistically insignificant for old CEOs also across the three proxies of stock price 
information quality. The control variables in general have the expected signs and some are 
statistically significant. If we compare the control variables across the two subsamples of CEOs, 
we can observe some interesting patterns. For example, the CEO-Chairman duality indicator is 
statistically significant at above 5% level for new CEOs but statistically insignificant for old 
CEOs. This may reflect the fact that the board has more confidence in new CEOs who are given 
.  
                                                     
22 Here the term new and old are used for convenience, they are not based on age even though it is true that CEOs with 
longer tenure tend to be older in age. 
23 Results based on Fama and French 48 industry and year fixed effects but no clustered standard errors are stronger. 
To save space, I don’t report them but are available upon requests. 
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the Chairman title so they are less likely to be fired. Or being the Chairman makes significant 
differences for new CEOs to entrench themselves but not so much for long-tenured CEOs whose 
long tenure already gives them large influence over the board. In contrast, if a CEO is a founder 
or comes from a founder’s family, the CEO is less likely to be replaced regardless of his/her 
tenure.          
Table 2.8 reports the subsample results for earnings volatility and accrual quality. For 
earnings volatility, the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and earnings volatility is 
statistically significant in both the new CEO and old CEO subsamples so there is no clear 
indication of differential effects for new and old CEOs. Since my arguments for differential 
effects for new and old CEOs are about a general pattern rather than a rule that applies to all 
information quality proxies, and also the original arguments for differential effect of earnings 
volatility are not among the strongest, this finding does not refute my hypothesis. Moving to 
columns 2 and 3, for AQ, I find that the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and AQ is 
statistically significant in the new CEO subsample but is insignificant in the old CEO subsample, 
which is consistent with the general pattern that the information quality effect should be stronger 
when the CEO is relatively new. Comparing this result with that in Table 2.6, we can see that the 
weak result on AQ in Table 2.6 is also driven by the fact that the full sample includes old CEOs. 
When I decompose the AQ into its innate and discretionary component in columns 5 through 8, I 
find that the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and iAQ is significant in the new CEO 
subsample but is insignificant in the old CEO subsample, while the interaction between industry-
adjusted ROA and dAQ is statistically insignificant in both the new and old CEO subsamples, 
which provides further evidence that the board treats unintentional and intentional estimation 
errors differently. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on dAQ is statistically insignificant in the new CEO 
subsample but is positive and statistically significant in the old CEO subsample. The result in the
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 Table 2.7: Stock price information quality effects by new and old CEOs 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions as those in Table 2.5 by new and old CEO subsamples. The new CEO subsample 
contains CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median (about 5.5 years) and the old CEO subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is at or above the 
sample median. As in previous tables, Info is the information quality proxy and Return*Info represents the interaction between stock return and the 
information quality proxy. The particular information quality proxy used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
Year and industry fixed effects at the Fama and French 17 industry level are included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, ** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively in two-sided tests.   
 RVOL  LIQ  DISP 
 New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Return -3.599*** -3.892***  -0.924 -3.524**  -2.138*** -2.349** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.304) (0.022)  (0.007) (0.042) 
Info 7.851*** 6.616***  -0.041 -0.149  0.266*** 0.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.564) (0.130)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Return*Info 8.040*** 4.300  -0.328** 0.020  0.446** 0.073 
 (0.001) (0.341)  (0.036) (0.931)  (0.021) (0.735) 
Indepboard 0.060 0.349  0.042 0.232  0.167 0.200 
 (0.765) (0.346)  (0.849) (0.555)  (0.556) (0.625) 
Return*Indepboard 0.317 0.232  0.361 -0.225  0.749 -0.634 
 (0.514) (0.808)  (0.597) (0.848)  (0.332) (0.579) 
Log total assets 0.046 0.184***  -0.047 0.289***  0.006 0.119 
 (0.287) (0.004)  (0.584) (0.009)  (0.912) (0.124) 
CEO age -0.021** -0.048***  -0.023** -0.055***  -0.007 -0.046*** 
 (0.024) (0.000)  (0.021) (0.000)  (0.526) (0.000) 
CEO duality -0.412*** -0.277  -0.439*** -0.250  -0.433*** -0.388 
 (0.003) (0.177)  (0.003) (0.247)  (0.010) (0.102) 
Founder -1.507*** -0.994***  -1.472*** -1.130***  -1.845*** -0.814** 
 (0.003) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.012) 
Hceoown -0.329 -0.654***  -0.233 -0.790***  -0.512 -0.670** 
 (0.165) (0.004)  (0.362) (0.003)  (0.102) (0.010) 
Nonemployee block 0.211 0.096  0.108 0.014  0.213 -0.044 
 (0.139) (0.630)  (0.467) (0.948)  (0.183) (0.848) 
Constant -3.131*** -2.400**  -2.114** -2.076*  -1.687* 0.516 
 (0.000) (0.029)  (0.013) (0.079)  (0.067) (0.662) 
Observations 6844 7098  6560 6872  5107 5358 
Chisq 261.2 191.3  196.6 162.6  174.3 156.1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.150  0.102 0.147  0.124 0.155 
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Table 2.8: Accounting information quality effects by new and old CEOs 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions as those in Table 2.6 by new and old CEOs. The new CEO subsample contains CEOs 
whose tenure is below the sample median (about 5.5 years) and the old CEO subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is at or above the sample median. 
As in previous tables, Info is the information quality proxy and ROA*Info represents the interaction between stock return and the information quality 
proxy. The particular information quality proxy used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. Year and industry 
fixed effects at the Fama and French 48 industry level are included in all columns. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively in two-sided tests.   
 EVOL   AQ   iAQ   dAQ  
 New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
ROA -5.363*** -7.391***  -5.130*** -3.718**  -6.553*** -3.774*  -4.057*** -4.151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.038)  (0.000) (0.077)  (0.000) (0.004) 
Info -0.748 -1.503  -3.345* 3.454*  -9.579** 1.463  -1.248 4.633* 
 (0.591) (0.411)  (0.096) (0.071)  (0.012) (0.740)  (0.545) (0.054) 
ROA*Info 16.770*** 20.644**  15.616* -9.629  23.460* -4.141  6.647 -11.333 
 (0.001) (0.035)  (0.058) (0.536)  (0.066) (0.855)  (0.491) (0.544) 
Indepboard -0.089 0.175  -0.221 0.406*  -0.247 0.457*  -0.229 0.458* 
 (0.586) (0.392)  (0.217) (0.080)  (0.167) (0.052)  (0.202) (0.052) 
ROA*Indepboard 0.091 -1.407  0.416 -2.669  0.522 -3.085*  0.440 -3.031* 
 (0.932) (0.400)  (0.723) (0.129)  (0.659) (0.081)  (0.704) (0.091) 
Log total assets -0.007 0.089  -0.013 0.143*  -0.063 0.138*  0.004 0.112 
 (0.898) (0.155)  (0.826) (0.051)  (0.321) (0.084)  (0.951) (0.128) 
CEO age -0.018* -0.041***  -0.027** -0.046***  -0.028** -0.049***  -0.025** -0.048*** 
 (0.098) (0.002)  (0.031) (0.003)  (0.024) (0.001)  (0.046) (0.001) 
CEO duality -0.331** -0.073  -0.231 -0.345  -0.228 -0.337  -0.253 -0.342 
 (0.024) (0.713)  (0.150) (0.103)  (0.157) (0.111)  (0.116) (0.106) 
Founder -1.524*** -0.972***  -2.102*** -0.890***  -2.174*** -0.897***  -2.078*** -0.884*** 
 (0.003) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Hceoown -0.251 -0.655***  -0.319 -0.822***  -0.185 -0.804***  -0.234 -0.812*** 
 (0.310) (0.004)  (0.261) (0.002)  (0.509) (0.002)  (0.408) (0.002) 
Nonemployee block 0.222 0.142  0.125 0.080  0.167 0.093  0.153 0.093 
 (0.144) (0.472)  (0.456) (0.719)  (0.323) (0.675)  (0.367) (0.675) 
Constant -17.527*** -16.430***  -16.942*** -15.941  -16.101*** -15.944***  -17.269*** -15.695*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (.)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 6322 6558  5028 5252  4972 5190  4972 5190 
Chisq 160.8 179.5  137.7 168.3  145.0 162.4  136.9 165.9 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0771 0.118  0.0798 0.134  0.0845 0.130  0.0798 0.133 
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old CEO subsample is consistent with Hazarika et al. (2009) who find that discretionary accruals 
significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover. One reason for the contrast between the 
results in the new and old CEO subsamples is that AQ (thus dAQ) is calculated using data in the 
previous 5 years so dAQ really measures the discretionary accruals in the past 5 years. All old 
CEOs can be held responsible for the discretionary accruals happened during the previous five 
years but not all new CEOs. A second reason may be that only old CEOs have the influence and 
power to successfully manipulate earnings. 
As I just alluded, one problem with using the discretionary component of AQ above to 
proxy for discretionary accruals in the year prior to CEO turnover is that the measure is estimated 
using data over a 5-year period prior to the year the measure is used for. Although it is reasonable 
to assume that past unavoidable estimation errors related to slowly moving firm characteristics 
predict future unavoidable estimation errors, it is less clear if past intentional estimation errors 
predict future intentional errors, especially when there is a change of CEO. To further confirm the 
differential effects of unavoidable estimation errors and intentional estimation errors, I construct 
three additional measures of discretionary accruals which are calculated using just data in the year 
the measure is used for. With these new measures, I repeat the analysis on discretionary accruals 
above. The three measures of discretionary accruals are constructed using modified Jones model, 
the performance-matched approach of Kothari et al. (2005) and the linear regression approach of 
Kothari et al. (2005). They are discussed in detail in Section 3. Table 2.9 reports the coefficient 
estimates of logit regressions using the absolute value of these three discretionary accruals for the 
full sample and the new and old CEO subsamples. Within the new and old CEO subsamples, the 
interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and the unsigned discretionary accruals measure is 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels for all three discretionary accruals measures. In 
the full sample, only the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and the unsigned 
discretionary accruals estimated by the linear regression approach of Kothari et al. (2005) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Overall, the results continue to support differential
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 Table 2.9: A robustness check on the effect of discretionary accruals 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for forced CEO turnover and the key 
explanatory variables are the absolute value of a measure of discretionary accruals, Abs(DA), and the interaction between ROA and the discretionary 
accruals measure, ROA*Abs(DA). The particular discretionary accruals measure used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in 
Table 2.1. The new CEO subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median (about 5.5 years) and the old CEO subsample contains 
CEOs whose tenure is at or above the sample median. Year and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects are included in all columns. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively in two-sided tests.  
  MJ_DA    PM_DA    LN_DA  
 All CEO New CEO Old CEO  All CEO New CEO Old CEO  All CEO New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
ROA -3.854*** -3.453*** -3.525**  -3.423*** -3.030*** -3.506**  -3.949*** -3.751*** -3.334** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.015)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) 
Abs(DA) 1.389** 0.585 2.973***  1.123** 0.983 1.928**  1.963** 1.443 3.327** 
 (0.021) (0.445) (0.006)  (0.023) (0.107) (0.032)  (0.012) (0.138) (0.026) 
ROA*Abs(DA) 4.920 3.069 2.423  1.097 -0.294 0.565  7.357* 7.631 0.742 
 (0.108) (0.441) (0.679)  (0.661) (0.926) (0.911)  (0.061) (0.139) (0.935) 
Indepboard 0.027 -0.115 0.347*  0.022 -0.124 0.352*  0.028 -0.105 0.349* 
 (0.827) (0.469) (0.099)  (0.861) (0.434) (0.093)  (0.821) (0.507) (0.097) 
ROA* Indepboard -0.449 0.407 -3.009**  -0.463 0.462 -3.021**  -0.522 0.327 -3.122** 
 (0.586) (0.685) (0.049)  (0.571) (0.641) (0.047)  (0.525) (0.745) (0.039) 
Log total assets 0.043 -0.005 0.097  0.042 -0.004 0.092  0.049 0.002 0.101* 
 (0.239) (0.910) (0.111)  (0.246) (0.940) (0.128)  (0.181) (0.961) (0.098) 
CEO age -0.030*** -0.023** -0.038***  -0.031*** -0.023** -0.040***  -0.030*** -0.022** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.035) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.038) (0.003) 
CEO duality -0.299*** -0.422*** -0.102  -0.298*** -0.422*** -0.101  -0.293*** -0.418*** -0.088 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.605)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.610)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.656) 
Founder -1.389*** -1.660*** -1.084***  -1.404*** -1.674*** -1.119***  -1.392*** -1.648*** -1.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Hceoown -0.497*** -0.330 -0.651***  -0.494*** -0.342 -0.628***  -0.500*** -0.332 -0.643*** 
 (0.001) (0.174) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.160) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.172) (0.004) 
Nonemployee block 0.120 0.167 0.156  0.120 0.165 0.145  0.124 0.171 0.159 
 (0.303) (0.260) (0.433)  (0.302) (0.266) (0.467)  (0.285) (0.247) (0.425) 
Constant -17.284*** -17.559*** -17.665***  -17.325*** -17.693*** -17.558***  -17.414*** -17.710*** -17.712*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Observations 13546 6423 6351  13546 6423 6351  13546 6423 6351 
Chisq 322.6 159.8 181.8  321.4 161.3 179.7  325.6 163.2 180.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0846 0.0736 0.121  0.0843 0.0743 0.119  0.0854 0.0752 0.119 
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effects of unavoidable estimation errors and intentional estimation errors. Besides, I find that all 
three unsigned measures of discretionary accruals are positively related to the likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover in the full sample and their coefficients are all statistically significant at 5% level, 
which confirms the results in Hazarika et al. (2009), Interestingly, the subsample results suggest 
that the statistical significance of the unsigned discretionary accrulas in the full sample is 
completely driven by the subsample of old CEOs. This seems to provide more support to the 
Hazarika et al. (2009) interpretation of their results that the board punishes CEOs for earnings 
management because longer-tenured CEOs are more likely to have the power and influence to 
manipulate earnings than newly hired CEOs. 
Overall, in this section, I find a consistent pattern across my stock and accounting 
information quality proxies that information quality tends to have a stronger effect on the board’s 
updating process when the CEO is relatively new than when the CEO is relatively longer-tenured.  
 
4.4. Distinguishing the information quality effects coming from different sources of noises 
Although the information quality proxies are supposed to capture different sources of 
noises and are motivated and calculated quite differently, they are in general highly correlated 
with each other (see Table 2.4). This makes it difficult to isolate their individual effect if we 
include them simultaneously in the same regression. This is one reason why I have chosen to 
include them one at a time in regressions. Keeping this difficulty in mind, in this section, I 
provide some evidence on to what extent the statistical significance of individual effect is affected 
when I include proxies for both sources of noises in stock (accounting) performance measures 
simultaneously in the same logit regression. For stock prices, the two sources of noises are noise 
related to exogenous shocks and the noise related to information content of stock prices. In Table 
2.10, I report results from logit regressions where stock volatility and stock liquidity or dispersion 
in analysts’ earnings forecasts are simultaneously included in the same logit regression for the full 
sample and the new and old CEO subsamples. Year and Fama and French 48 industry fixed 
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effects are included in all columns so the full sample results can be directly compared with those 
in Panel A of Table 2.5. As expected, in the full sample, the statistical significance of all key 
interaction terms falls in Table 2.10 from those in Table 2.5. However, the interaction between 
stock return and stock volatility remains significant at the 5% level in columns 1 and 4. The 
statistical significance of interaction between stock return and stock liquidity or dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts falls by a larger amount but remains statistically significant at the 
10% level in one-sided tests. The evidence suggests that the results I obtain on stock liquidity and 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts in previous tables are not completely driven by their 
correlation with stock liquidity. The stable effect of stock volatility from Table 2.5 to Table 2.10 
is expected because, in theory, both exogenous firm-specific shocks and noises from trading or 
information uncertainty contribute to stock return volatility so stock returns volatility subsumes 
some of the effect of stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Moving to the 
subsample results in columns 2 and 3 for stock liquidity and columns 5 and 6 for dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, I find that, consistent with my previous results, the interaction 
between stock return and stock volatility is statistically significant only in the new CEO 
subsample, while the interaction between stock return and stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts) becomes more statistically significant with a p-value of 0.10 (0.11) in the new 
CEO subsample and statistically insignificant in the old CEO subsample.  
For accounting earnings, the two sources of noise are respectively noise associated with 
exogenous firm-specific shocks and noise associated with accrual quality. In unreported results, I 
find that when earnings volatility is simultaneously included with the DD accrual quality 
measure, AQ, in the same logit regression, all statistical significance goes to the interaction 
between industry-adjusted ROA and earnings volatility. This is not completely surprising because 
earnings volatility is likely to subsume the effect of accrual quality when they are both included 
in the same regression because estimation errors tend to increase the volatility of earnings. 
Although this does not refute the AQ effect, because earnings volatility is the strongest 
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instrument for AQ according to Dechow and Dichev (2002) thus a significant earnings volatility 
effect is also consistent with a significant AQ effect, it does testify to the difficulty in trying to 
disentangle the effects associated with the two sources of noises. To see if the effect of earnings 
volatility is broader than just that of AQ, I run an OLS regression where earnings volatility is 
regressed on AQ and a series of year and industry dummies. The residual from this regression is 
taken to be the component of earnings volatility that is uncorrelated with AQ. Then I run logit 
regressions of CEO turnover in which I simultaneously include this residual component and the 
AQ measure as well as their respective interactions with industry-adjusted ROA to see if the 
interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and the residual component of earnings volatility is 
statistically significant. If yes, then we can say that earnings volatility and AQ are not the same 
and that earnings volatility has an effect on the board’s updating process that is independent of 
the effect of AQ. Table 2.11 reports the results from this logit regression for the full sample and 
the new and old CEO subsamples. In the full sample, the interaction between industry-adjusted 
ROA and the residual of earnings volatility has a p-value of close to 0.01, while the interaction 
between industry-adjusted ROA and AQ has a p-value of 0.13. In the new CEO subsample, the 
interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and the residual of earnings volatility has a p-value of 
0.13 while the interaction between industry-adjusted ROA and AQ has a p-value of 0.06. In the 
old CEO subsample, neither interaction is statistically significant at above 10% level in one-sided 
tests. Hence, there is some evidence that the effect of earnings volatility is broader than that 
through AQ24
In this section, I have only tried to distinguish the effect of different information quality 
proxies by looking at their statistical correlations with the board’s updating process. Obviously, 
given the considerable correlations among the information quality proxies, it is difficult to clearly
. The contrast between the new and old CEO subsample results is consistent with 
the general pattern I find before that information quality is more important when learning the 
ability of new CEOs. 
                                                     
24 Similar analysis is also conducted for iAQ instead of AQ in which I find similar pattern of results. 
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Table 2.10: Simultaneous effects of stock information quality proxies 
 
This table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions with two information quality proxies in the 
same regression. New and old CEOs subsamples are defined as in Table 2.7. In columns 1-3, stock liquidity 
is interacted with stock return, while in columns 5-7, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is interacted 
with stock return. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. Year and Fama and French 48 industry fixed 
effects are included in all columns. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively in two-sided tests. The bold fonts denote statistical significance at the 10% level in one-
sided tests of interaction terms of interests. 
  LIQ    DISP  
 All CEO New CEO Old CEO  All CEO New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (5) (6) (7) 
        
Return -2.756*** -2.357** -3.083*  -3.195*** -3.235*** -3.185** 
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.062)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.036) 
LIQ or DISP -0.118** -0.051 -0.257***  0.223*** 0.175** 0.334*** 
 (0.031) (0.471) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) 
Return*LIQ or DISP -0.140 -0.193 0.020  0.196 0.295 -0.018 
 (0.155) (0.103) (0.914)  (0.170) (0.110) (0.942) 
RVOL 6.797*** 7.339*** 2.045  5.284*** 6.641*** 0.928 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.509)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.766) 
Return*RVOL 6.194** 6.730** -1.183  6.721** 6.136* 4.854 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.849)  (0.024) (0.079) (0.438) 
Indepboard 0.135 0.051 0.284  0.175 0.205 0.198 
 (0.440) (0.808) (0.397)  (0.410) (0.458) (0.593) 
Return*Indepboard 0.116 0.249 -0.358  0.168 0.748 -0.614 
 (0.806) (0.661) (0.688)  (0.753) (0.290) (0.514) 
Log total assets 0.186*** 0.061 0.413***  0.083* 0.063 0.099 
 (0.006) (0.501) (0.000)  (0.073) (0.303) (0.195) 
CEO age -0.029*** -0.016 -0.042***  -0.017* -0.001 -0.037** 
 (0.001) (0.171) (0.004)  (0.076) (0.963) (0.020) 
CEO duality -0.355*** -0.451*** -0.177  -0.395*** -0.440*** -0.357 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.404)  (0.002) (0.010) (0.119) 
Founder -1.478*** -1.413*** -1.210***  -1.192*** -1.779** -0.876*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.007) 
Hceoown -0.594*** -0.280 -0.813***  -0.729*** -0.647** -0.706*** 
 (0.001) (0.273) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.040) (0.010) 
Nonempblock block 0.098 0.159 0.024  0.147 0.294* -0.073 
 (0.432) (0.315) (0.911)  (0.280) (0.090) (0.757) 
Constant -19.220*** -18.793*** -18.461***  -18.987*** -19.801*** -13.601 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Observations 14141 6566 6515  11036 4983 4908 
Chisq 498.3 250.1 244.3  438.0 236.3 196.3 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.124 0.176  0.152 0.145 0.174 
135 
 
Table 2.11: Simultaneous effect of accrual quality and the component of earnings volatility that is 
independent of the accrual quality  
This table shows coefficient estimates from logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on AQ and a residual 
component of earnings volatility (EVOL). RSEVOL is the residual from an OLS regression of earnings 
volatility (EVOL) on AQ and a series of year and Fama and French 48 industry dummies. New and old 
CEOs subsamples are defined as in Table 2.7. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. Year and Fama and 
French 48 industry fixed effects are included in all columns. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively in two-sided tests. The bold fonts denote statistical significance at 
the 10% level in one-sided tests of key interaction terms. 
 All CEOs New CEOs Old CEOs 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
ROA -5.317*** -5.455*** -4.438** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) 
RSEVOL -0.094 0.459 -1.525 
 (0.939) (0.776) (0.456) 
ROA* RSEVOL 14.178** 10.167 16.216 
 (0.014) (0.126) (0.228) 
AQ -0.121 -3.035 2.997 
 (0.930) (0.135) (0.128) 
ROA*AQ 10.213 16.630* -6.962 
 (0.131) (0.056) (0.667) 
Indepboard 0.010 -0.215 0.393* 
 (0.943) (0.229) (0.091) 
ROA*Indepboard -0.546 0.270 -2.512 
 (0.571) (0.817) (0.170) 
Log total assets 0.071 0.000 0.131* 
 (0.111) (0.998) (0.077) 
CEO age -0.035*** -0.026** -0.046*** 
 (0.000) (0.036) (0.003) 
CEO duality -0.267** -0.235 -0.329 
 (0.028) (0.144) (0.121) 
Founder -1.303*** -2.093*** -0.878*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) 
Hceoown -0.558*** -0.322 -0.847*** 
 (0.002) (0.256) (0.001) 
Nonemployee block 0.112 0.134 0.073 
 (0.391) (0.426) (0.741) 
Constant -16.871*** -17.051*** -15.845 
 (0.000) (0.000) (.) 
    
Observations 10848 5028 5251 
Chisq 284.0 140.7 170.2 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0924 0.0815 0.136 
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disentangle them. Another way to see the differences among them is to compare the magnitude of 
their economic effects. The proxies may be highly correlated but the magnitude of their economic 
effects can still be quite different. Later, when I analyze the economic effects, we will see more 
differences among them. 
 
4.5. Endogeneity 
Although the results so far are consistent with information quality of stock prices and 
accounting earnings affecting the board of directors’ learning of the ability of CEO in the 
direction predicted by the Bayesian learning models, whether the effect is causal is still not well 
established. Even though I have controlled for the more important corporate governance variables 
which include board independence, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO voting power, CEO founder 
status, and non-employee blockholders on board25
I begin with the innate component of accrual quality (iAQ) because its endogeneity 
concern can be addressed by resorting to the contrast in information quality effects in the new and 
, I still need to worry about other variables that 
I did not control and especially those that are unobservable to the econometricians but are 
actually driving the documented association. The main concern here is that innovations in the 
information quality proxies are correlated with change in unobservable governance variables 
which drive the information quality effect that I have documented. In this section, I discuss this 
endogeneity issue in detail and provide additional evidence on the causal effect of information 
quality on the board’s learning process. Given the number of information quality proxies in this 
paper, I focus on three information quality proxies because they are the most important ones in 
this paper and they are also most susceptible to endogeneity concerns. They are stock liquidity 
(LIQ) and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP), and the innate component of the DD 
accrual quality measure (iAQ).  
                                                     
25 In unreported results, I find that interactions between these variables and stock return are largely insignificant and 
adding them does not change the overall results. 
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old CEO subsamples. As we know, iAQ is calculated by regressing the DD accrual quality 
measure AQ on five firm characteristics. All except firm size are calculated using a 10-year 
rolling window. Hence, iAQ is correlated with slowly-moving long-term firm characteristics. The 
endogeneity concern here arises from potential correlation between these firm characteristics and 
an unobservable corporate governance variable that is driving the iAQ effect I document. This is 
possible because many corporate governance researchers argue that corporate governance is 
endogeneously chosen by firms based on its characteristics and monitoring environment (e.g. 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Since the firm characteristics at the center of the issue here are long-
term characteristics, the unobservable corporate governance variable that we are concerned about 
should also be quite stable over time. This implies that, if the unobservable corporate governance 
variable is driving the results for iAQ, the results should be the same for new and old CEOs. To 
the extent that they are not the same, I can reject this alternative explanation.  
Next, I move on to stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. The 
concern is that innovations in stock liquidity (or dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts) are 
correlated with innovations in an omitted variable which are driving the information quality 
effects that I find. For example, one likely choice for the omitted variable is the strength of 
internal corporate governance which can be unobservable to econometricians26
                                                     
26 Another possible omitted variable could be a variable that is related to how effectively institutional investors can 
monitor a firm. Institutional investors may choose to invest in firms that they can more effectively monitor. The 
increase in institutional trading may increase stock liquidity. At the same time, institutional monitoring makes CEO 
turnover more sensitive to prior year stock return.    
. For example, 
under the prudent man rule, institutional investors may be more likely to invest in stocks of firms 
with strong internal governance. Their trading can make the stocks of these firms more liquidity. 
At the same time, firms with strong internal corporate governance may be more aggressive at 
adjusting down their estimate of CEO ability after poor firm performance. Hence, the positive 
association between stock liquidity and the sensitivity of the board’s updating on CEO ability to 
stock return can be driven by the strength of internal governance. Similarly, for dispersion in 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts, it is likely that firms with strong internal governance are more 
transparent and thus associated with lower dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. This can 
explain the negative association between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and the 
sensitivity of the board’s updating on CEO ability to stock return.  
To address this endogeneity problem, I take an instrumental variable approach and 
estimate a two-step estimator for probit regressions with endogenous continuous regressors (see 
Woodridge, 2002). I use both lagged value of each firm’s stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ 
earning forecasts) and the median stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ earnings forcasts) of the 
firm’s Fama and French 48 industry as my instruments. Similar instruments are used by Fang et 
al. (2009) and Jayaraman and Milbourn (2011) in their two-stage least square estimations. 
Specifically, I instrument for a firm’s stock liquidity in year t with two variables: they are the 
firm’s lagged stock liquidity in year t-2 and the median stock liquidity in year t of the the firm’s 
Fama and French 48 industry. Both instruments are correlated with the firm’s stock liqudity in 
year t but are unlikely to be correlated with the error term in the latent variable equation 
underlying the probit model. The use of the lagged stock liquidity addresses the concern that the 
level of the omitted variable in year t  is correlated with both the firm’s stock liquidity in year t 
and the error term. The use of the industry median liquidity in year t explores the exogenous 
variation in the industry component of the firm’s stock liquidity in year t that is less likely to be 
correlated with the error term. I choose to use lagged stock liquidity in year t-2 rather than that in 
t-1 because stock liquidity is highly correlated over time. The use of two lags reduces the concern 
that there may be no meaningful difference between the lagged stock liquidity and the current 
year stock liquidity.  
Based on similar reasoning, I use two instruments for a firm’s dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in year t. They are the dispersion in analysts earnigns forecasts in year t-1 and 
the median dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts in year t of the firm’s Fama and French 48 
industry. The use of lagged dispersion mitigates the endogeneity problem caused by a
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Table 2.12: IV estimates of the effect of stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from a probit model where stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts) and its interaction with stock return are treated as endogenous. Stock liquidity 
(dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts) is instrumented by the lagged value of the firm’s stock liquidity 
(dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts) and the median stock liquidity (dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts) of the firm’s Fama and French 48 industry. The new CEO subsample contains CEOs whose 
tenure is below the sample median (about 5.5 years) and the old CEO subsample contains CEOs whose 
tenure is at or above the sample median. Info is the information quality proxy and Return*Info represents 
the interaction between stock return and the information quality proxy. The particular information quality 
proxy used is shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively in two-sided tests.   
  LIQ    DISP  
 All CEO New CEO Old CEO  All CEO New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Return -0.662* -0.809 -0.917*  -0.504 -1.060** -0.099 
 (0.078) (0.112) (0.096)  (0.170) (0.042) (0.848) 
LIQ or DISP 0.036 0.082** -0.009  0.048 0.012 0.090* 
 (0.155) (0.020) (0.814)  (0.154) (0.787) (0.089) 
Return*LIQ or DISP -0.135** -0.126* -0.095  0.297*** 0.260* 0.279* 
 (0.014) (0.093) (0.238)  (0.003) (0.051) (0.065) 
Indepboard 0.010 -0.049 0.117  0.034 0.019 0.069 
 (0.895) (0.623) (0.377)  (0.697) (0.876) (0.613) 
Return*Indepboard 0.199 0.291 0.228  0.084 0.556 -0.391 
 (0.421) (0.364) (0.541)  (0.745) (0.135) (0.291) 
Log total assets -0.061** -0.152*** 0.049  -0.011 -0.046* 0.040 
 (0.024) (0.000) (0.222)  (0.547) (0.067) (0.154) 
CEO Age -0.017*** -0.008 -0.026***  -0.014*** -0.004 -0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.126) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.511) (0.001) 
CEO duality -0.154*** -0.166** -0.097  -0.156*** -0.140* -0.155 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.289)  (0.007) (0.070) (0.109) 
Founder -0.578*** -0.567*** -0.509***  -0.437*** -0.705** -0.341** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.010) 
Hceoown -0.279*** -0.098 -0.366***  -0.274*** -0.245* -0.217* 
 (0.000) (0.411) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.090) (0.051) 
Nonemployee block 0.032 0.042 0.030  0.045 0.088 -0.019 
 (0.580) (0.570) (0.756)  (0.475) (0.277) (0.855) 
Constant -0.648*** -0.649** -0.860**  -0.839*** -1.208*** -0.651 
 (0.007) (0.047) (0.033)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.144) 
        
Observations 12923 5975 6419  10000 4624 4945 
Chisq 264.5 143.2 112.0  209.6 116.4 80.44 
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contemporaenous correlation between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the error term in the 
underlying latent variable model, while the use of the industry median dispersion relies on the 
industry variation in dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts that is correlated with the firm’s 
forecast dispersion but is much less likely to be correlated with the error term. 
In Table 2.12, I report the coefficient estimates of these Instrumental variables (IV) probit 
regressions. For each proxy, I estimate three regressions that differ in sample composition. The 
first regression is estimated using  all CEOs, the second new CEOs and the third old CEOs. The 
first three columns of Table 2.12 report results on stock liquidity. The coefficient estimate of the 
interaction of stock liquidity and industry-adjusted stock return is statistically significant at the 
5% level in the full sample and at the 10% level in the new CEO subsample but is statistically 
insignificant in the old CEO subsample. The last three columns of Table 12 reports results on 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. The coefficient estimate of the interaction of the 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and industry-adjusted stock return is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in the full sample and at the 10% level in both the new and old CEO 
subsample. Note that stock return is statistically insignificant in the regression for the old CEO 
subsample (column 6) while it is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
regression for the new CEO subsample (column 5). Somehow the interaction between stock 
return and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts subsumes some effect of stock return. Hence, 
the effect of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast on the board’s updating based on stock 
return is still weaker in column 6 than it is in column 5, which is still consistent with our previous 
findings that information quality is more important for learning about new CEOs than old CEOs.  
 
5. Calculating economic effects 
 
In the previous section, I have found statistical support for my hypotheses. In this section, 
I calculate the economic magnitude of the effect of the information quality proxies on the board’s 
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updating process. Since the board of directors’ internal estimate of CEO ability is unobservable, I 
choose to evaluate the effect of noise in firm performance on the board’s updating process by 
examining its effect on the probability of CEO turnover. Here, one important distinction to make 
is that the economic effect of information quality (𝑥2)  on the sensitivity of the board’s 
assessment of CEO ability to firm performance (𝑥1) is not the same as its effect on the sensitivity 
of CEO turnover to firm performance. The expression for the latter is given by: 
𝜕2𝑃(𝑌 = 1|𝑋)
𝜕𝑥1𝜕𝑥2
= 𝛽12 𝑒𝑋𝛽(1 + 𝑒𝑋𝛽)2 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽12𝑥2)(𝛽2 + 𝛽12𝑥1) �1 − 𝑒𝑋𝛽�(1 + 𝑒𝑋𝛽)3 (2.14) 
where 𝑋 is the vector of all explanatory variables. As we see, the marginal effect calculated by 
Equation (2.14) captures both the main effect from the term 𝛽2𝑥2 and the interaction effect from 
the term 𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2 on the probability of CEO turnover. However, the economic effect that I desire 
to calculate is the one that is purely driven by the interaction term  𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2 in Equation (2.6).  To 
infer the economic effect on probability of CEO turnover that comes purely from the interaction 
term 𝛽12𝑥1𝑥2, we need to keep the threshold CEO ability below which the CEO is removed 
constant, i.e. the main effect term  𝛽2𝑥2 constant, while changing the information quality in the 
interaction term. This way only the effect of information quality on the board’s updating process 
is captured. 
  
5.1. Inferred economic effect of information quality on the board’s updating process 
To implement this, I first estimate logit regressions similar to those in Tables 5-8 but 
without the industry and year fixed effects to simplify the calculateion of the economics effects. 
The coefficient estimates from these logit regressions are reported in Table 2.13. 
Based on these logit models, I fix the value of the information quality proxy in the main 
effect term while allowing its value in the interaction term to change from the 5th percentile to the 
95th percentile of the sample. Then I compare the change in estimated probability of forced CEO 
turnover for a drop in firm performance from the top decile to the bottom decile when the
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Table 2.13: Logit regressions used for calculating the economic effects of information quality proxies 
The new CEO subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is below the sample median (about 5.5 years) and 
the old CEO subsample contains CEOs whose tenure is at or above the sample median. As in previous 
tables, Info is the information quality proxy and Return*Info (ROA*Info) represents the interaction between 
stock return (ROA) and the information quality proxy. The particular information quality proxy used is 
shown on top of each column. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively in two-sided 
tests.   
Panel A: Stock price information quality proxies 
 RVOL LIQ DISP 
 New CEO Old CEO New CEO Old CEO New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Return -3.511*** -3.461*** -0.598 -3.978*** -1.544** -2.863*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.530) (0.004) (0.013) (0.000) 
Info 7.420*** 4.307** -0.019 -0.073 0.236*** 0.268*** 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.739) (0.382) (0.001) (0.002) 
Return*Info 8.804*** 2.601 -0.361** 0.080 0.528** 0.104 
 (0.000) (0.547) (0.020) (0.717) (0.022) (0.637) 
Indepboard -0.094 0.234 -0.153 0.210 -0.134 0.329 
 (0.551) (0.272) (0.367) (0.388) (0.484) (0.210) 
Log total assets 0.009 0.147*** -0.116* 0.170** -0.031 0.113* 
 (0.822) (0.005) (0.092) (0.021) (0.519) (0.069) 
CEO age -0.020** -0.044*** -0.023** -0.052*** -0.008 -0.040*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.409) (0.000) 
CEO duality -0.393*** -0.175 -0.383*** -0.145 -0.351** -0.271 
 (0.003) (0.360) (0.006) (0.474) (0.025) (0.213) 
Founder -1.451*** -0.997*** -1.378*** -1.089*** -1.736** -0.817*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.015) (0.007) 
Hceoown -0.366 -0.623*** -0.278 -0.773*** -0.522* -0.567** 
 (0.113) (0.004) (0.260) (0.002) (0.085) (0.026) 
Nonemployee block 0.178 0.113 0.090 0.052 0.247 0.040 
 (0.195) (0.556) (0.530) (0.798) (0.109) (0.859) 
Constant -2.953*** -2.917*** -0.980 -1.883** -1.899*** -1.776** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.130) (0.038) (0.005) (0.038) 
       
Observations 6990 7147 6702 6919 5209 5436 
Chisq 206.7 152.3 110.2 120.6 111.6 115.8 
Pseudo R-squared 0.103 0.125 0.0821 0.122 0.102 0.119 
 
Panel B: Accounting earnings information quality proxies 
 EVOL  AQ  iAQ 
 New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO  New CEO Old CEO 
VARIABLES (2) (3)  (5) (6)  (5) (6) 
         
ROA -2.790*** -7.117***  -2.719*** -5.962***  -3.475*** -6.186*** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Info 1.513** 1.477  1.028 3.645***  1.289 5.338** 
 (0.040) (0.147)  (0.254) (0.000)  (0.487) (0.023) 
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Table 2.13, continued 
ROA*Info 7.635* 11.983**  8.729* 4.872  17.137* 11.919 
 (0.051) (0.044)  (0.073) (0.506)  (0.059) (0.443) 
Log total assets -0.144*** 0.086**  -0.139*** 0.200***  -0.134*** 0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.043)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.025*** -0.052***  -0.032*** -0.057***  -0.033*** -0.059*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.840* -1.314**  -0.365 -1.847***  -0.354 -1.972*** 
 (0.078) (0.022)  (0.491) (0.004)  (0.546) (0.008) 
         
Observations 9353 9825  6700 7004  6625 6907 
Chisq 72.71 118.1  54.56 104.8  49.60 93.55 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0233 0.0612  0.0242 0.0668  0.0245 0.0621 
 
 
information quality proxy in the interaction term is at the 5th percentile of the sample with that 
when the information quality proxy in the interaction term is at the 95th percentile of the sample. 
The difference in the change in probability of forced CEO turnover between the two information 
quality levels is a measure of the inferred economic effect of the information quality proxy on the 
board’s updating process as shown up in sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.  
In Table 2.14, I report the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover in the new CEO 
subsample when firm performance is at the middle of the top and bottom decile and when the 
value of information quality proxy in the interaction term is at the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
sample respectively27
                                                     
27 Since the logit regression results show that most of the information quality proxies have statistically insignificant 
effect on the board’s updating process in the old CEO subsample. It is uninteresting to evaluate the economic effects in 
the old CEO subsample.        
. The value of information quality proxy in the main effect term is fixed at 
5th percentile (Panel A), median (Panel B), and 95th percentile (Panel C) of the sample 
respectively. All other variables are set to the means in the new CEO subsample. The table shows 
that the absolute magnitude of the economic effect is quite large while the relative magnitude is 
even bigger. For example, according to Panel B, when the information quality proxy in the main 
effect term is fixed at the sample median, a change in stock return from the top to bottom decile 
increases the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover by 14.45% when stock liquidity is 
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high (the 95th percentile), while the same change in stock return only increase the estimated 
probability of forced CEO turnover by 4.03% when stock liquidity is low (the 5th percentile). The 
difference is 10.42%, which is 2.56 times the increase in probability of forced CEO turnover 
when stock liquidity is low. Similar difference is 5.55% for stock volatility which is about 1.28 
times the increase in probability of forced CEO turnover when stock volatility is high (the 95th 
percentile) and is 8.93% for dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts which is 1.90 times the 
increase in probability of forced CEO turnover when dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is 
high.  
According to Table 2.14, the absolute magnitude of the economic effect of accounting 
information quality proxies is considerably smaller than that of stock price information quality 
proxies. However, since change in accounting performance also has a smaller effect on 
probability of forced CEO turnover, the relative magnitude of the economic effect is still 
significant. For example, Panel B of Table 2.14 shows that a change in ROA from the top to 
bottom decile increases the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover by 2.52% when iAQ is 
at the 95th percentile of the sample, while the same change in ROA increases the probability of 
forced CEO turnover by 4.11% when iAQ is at the 5th percentile of the sample. The difference is 
1.59% which is about 60% of the change in probability of forced CEO turnover when iAQ is at 
the 95th percentile of the sample. Similar difference is 1.15% for AQ which is about 50% of the 
change in probability of forced CEO turnover when AQ is at the 95th percentile of the sample and 
is 0.85% for earnings volatility which is about 45% of the change in probability of forced CEO 
turnover when stock liquidity is at the 95th percentile of the sample. Figure 2.1 plots these 
estimated probabilities based on Panel B of Table 2.14. 
To provide an alternative perspective to look at the economic effect, in Figure 2.2, I plot 
the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover against firm performance when the value of the 
information quality proxy in the main effect term is kept at the 95th percentile of the sample while 
the value of the information quality proxy in the interaction term is set at the 5th and 95th
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Table 2.14: Inferred effect of information quality on probability of forced CEO turnover in the new CEO subsample 
This table presents the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover when stock return (ROA) is at the middle of the top and bottom decile and when 
the value of the information quality proxy in the interaction term is at the 5th and 95th percentile of the sample respectively. The value of the information 
quality proxy in the main effect term is fixed at the 5th percentile (Panel A), median (Panel B) and 95th percentile (Panel C) respectively. All other 
variables are set to the means of the new CEO subsample. P1 is the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover at the middle of bottom decile of firm 
performance (5th percentile) and P2 is the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover at the middle of top decile of firm performance (95th percentile). 
∆( P1-P2) is the difference in (P1-P2) between the two levels of information quality. A negative value indicates that (P1-P2) is smaller when the 
information quality is at 95th percentile than when the information quality is at the 5th percentile of the sample. 
  Stock Information quality   Accounting Information quality 
  RVOL  LIQ  DISP   EVOL  AQ  iAQ 
  P95 P5  P95 P5  P95 P5   P95 P5  P95 P5  P95 P5 
Effect Return (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  ROA  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
                    
Panel A:                    
P1 -0.48 3.60 7.35  15.50 5.30  3.96 10.49  -0.08 4.50 4.79  4.78 5.17  4.94 5.53 
P2 0.74 0.49 0.15  0.16 1.00  0.46 0.09  0.33 2.51 1.92  2.55 1.82  2.50 1.54 
P1-P2  3.11 7.20  15.34 4.30  3.50 10.40   1.99 2.87  2.23 3.36  2.44 3.99 
∆( P1-P2)  -4.09   11.04    -6.9   -0.88   -1.13   -1.55  
                    
Panel B:                    
P1 -0.48 5.03 10.11  14.60 4.96  5.31 13.75  -0.08 4.31 4.59  4.90 5.30  5.09 5.70 
P2 0.74 0.69 0.22  0.15 0.93  0.62 0.12  0.33 2.40 1.83  2.62 1.87  2.57 1.59 
P1-P2  4.34 9.89  14.45 4.03  4.69 13.62   1.91 2.76  2.28 3.43  2.52 4.11 
∆( P1-P2)  -5.55   10.42   -8.93    -0.85   -1.15   -1.59  
                    
Panel C:                    
P1 -0.48 12.28 22.91  13.83 4.67  9.84 23.68  -0.08 5.26 5.60  5.37 5.81  5.49 6.15 
P2 0.74 1.81 0.57  0.14 0.88  1.20 0.24  0.33 2.94 2.25  2.88 2.06  2.78 1.72 
P1-P2  10.47 22.34  13.69 3.79  8.64 23.44   2.32 3.35  2.49 3.75  2.71 4.43 
∆( P1-P2)  -11.87   9.9   -14.80    -1.03   -1.26   -1.72  
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of inferred probability of forced CEO turnover at the top and bottom 
decile of firm performance 
 
The following graphs show the estimated probability of CEO turnover when industry-adjusted stock return 
(industry-adjusted ROA) is in the middle of the bottom decile (Decile 1) and top decile (Decile 10) 
respectively for new CEOs (i.e. CEOs with tenure less than the sample median) based on the logit 
regressions in Table 2.13. The information quality proxy used is shown in the title of each chart. All 
variables are defined in Table 2.1. The estimated probability is calculated by keeping the value of the 
information quality proxy in the main effect term at the sample median but allowing the value of the 
information quality proxy in the interaction term to be at the 5th and 95th percentile of the sample 
respectively. All other variables are at their means in the new CEO subsample. The two bars above 
P(Y=1|ret*p95) or P(Y=1|roa*p95) show the implied probability of CEO turnover (values shown on top of 
each bar) when the information quality proxy in the interaction term is at the 95th percentile of the sample, 
while the two bars above P(Y=1|ret*p5) or P(Y=1|roa*p5) show the implied probability of CEO turnover 
when the information proxy in the interaction term is at the 5th percentile of the sample. The difference in 
height of any pair of adjacent bars is a measure of sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, while 
the difference in this difference between the two groups of bars in each cell gives a measure of the 
economic effect of information quality on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.    
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Figure 2.1 Continued 
  
 
 
percentile of the sample respectively. I use the notation P(Y=1|m, ret*n) to represent the 
estimated probability of CEO turnover when the value of the information quality proxy in the 
main effect term is at the mth percentile and the value of the information quality proxy that 
interacts with stock return is at the nth percentile of the sample. P(Y=1|m, roa*n) is similarly 
defined except the firm performance measure is return on assets.  Panel A shows the graphs for 
stock price information quality proxies. The difference between the lines for P(Y=1|p95, ret*p95) 
and P(Y=1|p95, ret*p5) represents the inferred economic effect of a change in the value of the 
information quality proxy from the 5th to 95th percentile on the board’s updating process when the 
threshold CEO ability is fixed at a level corresponding to the value of the information quality 
proxy at the 95th percentile of the sample. As we can see, the inferred sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to stock return is significantly higher when information quality is high than when 
information quality is low in the new CEO subsample, while the difference is very small in the 
old CEO subsample. Panel B shows the graphs for accounting information quality proxies. The 
inferred effect of information quality on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
is much smaller than those in Panel A. However, we can still see that higher information quality 
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(i.e. lower noise in earnings) is associated with higher inferred turnover-performance sensitivity 
in the new CEO subsample, while the difference is very small in the old CEO subsample. 
Comparing panel A with panel B of Figure 2.2, I find an interesting difference in the 
boards of directors’ use of stock and accounting performance when they update their estimates of 
CEO ability. According to Panel A, the inferred sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock 
return is higher for new CEOs than for old CEOs when information quality is high. For example, 
when stock liquidity is high (the 95th percentile), the inferred probability of forced CEO turnover 
increases by 11% for a change in stock return from 0.8 to -0.4 for new CEOs,  while it increases 
by only 4% for old CEOs under the same condition.  However, when it comes to return on assets, 
the opposite is observed. Here, the inferred sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to industry-
adjusted ROA is lower for new CEOs than for old CEOs. This holds even when noise in 
accounting earnings is low in the new CEO firm. For example, when iAQ is at the 5th percentile 
of the sample, the inferred probability of forced CEO turnover increases by 7% for a fall in 
industry-adjusted ROA from 0.3 to -0.2 when the CEO is new, but it increases by 10% when the 
CEO is old. One explanation for the contrasts could be that the first few years of earnings after a 
new CEO takes office are likely to be affected by what happened under her predecessor; however, 
stock prices can quickly respond to new strategic moves taken by the new CEO. Thus stock 
return becomes more important than accounting earnings for evaluating new CEOs.  
 
5.2. Distinction between inferred economic effects and combined economic effects 
It is important to note that, since I fix the information quality variable in the main effect 
term at the 95th percentile of the sample, the implied probability of CEO turnover represented by 
the line P(Y=1|p95, ret*p5) is the inferred probability assuming that we could change the 
information quality proxy in the interaction term to the 5th percentile of the sample while keeping 
the threshold CEO ability below which to remove the CEO constant. The difference between 
P(Y=1|p95, ret*p95) and P(Y=1|p95, ret*p5) gives us a measure of the economic effect of
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Figure 2.2: Inferred economic effect of information quality on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover 
to firm performance 
The following charts show the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover in any given year vs. prior 
year industry-adjusted stock return or industry-adjusted ROA based on the logit regressions in Table 2.13. 
The information quality measures used are shown in the chart titles. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
At each row, the left panel shows the graph for the subsample of new CEOs while the right panel graph for 
the subsample of old CEOs. P(Y=1|m, ret*n) represents the implied probability when the value of the 
information quality measure in the main effect term is set at the mth percentile of the sample while the value 
of the information quality measure that interacts with stock return is set at the nth percentile of the sample. 
P(Y=1|m, roa*n) is similarly defined except firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted ROA. The 
values of all other explanatory variables in the logit regressions in Table 2.13 are kept at their means in the 
respective new and old CEO subsample. Panel A is for stock price information quality proxies, while Panel 
B is for accounting information quality proxies.  
Panel A: Stock price information quality 
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Figure 2.2, continued 
  
 
Panel B: Accounting information quality 
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Figure 2.2, continued 
  
 
 
information quality on the board’s updating process. This is in general different from the 
difference between estimated probability of CEO turnover in firms with information quality at the 
95th and the 5th percentile of the sample, which is directly related to the marginal interaction effect 
represented by Equation (2.14).   
To illustrate this distinction, I overlap the plots of the estimated probability of forced 
CEO turnover when the value of the information quality proxy in both the main and interaction 
effect term is at the 5th percentile of the sample on Figure 2.2. These are the thin lines with 
triangel markers associated with P(Y=1|p5, ret*p5) or P(Y=1|p5, roa*p5). The difference 
between the lines P(Y=1|p95, ret*p95) and P(Y=1|p5, ret*p5) or between the lines P(Y=1|p95, 
roa*p5) and P(Y=1|p5, roa*p5) represents the total economic effect of a change in the value of 
the information quality proxy from the 5th to 95th percentile of the sample. In Panel A, we can see 
that, for stock volatility, the total economic effect is much smaller than the inferred economic 
effect. This is because, according to the logit regressions in Table 2.13,  stock volatility reduces 
the weight on stock return in the board’s updating process but at the same time increases the 
threshold CEO ability as indicated by the significantly positive coefficient of stock volatility. The 
two effects offset each other to some extent when their effects are refleced on the probability of 
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CEO turnover. As a result, the estimated difference in probability of CEO turnover in firms with 
high and low stock volatility significantly underestimate the effect of information quality on the 
the Bayesian updating process. This example points to how directly comparing the estimated 
probability of CEO turnover in high and low information quality firms may miss the significant 
effect of information quality on the board’s updating process. This is exactly why the economic 
effect of information quality on board’s updating process should not be calculated by the cross 
derivative in Equation (2.14). However, when a information quality proxy does not affect the 
threshold CEO ability, the estimated probability of CEO turnover in high and low information 
quality firms should be the same as the inferred probability of CEO turnover calculated by 
keeping the threshold CEO ability constant. This is the case with stock liquidity. According to 
logit regressions in Table 2.13, the coefficient of stock liquidity is not statistically significant. 
Hence, in Panel A, the thin line for P(Y=1|p5, ret*p5) is very close to the line for P(Y=1|p95, 
ret*p5) in the new CEO panel. Hence, strictly speaking, the distinctions in interpretation I just 
discussed is only important when the information quality variable itself has a significant effect on 
the threshold CEO ability. Otherwise, the sensitivity of the board’s updating process to firm 
performance has a one-to-one correspondence to the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance. 
 
5.3. The combined economic effects of information quality on turnover-performance sensitivity 
 The inferred economic effect in Section 5.1 helps us to better understand the effect of 
information quality on the board’s updating on estiamte of CEO ability based on firm 
performance. However, in practice, the main effect of an information quality proxy on the 
threshold CEO ability and the interaction effect of it on the board’s updating process change 
simultaneously with value of the information quality proxy. Very often, people are interested in 
knowing how sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is different between firms 
with high and low information quality. This refers to the marginal interaction effect represented 
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by Equation (2.14). In Table 2.15, I compare the increase in estimated probability of forced CEO 
turnover for a drop in firm performance from the top to bottom decile in firms with high and low 
information quality in the new CEO subsample. All varaibles are set at the sample means. ∆( P1-
P2) is the difference in increase in probability of forced CEO turnover in the high and low 
information quality firms. This difference reflects the combined effect of an information quality 
proxy on both the threshold CEO ability and the board’s updating process so it could have 
different sign than the coefficient on the interaction term. It is a measure of the marginal 
interaction effect of information quality on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance. Consistent with the discussion in last section that a significant main effect term 
creates difference between the combined and inferred economic effects, the combined economic 
effect of information quality is significantly weaker than the inferred pure interaction effect for 
the following information quality proxies: stock volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and earnings volatility, while the combined economic effect of information quality is 
close to the inferred pure interaction effect for these information quality proxies: stock liquidity, 
AQ and iAQ.  
I note that although the main effect of earnings volatility is positive and statistically 
significant in Table 2.13, it is not statistically significant in the full specification in Table 2.6 
where industry and year fixed effects are included. This suggests that the number in Table 2.15 
probably underestimates the combined economic effect of earnings volatility on turnover-
performance sensitivity. Similarly, the number in Table 2.15 also underestimates the combined 
economic effect of iAQ because the main effect of iAQ is negative and statistically significant in 
the full specification in Table 2.6, which suggests a reduction in threshold CEO ability when iAQ 
increases. Figure 2.3 shows the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover for new CEOs in 
firms with high and low information quality. Figure 2.4 plots the estimated probability of forced 
CEO turnover against firm performance in high and low information quality firms for new and 
old CEOs separately. 
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Table 2.15: Estimated probability of forced CEO turnover in firms with high and low information quality for new CEOs   
This table presents the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover when stock return (ROA) is at the middle of the top and bottom decile and when the value 
of the information quality proxy in both the main and the interaction term is at the 5th and 95th percentile of the sample respectively. All other variables are set to 
the means of the new CEO subsample. P1 is the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover at the middle of bottom decile of firm performance (5th percentile) 
and P2 is the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover at the middle of top decile of firm performance (95th percentile). ∆( P1-P2) is the difference in (P1-P2) 
between the two levels of information quality. A negative value indicates that (P1-P2) is smaller when the information quality proxy is at 95th percentile than 
when the information quality proxy is at the 5th percentile of the sample. 
  Stock information quality   Accounting information quality 
  RVOL  LIQ  DISP   EVOL  AQ  iAQ 
  P95 P5  P95 P5  P95 P5   P95 P5  P95 P5  P95 P5 
Effect Return (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  ROA  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                    
P1 -0.48 12.28 7.35  13.83 5.30  9.84 10.49  -0.08 5.26 4.79  5.37 5.17  5.49 5.53 
P2 0.74 1.81 0.15  0.14 1.00  1.20 0.09  0.33 2.94 1.92  2.88 1.82  2.78 1.54 
P1-P2  10.47 7.2  13.69 4.30  8.64 10.40   2.32 2.87  2.49 3.35  2.71 3.99 
∆( P1-P2)  3.27   9.39   -1.76    -0.55   -0.86   -1.28  
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of probability of forced CEO turnover at the top and bottom decile of 
firm performance in high and low information quality firms  
 
The following graphs show the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover when industry-adjusted stock 
return (industry-adjusted ROA) is in the middle of the bottom decile (Decile 1) and top decile (Decile 10) 
respectively for new CEOs (i.e. CEOs with tenure less than the sample median) based on the logit 
regressions in Table 2.13. The information quality proxy used is shown in the title of each chart. All 
variables are defined in Table 2.1. The estimated probability is calculated by setting the value of the 
information quality at the 5th and 95th percentile of the sample respectively. The two bars above P95 show 
the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover (values shown on top of each bar) when the information 
quality proxy is at the 95th percentile of the sample, while the two bars above P5 show the estimated 
probability of forced CEO turnover when the information proxy is at the 5th percentile of the sample. The 
difference in height of any pair of adjacent bars is a measure of sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance, while the difference in this difference between the two groups of bars in each cell gives a 
measure of the economic effect of information quality on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.    
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Figure 2.3, continued 
  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Combined economic effects of information quality on sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance 
The following charts show the estimated probability of forced CEO turnover in any given year vs. prior 
year industry-adjusted stock return or industry-adjusted ROA based on the logit regressions in Table 2.13. 
The information quality measures used are shown in the chart titles. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
At each row, the left panel shows the graph for the subsample of new CEOs while the right panel graph for 
the subsample of old CEOs. P(Y=1|n, ret*n) represents the implied probability of forced CEO turnover in 
firms with information quality proxy in the nth percentile of the sample. P(Y=1|n, roa*n) is similarly 
defined except firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted ROA. The values of all other 
explanatory variables in the logit regressions are kept at their means in the respective new and old CEO 
subsample. Panel A is for stock price information quality proxies, while Panel B is for accounting 
information quality proxies.  
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Figured 2.4, continued 
  
 
  
 
Panel B: Accounting information quality 
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Figure 2.4, continued 
  
 
  
 
 
An important finding in this section is that stock liquidity and iAQ both have 
economically significant effect on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. Their 
effects are mainly driven by their effect on the board’s updating process rather than on threshold 
CEO ability. Table 2.15 shows that going from the top to bottom decile of stock return increases 
the probability of forced CEO turnover by about 14% in firms with high stock liquidity (the 95th 
percentile) but only by about 4% in firms with low stock liquidity (the 5th percentile). As for iAQ, 
going from the top to bottom decile of industry-adjusted ROA increases the probability of forced 
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CEO turnover by about 4% in firms with low iAQ and by 2.7% in firms with high iAQ. The 
difference of 1.3% is small in the absolute sense but it is about 48% of the 2.7% increase in 
probability of forced CEO turnover in firms with high iAQ. 
These results show that even when we compare sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance in different types of firms, in our case, the high and low information quality firms, 
information quality can have significant economic effect. In summary, noises arising from stock 
market trading or estimation errors in accruals are not significantly correlated with the threshold 
CEO ability so their effect on the board’s updating process is directly reflected as the same 
direction effect on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. On the other hand, noises 
arising from exogenous firm-specific shocks are correlated with threshold CEO ability so their 
effect on sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance may be different from their effect on 
the board’s updating process.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study develops a uniform framework for measuring information quality of stock 
prices and accounting earnings to study the impact of information quality of stock returns and 
accounting earnings on the board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability from firm performance 
under a Bayesian learning framework. Under this framework, I classify noises in stock prices and 
accounting earnings into two types. The first type of noise is related to exogenous shocks to firm 
performance that is not under the control of the CEO. It is measured by stock volatility and 
earnings volatility respectively. The second type of noise is related to the potential differences 
between observed firm performance and the unobserved true underlying firm performance. For 
stock prices, I measure it by stock liquidity and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. For 
accounting earnings, I measure it by accrual quality. I consider the information quality of a 
performance measure low if noise in the performance measure is high and vice versa. The main 
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hypothesis I test is that noises in firm performance measures reduce the sensitivity of the board’s 
update on estimate of CEO ability to these firm performance measures. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, I find that all my information quality proxies have significant effect on the board’s 
updating process as predicted by the main hypothesis. The effect is both statistically and 
economically significant when appropriately calculated. However the effect is not uniform 
between stock price information quality proxies and accounting information quality proxies, and 
between firms with newly-hired CEOs and firms with relatively longer-tenured CEOs. The 
economic effect is much stronger for stock price information quality proxies than for accounting 
information quality proxies. Most importantly, I find that the information quality effect is mainly 
driven by firms with recently hired CEOs where the need for learning is likely to be greater.   
Furthermore, I find that the effect of accrual quality is mainly driven by unavoidable 
estimation errors. Discretionary accruals (i.e. intentional estimation errors) are found to have no 
systematic effect on the board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability based on accounting 
earnings, consistent with boards of directors being able to undo the intentional estimation errors 
when making CEO retention decisions. 
In terms of economic effect, although the inferred effect on sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance is economically significant for all information quality proxies, the 
effect are not necessarily reflected as the same direction differences in sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance across firm types defined by the information quality proxy. For 
stock price information quality proxies, I find that sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock 
return is higher in firms with high stock liquidity (low dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts) 
than in firms with low stock liquidity (high dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts). However, 
the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is even a little bit higher in firms with 
high stock volatility than in firms with low stock volatility, which is opposite to the effect of 
stock volatility on the board’s updating on estimate of CEO ability based on stock returns. For 
accounting information quality proxies, I find that the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
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industry-adjusted ROA is lower in firms with low accrual quality than in firms with high accrual 
quality. This is mainly driven by firms with intrinsic propensity to make larger unavoidable 
estimation errors. Although the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to industry-adjusted ROA is 
lower in firms with high earnings volatility than in firms with low earnings volatility, the 
difference is quite small.    
The results in this paper suggest that the commonly-held view that the strength of the 
relation between sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is positively related to 
the quality of internal governance overlooks the cross-sectional variations in turnover-
performance sensitivity due to information quality. The relative importance of quality of internal 
corporate governance and information quality in explaining turnover-performance sensitivity is 
likely to change with CEO tenure. For relatively new CEOs, information quality is more 
important; while, for relatively long-tenured CEOs, quality of internal corporate governance is 
more important.  
The policy implication of this study is that lawmakers, regulators and large shareholders 
looking for ways to improve corporate governance should not focus their attention only on 
changing the board structure and director incentives. Rather, they should also look for ways to 
improve information quality of performance signals, especially through improving stock market 
liquidity, so that rightly-incentivized directors have the right information to do their job. This 
broader view on how to improve corporate governance becomes more important today as new 
regulations in the past decade or so in the U.S. seem to have improved board monitoring in U.S. 
publicly listed firms and we may be facing a decreasing return to further improvement in internal 
governance systems. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INDUSTRY COMPETITION, FIRM PROFITS AND CEO TURNOVER 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is widely believed that product market competition reduces managerial slack. This 
view can be traced back to Adam Smith, who wrote in 1776 that “monopoly … is a great enemy 
to good management”, and has greatly influenced economic thinking and policy making since 
then. When the product market is perfectly competitive, this is clearly true because all firms have 
to maximize profits to survive and there is no room for managerial slack. However, most product 
markets in real life can best be described as imperfectly competitive. Although some empirical 
studies find evidence that is consistent with the notion that firms in competitive industries operate 
more efficiently (For example, Nickell, 1996;  Giroud and Mueller, 2010), theoretical studies 
have had a difficult time to clearly demonstrate the precise mechanism through which product 
market competition reduces managerial slack in an imperfectly competitive market. It is fair to 
say that until today economists still do not have a complete understanding of this issue despite the 
progresses that have being made.  
Very often we hear people making the following argument: while managers in firms in 
non-competitive industries can afford to enjoy “quite life” (and they would do so), managers in 
firms in competitive industries have to continuously improve efficiency so that their firms would 
survive. Although there is some truth to this argument, for example, Schmidt (1997) formalizes it 
as the “threat-of-liquidation” effect and shows that this effect unambiguously induces managers 
to work harder to reduce cost in order to avoid the disutility of liquidation, this argument is 
incomplete. It leaves the matter of providing incentives to managers entirely to the hand of 
market forces while, in reality, internal governance by boards of directors also plays an important 
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role in setting incentives to managers. Taking internal governance into account, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that “the owners of a firm with monopoly power have the same incentive 
to limit divergence of the manager from value maximization … as do the owners of competitive 
firms” and “both will undertake the level of monitoring which equates the marginal cost of 
monitoring to the marginal wealth increment from reduced consumption of perquisite by the 
manager.” Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not explore how competition may affect the 
trade-off between marginal cost and marginal benefit of monitoring, they implicitly conclude that 
competition has no effect on agency costs. However, when the potential effect of competition on 
optimal incentive scheme is being taken into accounts, existing theoretical papers that have tried 
to formalize the notion that competition reduces managerial slack in general produce ambiguous 
predictions. Hart (1983) provides a hidden-information model and demonstrates that competition 
mitigates managerial slack through the price mechanism. However, Scharfstein (1988) shows that 
this result critically depends on the specification of managerial utility function. The effect can be 
completely reversed, i.e. competition can exacerbate incentive problem, when managerial 
preference is specified differently. Hermalin (1992) decomposes the effect of competition on 
executive behavior into four components and finds that each of the four components is of 
ambiguous sign. Schmidt (1997) shows that although the “threat-of-liquidation” effect 
unambiguously reduces managerial slack; an increase in competition, at the same time, change 
the profitability of cost reduction effort so that the total effect of competition on managerial 
incentives is of ambiguous sign. An interesting paper is Raith (2003). He provides a model that 
gives some unambiguous predictions on the relation between competition and managerial 
incentives. Unlike previous studies, Raith (2003) treats market structure as endogenous and 
allows the degree of competition to vary along three dimensions. He shows that the relation 
between competition and managerial incentives is unambiguous but depends on which of the 
three competition fundamentals included in his model drives the variations in the degree of 
competition.   
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Given the ambiguity in existing theory, it is important for empirical researchers to 
provide more empirical evidence that will shed light on which elements in these theories are 
dominant in empirical data. This should help us to better understand the underlying forces of 
competition and guide the development of new theories that will further our understanding of the 
working of competition. The purpose of this paper is to provide more empirical evidence on this 
issue using CEO turnover data in U.S. publicly listed firms.  
I consider that this work is important for understanding the link between product market 
competition and managerial slack for the following reasons. First, threat of termination is an 
integral part of the total incentives provided to CEOs. To a CEO, the career consequence of firm 
liquidation is usually the same as dismissal – the loss of the CEO position. However, although 
people often relate product market competition to threat of liquidation, much less attention has 
been paid so far to the relation between competition and the threat of termination – a link that is 
less intuitive but has potentially just as strong an effect on managerial slack. Second, many 
people associate managerial slack in non-competitive industries with the enjoyment of “quite 
life”. As Hicks (1935) put it, “the best of all monopoly profits is a quite life.” It seems that a 
necessary condition for CEOs in non-competitive industries to enjoy “quite life” is continued 
employment. If boards are just as likely to fire CEOs who shirks in monopoly firms as they do in 
competitive firms, product market competition may have a much smaller effect on managerial 
slack than economists have assumed. This would cast doubt on the proposition that competition 
reduces managerial slack. Third, besides shirking, boards also fire CEOs for reasons related to 
low CEO ability or poor CEO and firm matching. According to the theory by Hermalin (1992), 
Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003), competition may change the relative value of managers’ cost 
reduction efforts and thus affect optimal incentives. In general, when an increase in competition 
increases the relative value of managers’ cost reduction efforts, firms are expected to offer 
stronger incentives to managers and vice versa. It is reasonable to expect that a situation where 
cost-reduction effort is more important is also a situation where cost-reduction ability is more 
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important. In many situations, new talent for cost reduction could well be more important than 
higher level of effort of the incumbents. Hence, CEO turnover studies like this may provide 
cleaner and stronger evidence than studies focusing on executive compensation alone. Here, cost 
reduction could refer to any action of the manager to increase the profitability of his firm, 
including but not limited to cutting cost, reorganizing his company, investing in new growth 
options, etc. 
The second purpose of this study is to provide new empirical evidence on how product 
market competition affects executive turnover. In the corporate governance literature, prior 
evidence on this relation is very limited. DeFond and Park (1999) measure product market 
competition by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). They find that the frequency of CEO 
turnover is higher and the relation between industry-adjusted accounting performance and CEO 
turnover is stronger in low concentration industries. However, Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) show 
that the DeFond and Park (1999) finding, which uses Compustat-based measure of industry 
concentration, is not robust to using US Census-based industry concentration measures. Fee and 
Hadlock (2000) test a number of theories on the relation between competition and managerial 
incentives using data on non-CEO executive turnover in the US newspaper industry. They 
measure competition by the number of newspapers in a local market. They find no support for 
any of the theories they examined and the only hypothesis that is supported by their data is that 
non-CEO executives are more likely to look for alternative jobs when market competition 
increases the likelihood of liquidation of their firms. Therefore, existing evidence has shown no 
clear relation between product market competition and the board’s decision to fire managers.  
This paper departs from DeFond and Park (1999) and Fee and Hadlock (2000) by treating 
market structure as endogenous. This departure reflects a view that is gradually getting popularity 
in the industrial organization literture which says that market structure is endogenous in the long 
run. Raith (2003) shows that, when market structure is endogenous, HHI or number of firms are 
169 
 
poor measures of competition and their relations with managerial incentives are ambiguous. This 
may explain the lack of clear evidence in prior studies.       
Following Raith (2003), I characterize product market competition by three variables – 
product substitutability, market size and entry costs – and examine how each of the three 
variables is related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance. I measure product substitutability in an industry by the median net 
profit margin (NPM). In the industrial organization literature, industry NPM is often used as a 
proxy for the Lerner index which is negatively related to price elasticity of demand facing a firm. 
I measure market size by the industry total sales but I control for industry concentration at the 
same time so that conditional on industry concentration cross-industry comparison of market size 
captures the differences in average firm-level output in an industry. As I will discuss in more 
detail later, firm-level output drives the effect of market size on optimal managerial incentives in 
the Raith model. Lastly, I measure entry costs by the weighted average costs of gross property, 
plant and equipment (PPE).  
My results show that industry NPM is significantly negatively associated with the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover in most specifications but is significantly positively associated 
with the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. While the former effect is 
consistent with the prediction of the Raith model, the latter effect does not seem to be so but, as I 
will discuss later, it does not completely reject the prediction of the Raith model either. 
Conditioning on industry concentration, industry total sales is significantly positively associated 
with both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
firm performance – both are consistent with the prediction of the Raith model. On the other hand, 
industry PPE is significantly negatively associated with both the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance, which is opposite to the 
prediction of the Raith model. However, the evidence on entry cost is intuitively consistent with 
entry cost being negatively associated with the threat of liquidation and thus being consistent with 
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the prediction in Schmidt (1997) that threat of liquidation is negatively related to the cost of 
inducing higher level of effort.  
Since the Raith (2003) model is built on strategic interactions between firms in an 
oligopoly industry, I further examine whether the three fundamental dimensions of competition 
are only important in oligopoly industries. I find support for this hypothesis. Specifically, I find 
that all my results are driven by the subsample of industries with concentration levels above the 
sample median. Overall, I conclude that the theoretical model of Raith (2003) still cannot explain 
all important empirical regularities in the data though it does seem to capture some important 
dimensions of competition in oligopoly industries.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature 
on product market competition and managerial incentives and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 
describes data and sample. Section 4 reports empirical results. Section 5 reports results from 
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
Despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, the proposition that product market 
competition helps to reduce managerial slack has proved to be difficult to formulate theoretically. 
The early papers focus on the effect of competition on information structure of the agency 
problems. The basic idea is that when a firm’s performance can be compared with that of other 
firms in the same industry, relative performance evaluation can be used to provide more powerful 
incentives (Holmstrom, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). However, as argued by Schmidt 
(1997), it is not sufficient to conclude from this that the optimal incentive level is higher in more 
competitive firms than in others, because the level of incentive also depends on the trade-off 
between the marginal cost and marginal benefit of providing a higher level of incentive. Hart 
(1983) provides a model in which competition can affect managerial incentives even when each 
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manager’s wage depends on its own firm performance. In his model, the common shocks to 
firms’ costs are transmitted through market price. There are two types of firms – the 
entrepreneurial firms in which costs are always observable to owners and the managerial firms in 
which costs are not observable to owners. When costs are high, both entrepreneurial firms and 
managerial firms operate efficiently. However, when costs are low, managers in managerial firms 
may shirk. But if the proportion of entrepreneurial firms is increased, then industry output will 
increase and price will fall; as a result, managers in managerial firms will have to work harder to 
meet her fixed profit target. Hence, competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. 
However, Scharfstein (1988) shows that this result critically depends on the assumption that 
managers are infinitely risk reverse to change in income so that a fixed profit target contract is 
optimal. When marginal utility of income is assumed to be positive and finite, Scharfstein (1988) 
finds that competition actually exacerbate the incentive problem. This is because managerial 
firms now operate inefficiently when costs are high. When the proportion of entrepreneurial firms 
increases, industry output increases and price falls. This further lower the profit target at high 
costs state for managers in managerial firms which makes shirking more attractive.  
Another link between competition and managerial incentives that have been explored in 
the literature is that competition may change the sensitivity of firm profits to cost-reduction 
actions of managers. Hermalin (1992) calls this the “change-in-relative-value-of-actions” effect. 
Schmidt (1997) calls it the “value-of-a-cost-reduction” effect. Specifically, if an increase in 
competition makes cost-reduction actions of managers more profitable, the optimal level of 
incentives is likely to be higher. On the other hand, if an increase in competition drives the 
marginal cost of providing the current level of incentives above the marginal benefits, the optimal 
level of incentives will be lower. Hence, this effect in general has ambiguous sign. Unlike 
Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) who do not discuss what kinds of changes in market 
fundamentals will increase or decrease the profitability of cost-reduction actions, Raith (2003) 
explicitly models three forms of change in fundamentals of competition in an oligopolistic 
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industry. They are product substitutability, market size and entry costs. In his model, an increase 
in competition due to greater product substitutability has two opposite effects on managerial 
incentives. First, there is a business-stealing effect which calls for greater managerial incentives. 
This is because a reduction in costs can steal more business from rivals as demand elasticity 
increases. Second, there is a scale effect which reduces managerial incentives. This is because, 
with greater product substitutability, a firm’s rivals are more likely to reduce costs and charge 
lower prices, which tends to reduce the market share of the firm and makes a cost-reduction effort 
look less attractive. Like prior studies, Raith (2003) finds that when the number of firms is fixed, 
the sign of the net effect is ambiguous. However, when market structure is allowed to be 
endogenously determined by free entry and exit, Raith (2003) finds that change in each of the 
three parameters of competition in his model has unambiguous effect on managerial incentives. 
The key intuition of the model is that in equilibrium firm provides stronger incentives to 
managers when competition increases firm-level output and vice versa. The main predictions of 
the model are as follows: First, for any fixed number of firms, greater product substitutability 
leads to lower price and lower profit for every firm in the market, which encourages some firms 
to exit. In equilibrium, the remaining firms each produce a larger output and thus provide stronger 
incentives to managers. Second, an exogenous increase in market size leads to higher profit for 
any given number of firms and encourages entry. However, since the increase in number of 
entries is proportionally less than the increase in market size, the net effect is that each firm 
produces more output and thus provides stronger incentives. Finally, an exogenous decrease in 
entry cost leads to the entry of new firms, which, in equilibrium, reduces the output of each firm 
and thus each firm provides weaker incentives to managers. One important message sent by the 
Raith (2003) model is that concentration indices alone are poor measures of degree of 
competition with free entry and exit. An increase in concentration may be related to an increase 
or decrease in competition depending on what other aspects of competition have also changed. 
For example, when the increase in concentration is caused by an increase in product 
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substitutability, higher concentration is related to higher degree of competition and incentives. On 
the other hand, if the increase in concentration is caused by a decrease in demand, higher 
concentration is related to lower degree of competition and incentives because, according to thee 
Raith (2003) model, firm-level output would decrease more than proportionally than the number 
of firms that exit the industry. Besides concentration indices being poor measures of competition, 
Raith (2003) also suggests that the relation between competition and managerial incentives is 
better captured by a combination of a variety of fundamental factors of competition – three of 
which are present in his model.  
Although the idea that competition may affect returns to cost-reduction effort is present 
in several theory papers I have discussed, Raith (2003) is the first to explicitly demonstrate what 
changes in market structure increase or decrease returns to cost-reduction efforts, which allows 
me to empirically model these changes and be able to conduct empirical tests on the proposed 
mechanism. Thus, in this study, I use the predictions in the Raith (2003) model to develop my 
hypotheses. I measure competition by the three fundamental factors proposed in Raith (2003) – 
product substitutability, market size and entry costs – and examine their joint relations with CEO 
turnover. For each of the three competition fundamentals, I hypothesize its relation with both the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance based on its relation with value of cost reduction effort in Raith (2003). The general 
argument is that, in equilibrium, if a factor is positively related to the value of cost reduction, then 
it should be positively related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnover to firm performance. This is because, first, as the value of cost reduction 
increases, it is optimal for firms to provide stronger incentives to CEOs to engage in cost 
reduction; second, the expected gain from hiring a CEO with a higher ability of cost reduction is 
also more likely to exceed the costs of CEO turnover, which makes the option of replacing the 
incumbent CEO more attractive. Specifically, I have the following six hypotheses: 
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• H1a: Product substitutability is positively associated with the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover. 
• H1b: Product substitutability is positively associated with the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance. 
• H2a: Market size is positively associated with the likelihood of forced CEO turnover 
conditional on industry concentration. 
• H2b: Market size is positively associated with the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
firm performance conditional on industry concentration. 
• H3a: Entry cost is negatively associated with the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
• H3b: Entry cost is negatively associated with the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
firm performance. 
 
3. Sample and variables 
 
The sample consists of all firms with data available on ExecuComp, Compustat and 
CRSP from 1992-2008. Both ExecuComp and Compustat cover firms in the S&P 1500 index 
currently or from 1992 forward but data before 1994 are mostly for S&P 500 firms. I use the 
ExecuComp database to obtain my CEO turnover sample. Industry competition measures are 
constructed from Compustat segment database and Compustat industrial annual database at the 
four-digit SIC code level. Firm financial data are from Compustat and stock return data from 
CRSP. Corporate governance variables are from the RiskMetrick (formerly IRRC) database. The 
coverage of RiskMetics’ directors database is also S&P 1500 firms but the data is only available 
from 1996 onward. Hence, in specifications with corporate governance controls, the regressions 
are estimated using data from 1996 to 2008. 
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I exclude financial and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) because these 
industries are regulated and the extent of product market competition is restricted. Furthermore, I 
require that each industry to include at least 4 firms so that I can study the competition among 
them. 
 
3.1. CEO turnover sample 
The ExecuComp database contains information on annual compensation for up to five top 
executives in firms that are in the S&P 1500 index. The database allows me to track the CEO’s 
identity over time and thus, to identify a CEO turnover when the CEO’s identity changes from 
one fiscal year to the next. I then search the Factiva and Lexis-Nexis databases to find the earliest 
turnover announcement date and code the stated reasons for the turnover. Since I associate each 
CEO turnover with the industry and firm characteristics in the year prior to the turnover 
announcement, the sample period is 1996-2007. Year 1996 is the first year that board data is 
available from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) and year 2007 is the last year I have information 
about CEO turnovers announced in the following year.   
For my analysis, I am mainly interested in CEO turnovers that result from board 
disciplinary actions. However, many CEO turnovers occur for other reasons like retirements, 
health problems, deaths, departures for more attractive positions, etc. Consequently, I classify 
CEO turnovers into forced and voluntary. To determine whether a CEO turnover is forced or 
voluntary, I follow the classification method used in Parrino (1997), which is commonly used in 
recent CEO turnover studies (e.g., Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004; Hazarika, Karpoff and 
Nahata, 2009). Specifically, a CEO turnover is classified as forced if (i) news articles mention 
that a CEO was fired, forced out or left due to unspecified policy differences; (ii) the CEO is 
under the age of 60 and the news did not mention death, poor health, or the acceptance of another 
position (within the firm or elsewhere) as the reason for the departure; (iii) a reported CEO 
retirement is not announced at least six months in advance.  For this third group, I check a wider 
176 
 
range of news to make sure that no other articles suggest that the turnover is voluntary in nature. 
These CEO turnovers are reclassified as voluntary if the incumbent takes a comparable position 
elsewhere or departs for reasons previously undisclosed that are unrelated to firm activities. The 
remaining CEO turnovers are classified as voluntary. The CEO turnover sample is then combined 
with the no turnover years of these firms in my sample period to produce a panel database 
containing CEO turnovers between1996 and 2007. I further exclude firm-years that are related to 
interim CEOs or co-CEOs and CEO turnovers that result from bankruptcies, spin-offs and 
mergers and acquisitions. 
I identify 2,111 turnovers, 594 are classified as forced and 1,517 are classified as 
voluntary. On average, CEO turnovers happen in about 11% of the firms each year, with about 
3% of the firms having forced CEO turnovers. As a percentage of all turnovers, forced turnovers 
account for about 28% of all turnovers in my sample. The overall CEO turnover rate is the same 
as the 11% rate in Huson et al. (2001) who construct their sample of CEO turnovers using Forbes 
compensation surveys from 1971 to 1994. The percentage of all CEO turnovers that are forced is 
comparable to those in Jenter and Kanaan (2010) and Hazarika et al. (2009). Like us, Jenter and 
Kanaan (2010) construct their CEO turnover sample from ExecuComp database. They find that 
forced CEO turnovers account for 24% of the 1,590 CEO turnovers in their sample from 1993-
2003. Hazarika et al. (2009) build their CEO turnover sample from both ExecuComp and Forbes 
annual compensation surveys. In their sample of 1,895 CEO turnovers from 1992-2004, 21% are 
forced turnovers.    
 
3.2. Measures of product market competition 
Measures of product market competition are calculated at the four-digit SIC industry 
level using Compustat segment and Compustat industrial annual data. To account for the fact that 
some firms have segments operating in different industries, measures of industry competition are 
calculated using segment level data rather than firm level data. The segment file of Compustat 
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reports net sales, operating income after depreciation, assets, capital expenditures and 
depreciation, at the segment level for all active Compustat firms other than utility subsidiaries. 
Compustat assigns a primary and a secondary SIC code to each business segment of the firm. I 
use the primary SIC code of a segment as the industry code for that segment. The segment data 
are then merged with firm level data from the Industrial Annual file of Compustat by firm and 
year. To exclude observations with potentially erroneous segment data, I require that the sum of 
sales in all segments of a firm be within 10% of the firm level sales from the Industrial Annual 
file. Firms that are in the industrial annual file but are not in the segment file are included as 
single-segment firms in our sample. For variables that are not reported in the segment file, I 
allocate the corresponding firm level value to each segment based on the sales share of each 
segment in the firm. For example, the segment-level property, plant and equipment (PPE) is 
calculated as the firm-level PPE multiplied by the sales share of the segment in the firm.      
I measure product substitutability in an industry by the median net profit margin (NPM) 
for all segments in that industry. At the segment level, the NPM is computed as operating income 
before depreciation and amortization divided by sales.  In the industrial organization literature, 
industry NPM is widely used as a proxy for the Lerner Index, which measures the market power 
of firms to set prices above marginal costs. The Lerner index ranges from a maximum of 1 to a 
minimum of 0 with higher values implying greater market power and 0 implying no market 
power. It is can be shown that the Lerner index equals to the negative reciprocal of price elasticity 
of demand facing a firm. Hence, larger values of NPM indicate less product substitutability and 
stronger market power and vice versa. This measure is used by Giroud and Mueller (2010) to 
define competitive vs. non-competitive industries. Karuna (2007) uses price-cost margin 
calculated as the sales divided by operating costs to proxy for product substitutability, where 
operating costs equal to the sum of costs of goods sold, selling, general, and administrative 
expenses and depreciation.  Since operating costs are missing for many observations, I choose to 
use the net profit margin to proxy for product substitutability.   
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As for market size, in the original model of Raith (2003), market size equals to the 
density of demand on a unit circle along which competing firms are evenly distributed.  An 
increase in demand attracts more entrants; however, since the increase in number of firms is 
proportionally less than the increase in demand, each firm still produces more than it produces 
before and thus provides stronger incentives to managers. To proxy for market size, Karuna 
(2007) uses industry total sales. Although this is a valid proxy for industry demand in general, 
what the market size parameter in Raith (2003) model tries to capture is not industry demand but 
firm-level demand (or output). I emphasize this point because firm-level output plays a key role 
in Raith (2003) model and drives the predictions of the model28
                                                     
28 Raith (2003) p1430: “how incentives are related to competition depends on how firm-level output varies 
with the degree of competition.”  
. This point is easily missed 
because in the original model each firm in an industry is assumed to produce the same output, 
thus, industry sale has a one-to-one correspondence with firm-level output. However, when we 
take the model to empirical tests, we need to make this distinction and be clear about what we 
want to proxy for. In empirical data, besides difference in industry sales, both the number of firms 
and the distribution of industry sales across firms within an industry vary across industries. Direct 
comparison of industry sales across industries probably reveals little about cross-industry 
differences in average firm-level output. Even when two industries have the same industry sales 
and the same number of firms, differences in the distribution of the industry sales across firms in 
the same industry may still affect the firm-level output of the average firm in each industry and 
thus the average level of managerial incentives provided in the industry. Therefore, I measure 
market size by industry sales but at the same time I also control for the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) of the industry so that conditional on a given level of HHI, comparison of industry 
sales captures the cross-industry differences in average firm-level output. I expect that for a given 
level of industry sales larger HHI indicates higher concentration of firms in the industry and thus 
higher average firm-level output for the industry as a whole and vice versa. Similarly, for a given 
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level of HHI, larger industry sales indicate higher firm-level output for the industry as a whole 
and vice versa. I need to emphasize that although Karuna (2007) also uses industry sales as a 
proxy for market size and control for HHI in his regressions of equity incentives on proxies for 
industry competition, the reason he gives for including HHI is quite different from mine. I 
consider that the inclusion of HHI makes comparison of industry sales across industries 
meaningful, whereas he treats HHI as an additional industry competition measure that needs to be 
controlled for. Since the main point of the Raith (2003) model is that industry concentration is 
endogenous, interpreting it as another determinant of industry competition seems to be 
inconsistent with the model. 
Following Karuna (2007), I measure entry costs by the weighted average costs of gross 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) of all segments in an industry where the weight is each 
segment’s sales share in the industry. An alternative measure of entry costs may be the minimum 
segment PPE in an industry. However, I prefer the weighted average PPE measure because, when 
there is economy of scale, the weighted average costs of PPE probably better reflects the efficient 
scale of operation in an industry than the minimum costs of PPE in an industry. Moreover, the 
SIC industry does not coincide with actual product market. A firm with minimum total assets may 
be a peripheral firm which does not produce the product that most of the firms in the industry are 
competing on. Using the average of all firms in an industry reduces the risk of selecting an 
unrepresentative firm. Lastly, to make the competition measures comparable over time, all dollar 
value industry competition measures are adjusted for inflation to year 2000 dollars using CPI 
index.   
I then merge CEO turnover data with industry competition data by year and the SIC code 
of the primary segment of each firm. The primary segment of each firm is defined as follows: if 
the firm has a segment with the same SIC code as the firm’s, then that segment is the primary 
segment. Else, the segment with the largest sales is the primary segment. This merging procedure 
implicitly assumes that managerial incentives are only affected by product market competition in 
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a firm’s primary segment industry. For large conglomerates, a firm may have more than one 
primary markets and this assumption may be violated. However, for the majority of firms in my 
sample, I consider this to be a valid characterization. Even for conglomerates, as long as the 
consideration for the primary segment dominates that for other segments when setting incentives 
or making CEO turnover decisions, this assumption would still be valid. 
 
3.3. Measures of firm performance 
To measure stock performance, I use a firm’s monthly stock return adjusted by the return 
on value-weighted CRSP index cumulated over the 12-month period that ends one month prior to 
the CEO turnover announcement date for years associated with CEO turnover events and over the 
prior fiscal year for years associated with no CEO turnovers. This measure is used in Weisbach 
(1988) and some other CEO turnover studies. The use of market adjustment is supported by 
results in Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Barro and Barro (1990) who find that market 
component of stock return is at least partially filtered out in CEO turnover decisions and results in 
Jenter and Kanaan (2010) who find that highly-visible market benchmarks are removed from 
CEO turnover decisions.  
I measure a firm’s accounting-based performance by change in ROA in the year prior to 
CEO turnover, where ROA is defined as annual earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. This performance measure is not affected by 
changes in capital structure and tax treatments of the firms. The median of this ratio for all 
Compustat firms in the firm’s Fama and French 48 industry is then subtracted from the firm’s 
change in ROA to obtain the industry-adjusted ROA. Most researchers believe that some kind of 
filtering of exogenous shocks is used in evaluating CEO performance though there is no 
agreement as to the exact comparison group being used. Industry adjustment based on two-digit 
SIC industry or Fama-French industry is typically used in prior CEO turnover studies such as 
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(Weisbach, 1988; DeFond and Park, 1999; Huson et al., 2001; Engel et al, 2003). I use the Fama-
French industry though results are similar to those obtained using four-digit SIC industry.     
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics of the final sample. Industry median NPM is 
winsorized at the upper and lower 5% tails, while industry sales, industry PPE and HHI are 
winsorize at both upper and lower 1% tails. As we can see, both industry sales and industry PPE 
are skewed to the right. Hence I take the natural logarithm of both variables and use them as the 
continuous measure of industry competition in regression analyses. Table 3.2 reports the pairwise 
Pearson correlation coefficients among the three competition measures and two industry 
concentration measures – the HHI and four-firm concentration ratio. The correlation coefficients 
between industry sales and industry PPE and between industry sales and four-firm concentration 
ratio are similar to those reported in Karuna (2007) for his sample of Compustat firms between 
1992 and 2003. However, the correlation between industry PPE and four-firm concentration ratio 
has opposite sign to that in Karuna (2007). Also, the signs of the correlation coefficients between 
my proxy for product substitutability and other variables in the table are opposite to those 
reported in Karuna (2007). However, I find that signs of these correlations in my table are the 
same as those reported in Li (2010) for her sample of Compustat firms for the sample period 
1977-2007. Unlike us, Li (2010) actually uses the same proxy for product substitutability as 
Karuna (2007). This fact suggests that the difference between the correlation between variables in 
my data and that in Karuna (2007) is not purely driven by my use of a different proxy for product 
substitutability than Karuna (2007).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Main results 
According to Raith (2003), managerial incentives are jointly determined by the three 
fundamental factors in his model. Hence, examining any one of the factors without controlling for
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample consists of all firms in the CEO turnover database between 1992-2007 that also have data 
available on Compustat segment database and industrial annual database as well as CRSP. Firms whose 
sum of segment sales differs from firm level sales by more than 10% are excluded to avoid using erroneous 
segment data. Firms in financial and utility industries are also excluded because product market 
competition is restricted in these industries. Lastly, Four-digit SIC industries with less than four firms are 
excluded. All variables are defined in Appendix B.The variables CEO voting power, CEO-Chairman, 
Nonemployee blockholders on board and Dual Class firm are constructed using data on RiskMetics 
database which starts in 1996. Hence the summary statistics for these four variables are for the sample 
period 1996-2007. 
 
Variables Mean Median  Q1 Q3 SD 
      
Industry median NPM 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.10 
Industry sales ($ mil) 119929.10 36709.41 11813.04 121716.10 215651.60 
Industry average PPE ($ mil) 6789.35 2098.38 678.28 7536.54 12785.22 
Industry HHI 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.24 0.15 
Four-firm concentration ratio 0.63 0.63 0.43 0.82 0.23 
Total assets ($ mil) 11575.09 1454.50 484.86 5255.21 60513.82 
Sales ($ mil) 4665.03 1207.57 454.90 3649.40 13686.90 
Tobin’s Q 2.06 1.52 1.17 2.24 2.13 
Stock volatility 0.109 0.092 0.065 0.134 0.064 
Market-adjusted stock return 0.050 -0.014 -0.233 0.234 0.480 
Industry-adjusted change in EBIT 0.0069 0.0020 -0.0155 0.0258 0.0646 
CEO tenure 7.8 5.5 2.6 10.6 7.5 
CEO age 55.6 56.0 51.0 60.0 7.5 
Founder-heir CEO 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 
CEO voting power 3.79 0.00 0.00 2.70 9.89 
CEO-Chairman 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Nonemployee blockholders on board 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 
Dual class firm 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 
 
 
Table 3.2: Correlations matrix 
 
This table reports the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients among the three competition measures and 
the two industry concentration measures in the full sample. All variables are defined in Appendix B. All 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
 Industry median NPM Industry sale  Industry average PPE HHI 
Industry sales 0.3048    
Industry average PPE 0.2215 0.6123   
HHI -0.1451 -0.3408 -0.1373  
Four-firm concentration ratio -0.2473 -0.4717 -0.2227 0.8456 
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the other two factors may give misleading results due to correlations between these factors. 
Therefore, in all regressions, I include all three competition variables simultaneously to better 
isolate the individual effect of any one of them conditional on the other two. As I have discussed, 
I also control for industry HHI so that, conditional on HHI, differences in market size capture 
cross-industry differences in average firm-level output for each industry as a whole.  
In Table 3.3, I examine how the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is affected by the 
three competition variables by estimating logit regressions in which the dependent variable is an 
indicator for forced CEO turnover and the three competition variables are the key explanatory 
variables. These logit regressions are estimated using pooled cross section time series data so the 
competition effects are identified from both time series and cross-sectional variations in the 
dependent and independent variables. Year fixed effects are included to control for changes in 
rate of CEO turnover over time that are unrelated to changes in industry competition. Column 1 
of Table 3.3 reports the results for logit regressions that only include industry level variables. 
Since my proxy for product substitutability is likely to be positively correlated with industry 
performance, to isolate the effect that is due to competition rather than industry performance, I 
control for industry stock performance by industry median stock return adjusted by return on 
CRSP value-weighted index and control for industry accounting performance by industry median 
change in ROA. As expected, coefficients on both industry median stock and accounting 
performance are negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting that CEOs in 
underperforming industries are more likely to be forced out than CEOs in other industries. This is 
consistent with findings in Jenter and Kanaan (2010) and Kaplan and Minton (2011) who find 
that industry underperformance increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover in that industry.  
Interestingly, I find that the coefficient on industry median NPM is negative and statistically 
significant even after I have controlled for industry performance. Since higher values of NPM 
suggests low price elasticity of demand and thus less product substitutability, the negative sign 
before industry median NPM indicates that CEOs are less likely to be fired in industries with less 
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price competition and less substitutable products than in other industries, which provides support 
to hypothesis H1a.  Besides NPM, the coefficient on market size is also statistically significant. 
The positive sign is consistent with my hypothesis that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is 
higher in industries with larger demand because the return to cost reduction efforts is likely to be 
higher in such industries than in others. The coefficient on log industry PPE is marginally 
significant with a p-value of 0.107. The negative sign of log industry PPE suggests that CEOs in 
industries with higher entry costs are less likely to be forced out, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3a. According to Raith (2003), high entry costs deter entries of new firms and thus in 
equilibrium each firm already in the industry produces more and provide more powerful 
incentives. However, if we think of competition from the point of view of threat of liquidation, 
the negative sign of log industry PPE is intuitively consistent with the prediction in Schmidt 
(1997) that it becomes cheaper to implement higher level of incentives when threat of liquidation 
is higher. Intuitively, when entry cost is low, competition from new entrants tends to increase the 
risk of liquidation of existing firms; on the other hand, when entry cost is high, existing firms 
earn more rents and face a smaller risk of liquidation. One explanation of the negative sign on log 
industry PPE is that, besides the return to cost reduction efforts effect that is modeled by Raith 
(2003), which suggests a positive sign, the relation between product market competition and 
managerial incentives is also influenced by a threat of liquidation effect (See Schmidt,1997), 
which suggests a positive sign, and the latter effect dominates the former.  
I also notice that the coefficient on HHI is positive and highly significant. This appears to 
be counter intuitive because industries with high HHI indices are often considered to be 
concentrated and thus less competitive in prior studies. However, if market structure is 
endogenous, this is not as surprising. As shown by Raith (2003), depending on what causes 
change in competition, with free entry and exit, industries with higher concentration can be more 
competitive than industries with low concentration. One example is the U.S. airline industry 
which is highly concentrated and competitive. Actually, the positive coefficient on industry HHI 
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appears to be consistent with the key intuition of the Raith (2003) model that higher firm-level 
output is associated with stronger managerial incentives. Conditional on the level of industry 
sales, we expect that industry HHI to be positively related to average firm-level output in the 
industry. To confirm this claim, in unreported results, I estimate an OLS regression of log of 
firm-level sales on industry sales and industry HHI using all firms in my sample. I find that both 
coefficients are indeed positive and highly significant. Ali et al. (2009) argue that industry HHI 
calculated with Compustat data, which contains only public firms, is negatively related to 
industry sales growth rate and hence declining industries tend to have higher industry HHI. Since 
I control for industry performance in my regressions, it seems less likely that the positive sign 
simply reflects higher rate of CEO turnover in declining industries.  
In column 2, I estimate similar logit regressions but use firm level rather than industry 
level control variables. The firm level data allow me to control for a variety of firm and 
governance characteristics that may affect forced CEO turnovers. I control for firm stock 
performance by market-adjusted stock returns and firm accounting performance by industry-
median-adjusted change in ROA where industry is defined by Fama and French 48 industry 
classification29
                                                     
29 The results are qualitatively the same when I use 4-digit SIC industry medians. 
. Both measures are widely used in prior CEO turnover studies. I also control for 
firm size measured by log of total assets, firm risk measured by the firm’s monthly stock return 
volatility in the past 12 months and growth opportunities by Tobin’s Q.  For CEO characteristics, 
I include CEO tenure measured as log of one plus CEO tenure in years, CEO age and an indicator 
for whether the CEO is a founder or an heir of founders. Compared with column 1, the signs of 
the coefficients on the three competition variables and HHI remain the same but the coefficient 
on industry median NPM is no longer statistically significant; however, the coefficient on 
industry PPE becomes more significant. In column 3, I control for more corporate governance 
variables using data from RiskMetrics. They include CEO voting power, an indicator for CEO 
Chairman duality, an indicator for dual class firms, and an indicator for the presence of 
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Table 3.3: The effect of competition on rate of forced CEO turnover (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. The 
sample consists of all firms in the final sample. In column 3, firms are also required to have data available 
on RiskMetrics database. This requirement restricts the sample period to 1996-2007. Year fixed effects are 
included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses 
are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Industry median NPM -1.118** -0.141 -0.745 
 (0.031) (0.831) (0.365) 
Log of market size 0.240*** 0.210*** 0.228*** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.004) 
Log of industry PPE -0.129 -0.126** -0.129** 
 (0.107) (0.020) (0.048) 
Industry HHI 1.307*** 1.236*** 1.491*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) 
Market-adjusted return  -1.500*** -1.849*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-adjusted change in ROA  -2.430*** -3.609*** 
  (0.000) (0.005) 
Log of total assets  -0.038 0.062 
  (0.330) (0.213) 
Stock volatility  4.183*** 3.574*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.121* -0.146* 
  (0.051) (0.056) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure)  -0.198*** -0.014 
  (0.001) (0.868) 
Founder-heir CEO  -1.574*** -1.262*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age  -0.025*** -0.031*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Market-adjusted industry median return -0.961***   
 (0.000)   
Industry median change in ROA -2.239**   
 (0.016)   
CEO voting power   -0.038* 
   (0.095) 
Dual class firms   0.122 
   (0.595) 
CEO-Chairman   -0.418*** 
   (0.001) 
Nonemployee blockholders on board   0.201 
   (0.164) 
Constant -5.095*** -4.135*** -3.746*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
N 12002 15289 9019 
Chisq 102.9 458.3 362.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0218 0.118 0.131 
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nonemployee blockholders on board. Since board data on RiskMetrics starts in 1996, adding 
these extra control variables reduces the sample size and limits the sample period to 1996 to 
2007. However, as we can see from column 3, the signs and statistical significance of the 
coefficients on the three competition variables and HHI are very similar to those in column 2. The 
sign and statistical significance of control variables are largely consistent with results in prior 
CEO turnover studies and with economic intuition.    
In Table 3.4, I examine how different dimensions of industry competition affect the 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. Whether industries showing higher rate 
of forced CEO turnover also show higher sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
depends the equilibrium between CEO effort and sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance. In general, we expect higher turnover-performance sensitivity to be associated with 
higher rate of forced CEO turnover. However, knowing that the turnover-performance sensitivity 
is higher, a CEO is likely to exert higher effort. So, in equilibrium, the rate of forced CEO 
turnover does not necessarily have to be higher in industries with higher turnover-performance 
sensitivity. Hence, if both the rate of forced CEO turnover and sensitivity of forced CEO turnover 
to firm performance are high (or low), then the evidence is consistent with higher (or lower) 
incentives being provided to the CEOs in these firms.  However, if rate of forced CEO turnover is 
low but turnover-performance sensitivity is high, the result can have alternative interpretations. 
For example, if the effort cost in the industry is the same as that in other industries, then the 
evidence is still consistent with higher incentives being provided to CEOs. However, if the effort 
cost is very low in the industry, then higher turnover-performance sensitivity in equilibrium may 
still induce less effort in the industry than in other industries, in which case, the evidence could 
still be consistent with lower incentives being provided to the CEOs.    
To examine the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance, I add to the logit 
models in Table 3.3 four interaction terms consisting of the interactions of the three competition 
variables with firm performance as well as that of industry HHI with firm performance. In 
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columns 1 and 2, firm performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return, while in 
columns 3 and 4 by industry-adjusted change in ROA. Columns 1 and 3 are estimated using data 
from 1992 to 2007. Columns 2 and 4 are estimated using data from 1996 to 2007 and I include 
more corporate governance variables in the regressions. I find that the coefficient on industry 
median NPM is negative and highly significant in all columns. The negatives sign is consistent 
with our hypothesis H1a which says that CEOs are more likely to be fired in industries with 
greater product substitutability than in other industries ceteris paribus. However, the coefficient 
on the interaction of industry median NPM and firm performance is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that forced CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance in 
industries with higher industry NPMs, i.e. lower product substitutability, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H1b. One explanation of this seemingly inconsistency is that, CEOs in industries 
with lower product substitutability and thus higher net profit margin can considerably reduce their 
chance of being fired by exert somewhat higher effort and thus it may be optimal for these firms 
to have higher turnover-performance sensitivity so some minimum level of incentive is provided 
to the CEOs. Hence, this result offers mixed evidence but does not completely reject the 
hypothesis that firms in industries with lower product substitutability offers lower incentives to 
CEOs in equilibrium than firms in industries with higher product substitutability. Alternatively, 
comparing with firms in industries with lower median NPMs, firms in industries with higher 
median NPMs in general have relatively stable profits. As a result, the same drop in firm 
performance may signal greater managerial problems in firms in industries with higher NPM than 
in firms in industries with lower NPM.  
 As for the other two competition factors, the coefficients on their interactions with firm 
performance are statistically significant in three out of the four columns. The negative coefficient 
on the interaction of market size with firm performance suggests that forced CEO turnovers are 
more sensitive to firm performance in industries with larger market size for any given level of 
industry concentration. In contrast, the positive coefficient on the interaction between industry
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Table 3.4: The effect of competition on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. The 
sample consists of all firms in the final sample. In columns 2 and 4, firms are also required to have data 
available on RiskMetrics database. This requirement restricts the sample period to 1996-2007. Firm 
performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return in columns 1 and 2, while by industry-adjusted 
change in ROA in columns 3 and 4. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are 
clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Market-
adjusted stock 
return 
Market-
adjusted stock 
return 
Change in 
ROA 
Change in 
ROA 
     
Industry median NPM -1.756*** -2.334*** -1.275** -2.283*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.037) (0.001) 
Log of market size 0.063 0.089 0.182** 0.176** 
 (0.469) (0.540) (0.010) (0.031) 
Log of weighted average PPE 0.046 0.036 -0.098* -0.073 
 (0.532) (0.784) (0.099) (0.293) 
HHI 0.596 0.882 0.732 0.920 
 (0.265) (0.240) (0.106) (0.139) 
Firm performance 0.037 -0.652 5.538 10.118 
 (0.978) (0.773) (0.333) (0.284) 
NPM × Firm performance -6.035*** -5.622** -24.587*** -42.947*** 
 (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Size × Firm performance -0.549*** -0.514 -1.759*** -2.870*** 
 (0.006) (0.204) (0.008) (0.004) 
Log PPE × Firm performance 0.637*** 0.620 1.697*** 2.636*** 
 (0.001) (0.101) (0.008) (0.008) 
HHI × Firm performance -2.598** -2.376 -20.673*** -26.001*** 
 (0.028) (0.196) (0.000) (0.001) 
Log of total assets -0.043 0.051 -0.047 0.071 
 (0.262) (0.307) (0.232) (0.158) 
Stock volatility 3.885*** 3.453*** 5.032*** 4.943*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.156*** -0.181** -0.286*** -0.327*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure) -0.197*** -0.011 -0.174*** 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.897) (0.004) (0.939) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.578*** -1.258*** -1.588*** -1.266*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO voting power  -0.039*  -0.037 
  (0.090)  (0.102) 
Dual class firm  0.090  0.157 
  (0.688)  (0.495) 
CEO-Chairman  -0.436***  -0.434*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Nonemployee blockholders on board  0.203  0.212 
  (0.154)  (0.141) 
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Table 3.4, continued 
Constant -3.522*** -3.151*** -3.462*** -3.096*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Observations 15399 9089 15349 9025 
Chisq 567.9 393.3 473.9 347.4 
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.130 0.0955 0.106 
 
 
average PPE and firm performance suggests that forced CEO turnovers are less sensitive to firm 
performance in industries with higher entry costs than in other industries ceteris paribus. Again, 
this result on entry costs is consistent with entry costs being positively related to threat of 
liquidation but is inconsistent with prediction of the Raith (2003) model as expressed in H3b. 
Lastly, the negative coefficient on the interaction of HHI and firm performance appear to be 
consistent with the intuition of Raith (2003) model in the sense that conditional on a given level 
of industry sales, higher concentration tends to be associated with higher average firm-level 
output in the industry and thus stronger incentives according to Raith (2003). But this 
interpretation is only suggestive as other alternative explanations are possible.  
 
4.2. Competitive vs. oligopoly Industries 
Raith (2003) models competition in an oligopolistic industry where strategic reactions of 
other firms in the same industry play an important role in setting managerial incentives. However, 
not all industries are oligopolistic. Hence, the model predictions may not apply to industries 
where a large number of firms compete in the same product market to the point that strategic 
reactions of competitors play little role in any firm’s decisions. To see if the three dimensions of 
competition I study are only important in oligopolistic industries, or in other words, my previous 
results are mostly driven by firms in oligopolistic industries, I divide the sample firms into two 
groups – those in oligopoly industries and those in competitive industries. The difference between 
the two groups is only in the degree of importance of strategic interactions in firm decisions and 
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not in with or without strategic interactions. One concentration measure that is often used to 
quantitatively describe oligopoly is the four-firm concentration ratio which is calculated as the 
market share of the four largest firms in an industry in percentage. Usually, when this ratio is in 
the range of 50% to 80%, an industry is likely to be an oligopoly. The range from 80% to 100% 
includes oligopoly industry all the way to monopoly industry. In my sample, the four-firm 
concentration ratio ranges from 24% to close to 100% with a median of 67%. I use the median 
four-firm concentration ratio to separate the sample into two subsamples. I choose to use median 
instead of a value of 50% as the cut-off to divide sample firms because I want to make sure that 
the two subsamples are about the same size so that any differences in the significance of the 
coefficient estimates are unlikely to be purely driven by differences in sample size. The 
subsample with the ratio above the sample median is likely to contain mostly firms in 
oligopolistic industries, while the subsample with the ratio below the sample median contains 
mostly firms in competitive industries.  
Table 3.5 reports the results for the two subsamples separately. Columns 1 and 2 are for 
the competitive industries subsample while columns 3 and 4 are for the oligopoly industries 
subsample. As in Table 3.3, the coefficient of industry median NPM is mostly statistically 
insignificant except in one specification in the competitive sample. Thus I focus on comparing the 
coefficients on market size and industry average PPE across the two subsamples. I find that for 
firms in the competitive subsample, the coefficients on both market size and industry average 
PPE are statistically insignificant. In contrast, for firms in the oligopoly subsample, both 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level in column 3. In column 4, when I include 
more control variables for corporate governance and the sample period is reduced to 1996 to 
2007, the coefficient on market size remains statistically significant at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient on industry average PPE is statistically significant at the 10% level in one-sided test.  
In Table 3.6, I further examine the effects of competition on the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance in the two subsamples. In columns 1 and 2, firm performance
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Table 3.5: The effect of competition on rate of forced CEO turnover - competitive vs. oligopoly 
industries (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. In 
columns 2 and 4, firms are also required to have data available on RiskMetrics database. This requirement 
restricts the sample period to 1996-2007. The results are reported separately for two subsamples of 
industries divided by the median four-firm concentration ratio in our sample. The competitive subsample 
contains firms in industries with four-firm concentration ratio below the sample median, while the 
oligopoly subsample contains firms in industries with four-firm concentration ratio above the median. The 
subsample used is indicated at the top of each column. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
 Competitive Oligopoly 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Industry median NPM -0.646 -1.964** 1.228 2.270 
 (0.461) (0.040) (0.323) (0.211) 
Log of market size 0.093 0.163 0.327*** 0.314*** 
 (0.370) (0.187) (0.000) (0.005) 
Log of weighted average PPE -0.045 -0.130 -0.232*** -0.138 
 (0.598) (0.123) (0.002) (0.172) 
HHI 0.767 0.326 1.447*** 1.500** 
 (0.671) (0.903) (0.005) (0.039) 
Market-adjusted return -1.226*** -1.261*** -1.825*** -2.561*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-adjusted change in ROA -1.867*** -2.129 -3.635*** -5.723*** 
 (0.007) (0.151) (0.010) (0.005) 
Log of total assets -0.114** 0.097 0.048 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.146) (0.425) (0.758) 
Stock volatility 3.773*** 4.100*** 4.728*** 3.045* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.058) 
Tobin’s Q -0.130* -0.218** -0.133 -0.098 
 (0.074) (0.037) (0.207) (0.367) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure) -0.112 0.178 -0.286*** -0.160 
 (0.198) (0.177) (0.001) (0.186) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.607*** -1.252*** -1.557*** -1.371*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Age -0.023*** -0.032** -0.029*** -0.030** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.029) 
CEO voting power  -0.017  -0.089** 
  (0.463)  (0.012) 
Dual class firms  -0.129  0.263 
  (0.703)  (0.332) 
CEO-Chairman  -0.417**  -0.434** 
  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Nonemployee blockholders on board  0.212  0.218 
  (0.344)  (0.260) 
Constant -2.910** -3.281** -5.113*** -4.304*** 
 (0.044) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
N 7683 4307 7606 4712 
Chisq 456.2 248.7 277.6 283.5 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.104 0.137 0.180 
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Table 3.6: The effect of competition on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm 
performance - competitive vs. oligopolistic industries (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. The 
results are reported separately for two subsamples of industries divided by the median four-firm 
concentration ratio in the sample. The competitive subsample contains firms in industries with four-firm 
concentration ratio below the sample median, while the oligopoly subsample contains firms in industries 
with four-firm concentration ratio above the median. The subsample used is indicated at the top of each 
column. Firm performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return in columns 1 and 2, while by 
industry-adjusted change in ROA in columns 3 and 4. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
 Competitive Oligopoly Competitive Oligopoly 
VARIABLES Stock return Stock return Change in 
ROA 
Change in 
ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Industry median NPM -1.751** -1.343 -1.621** -0.475 
 (0.029) (0.270) (0.040) (0.699) 
Log of market size -0.027 0.123 0.075 0.247** 
 (0.850) (0.304) (0.525) (0.016) 
Log of weighted average PPE 0.054 0.052 -0.029 -0.154* 
 (0.628) (0.626) (0.763) (0.072) 
HHI 0.664 0.811 0.028 0.890 
 (0.778) (0.194) (0.989) (0.127) 
Firm performance 1.077 -0.717 8.359 10.988 
 (0.671) (0.698) (0.374) (0.264) 
NPM × Firm performance -4.179*** -9.146*** -18.779*** -42.822*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) 
Market Size × Firm performance -0.475 -0.822*** -1.636 -3.190** 
 (0.123) (0.003) (0.173) (0.020) 
Log PPE × Firm performance 0.376 1.083*** 1.333 3.092** 
 (0.124) (0.000) (0.197) (0.015) 
HHI × Firm performance 0.411 -2.548 -37.421* -23.632*** 
 (0.952) (0.102) (0.094) (0.003) 
Log of total assets -0.116** 0.040 -0.131** 0.044 
 (0.030) (0.499) (0.019) (0.447) 
Stock volatility 3.438*** 4.185*** 4.429*** 5.875*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.163** -0.165 -0.280*** -0.310*** 
 (0.024) (0.111) (0.000) (0.009) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure) -0.118 -0.276*** -0.095 -0.256*** 
 (0.181) (0.001) (0.270) (0.002) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.596*** -1.608*** -1.613*** -1.584*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -2.146 -4.640*** -2.249 -4.212*** 
 (0.175) (0.001) (0.120) (0.003) 
     
Observations 7709 7690 7722 7627 
Chisq 699.9 381.2 429.6 284.2 
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.142 0.0909 0.109 
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is measured by market-adjusted stock return, while in columns 3 and 4 by industry-adjusted 
change in ROA. Columns 1 and 3 are for firms in the competitive subsample, while columns 2 
and 4 are for firms in the oligopoly subsample. I find that coefficients on interactions of market 
size and industry average PPE with firm performance are statistically significant at the 1% level 
in the oligopoly subsample but are statistically insignificant in the competitive subsample. The 
signs of these coefficients are the same as those in Table 3.4. This is consistent with my 
hypothesis that these two dimensions of competition are only important when strategic 
interactions between firms are important. However, the coefficients on the interaction of industry 
median NPM with firm performance are statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
subsamples, suggesting that its importance does not depend on whether strategic interactions 
between firms play an important role in firm decisions. The sign of the interaction of industry 
median NPM with firm performance remains negative as in Table 3.4.  
Overall, results in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show that market size and entry costs seem to 
affect forced CEO turnover decisions mainly in oligopolistic industries. This is consistent with 
the Raith (2003) model in the sense that these two factors are important only when strategic 
interactions between firms are important to firm decisions. However, industry median NPM 
seems to affect forced CEO turnover decisions in both competitive and oligopoly industries.  
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
Until now, I have used competition measures constructed from annual data. Given the 
volatility in some of the variables I use, changes in these variables from year to year may 
overstate the actual change in fundamentals of competition. For example, change in industry 
median NPM may just reflect change in macroeconomic environment rather than change in 
product substitutability. Similarly, annual changes in sales in most cases simply reflect the 
volatile nature of sales rather than change in expected demands. As a robustness check, in Tables
195 
 
Table 3.7: Robustness check on effect on rate of forced CEO turnover using smoothed 
competition measures (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. The 
sample consists of all firms in the final sample. In column 3, firms are also required to have data available 
on RiskMetrics database. This requirement restricts the sample period to 1996-2007.Year fixed effects are 
included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses 
are robust p-values and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Industry median NPM -1.009 0.018 -0.363 
 (0.128) (0.982) (0.743) 
Log of market size 0.224** 0.205*** 0.254*** 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of weighted average PPE -0.130 -0.117* -0.142** 
 (0.148) (0.057) (0.046) 
HHI 1.016* 1.004** 1.624** 
 (0.086) (0.032) (0.010) 
Market-adjusted return  -1.509*** -1.862*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-adjusted change in ROA  -2.405*** -3.622*** 
  (0.000) (0.004) 
Log of total assets  -0.040 0.054 
  (0.313) (0.273) 
Stock volatility  4.261*** 3.830*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.115* -0.134* 
  (0.059) (0.075) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure)  -0.199*** -0.028 
  (0.001) (0.748) 
Founder-heir CEO  -1.608*** -1.259*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age  -0.026*** -0.033*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Market-adjusted industry median return -0.987***   
 (0.000)   
Industry median change in EBIT -2.604***   
 (0.007)   
CEO voting power   -0.037 
   (0.100) 
Dual class firms   0.144 
   (0.536) 
CEO-Chairman   -0.384*** 
   (0.004) 
Nonemployee blockholders on board   0.203 
   (0.162) 
Constant -4.863*** -4.047*** -3.884*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
N 11933 15114 8911 
Chisq 96.00 475.6 359.9 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0210 0.119 0.132 
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Table 3.8: Robustness check on effect on sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
using smoothed competition measures (1992-2007) 
 
This table reports result of logit regressions where the dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover 
indicator for year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and are defined in Appendix B. The 
sample consists of all firms in the final sample. In columns 2 and 4, firms are also required to have data 
available on RiskMetrics database. This requirement restricts the sample period to 1996-2007. Firm 
performance is measured by market-adjusted stock return in columns 1 and 2, while by industry-adjusted 
change in ROA in columns 3 and 4. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are 
clustered by four-digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses are robust p-values and ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Market-
adjusted stock 
return 
Market-
adjusted stock 
return 
Change in 
ROA 
Change in 
ROA 
     
Industry median NPM -1.719** -1.889 -1.064 -1.940* 
 (0.025) (0.131) (0.207) (0.054) 
Log of market size 0.067 0.083 0.181** 0.200** 
 (0.489) (0.608) (0.020) (0.039) 
Log of weighted average PPE 0.044 0.031 -0.096 -0.084 
 (0.595) (0.831) (0.175) (0.305) 
HHI 0.252 0.632 0.460 1.002 
 (0.700) (0.505) (0.389) (0.183) 
Firm performance 0.105 0.775 7.413 6.890 
 (0.942) (0.761) (0.210) (0.495) 
NPM × Firm performance -6.859*** -5.222* -19.347*** -28.501** 
 (0.000) (0.085) (0.009) (0.012) 
Market Size × Firm performance -0.499** -0.635 -1.678** -2.009* 
 (0.019) (0.159) (0.021) (0.060) 
Log PPE × Firm performance 0.577*** 0.634 1.392** 1.844** 
 (0.003) (0.121) (0.032) (0.048) 
HHI × Firm performance -2.934** -3.896* -24.627*** -26.210*** 
 (0.040) (0.082) (0.000) (0.005) 
Log of total assets -0.046 0.044 -0.053 0.057 
 (0.242) (0.377) (0.177) (0.259) 
Stock volatility 3.916*** 3.663*** 5.083*** 5.199*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.150** -0.167** -0.278*** -0.312*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (1 + CEO tenure) -0.199*** -0.024 -0.176*** -0.009 
 (0.001) (0.781) (0.004) (0.918) 
Founder-heir CEO -1.612*** -1.255*** -1.636*** -1.282*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO voting power  -0.039*  -0.036 
  (0.091)  (0.104) 
Dual class firms  0.109  0.185 
  (0.633)  (0.427) 
CEO-Chairman  -0.406***  -0.385*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Nonemployee blockholders on board  0.213  0.219 
  (0.138)  (0.132) 
197 
 
Table 3.8, continued 
Constant -3.370*** -2.949*** -3.335*** -3.127*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 15222 8981 15174 8917 
Chisq 589.8 397.3 477.2 372.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.130 0.0951 0.102 
 
 
3.7 and 3.8, I reexamine the main results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 using smoothed competition 
measures respectively. Specifically, for each year, I calculate the five-year moving average of 
each competition measures as well as industry HHI. I require that data be available for at least 
three out of the past five years to be included in the sample. I find that the results are in general 
very similar to those in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Except for coefficient on industry median NPM in 
column 1 which become statistically insignificant, the coefficient on market size and industry 
PPE remain statistically significant in both columns 2 and 3.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I empirically examine the relation between product market competition and 
forced CEO turnover using a multi-dimensional set of competition measures motivated by recent 
theory by Raith (2003). Consistent with the prediction of Raith (2003), I find that market size is 
positively related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to performance. Contrary to the prediction of Raith (2003), I find that entry costs are 
negatively related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover as well as the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to performance. However, this evidence is consistent with the prediction in 
Schmidt (1997) which says that threat of liquidatiaon lowers the cost for the owner of the firm to 
induce higher level of effort by the managers. It seems that the relation between entry cost and 
managerial incentives is driven both by the threat of liquidation effect in Schmidt (1997) and the 
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return to cost reduction effort effect in Raith (2003) with the former dominating the latter30
I further show that, consistent with the oligopoly setting of Raith (2003) model, the 
results are mainly driven by the subsample of firms in oligopoly industries. Overall, the results 
suggest that the Raith (2003) model seems to capture some important feature of competition but 
the mechanism through which competition affects managerial incentives proposed in the model is 
not fully supported by our CEO turnover data. Besides the return to cost reduction mechanism 
studied in Raith (2003), the threat of liquidation mechanism studied in Schmidt (1997) also plays 
important roles in the relation between production market competition and managerial slack. The 
results also suggest that strategic interactions between firms in oligopoly industry appear to play 
an important role in forced CEO turnover decisions. This aspect of CEO turnover decision has not 
been explored in the literature before.  
. The 
evidence on product substitutability is mixed. While product substitutability is positively 
associated with the probability of forced CEO turnover, which is consistent with the prediction 
based on Raith (2003); it is negatively associated with the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to 
firm performance, which does not seem to be consistent with the prediction based on Raith (2003) 
but it does not reject the prediction either.  
One limitation of this study is that I have used Compustat data to construct the 
competition measures as well as other control variables31. As a result, I only include public firms 
in the sample. Recent study by Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) suggests that leaving out private 
firms in an industry could be a serious concern in studies of product market competition in 
general32
                                                     
30 Schmidt (1997) also models a value of cost reduction effect but in his model this effect only shows up 
when “the manager is paid a rent in excess of his reservation utility”. It is this second effect that makes the 
relation between competition and managerial slack in his model ambiguous. 
. However, I consider it not a big concern in this study because I have shown that the 
31 The US Census of Manufacturers data do not have all variables that I need to construct the competition 
measures. 
32 Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) show that industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data 
are poor proxies for actual industry concentration and thus results in some prior studies that used 
Compustat-based industry concentration to define competition are not robust when Census-based 
concentration measures are used. 
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results are mainly driven by the sample of firms in oligopoly industries where the major players 
are usually public firms. For example, the U.S. airline industry and automobile industry are all 
oligopoly industries where the major players are public. In these industries, public firms mainly 
compete with other public firms in the same industry, thus leaving out private firms should not 
bias the results; on the contrary, including private firms may actually bias the results because 
these small firms are less likely to be direct competitors to the oligopoly firms in their industry. 
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Appendix B: Definitions of variables 
 
Variables Definition 
 Dependent variables 
Forced CEO turnover An indicator variable for forced CEO turnover classified 
using the method in (Parrino, 1997). 
  
 Industry competition measures 
Industry median NPM The median net profit margin of all segments in a four-digit 
SIC industry where profit margin is calculated at the 
segment level as operating income before depreciation and 
amortization divided by sales. 
Industry sales Sum of sales of all segments in a four-digit SIC industry. 
Industry average PPE Weighted-average costs of gross property, plant and 
equipment of all segments in a four-digit SIC industry where 
the weight is each segment’s sales share in the industry. 
  
 Industry concentration measures 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated from sales shares of 
all segments in a four-digit SIC industry. 
Four-firm concentration ratio Sales share accounted for by the largest four segments in a 
four-digit SIC industry. 
  
 Firm characteristics 
Log of total assets Natural log of book value of total assets in millions of 
dollars 
Log of sales Natural log of annual sales in millions of dollars 
Tobin’s Q Book value of total assets minus book value of common 
equity plus the market value of common equity over book 
value of total assets. 
Stock volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the past 12 
months.  
  
 Firm Performance 
Market-adjusted return The firm’s stock return minus return on value-weighted 
CRSP index cumulated over the 12 months that end one 
month before the CEO turnover announcement or over the 
fiscal year when there is no CEO turnover. This variable is 
winsoried at 1% and 99% of the distribution. 
Industry-adjusted Change in 
ROA 
The firm’s change in ROA adjusted by the median of this 
ratio for the firm’s industry over the fiscal year prior to the 
CEO turnover, where ROA is defined as annual EBIT scaled 
by lagged total assets and industries are defined by Fama and 
French 48 industry classification. This variable is winsorized 
at 1% and 99% of the distribution. 
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Appendix B, continued 
 Governance characteristics 
CEO-Chairman An indicator variable that equals to one if the CEO is also 
the Chairman of the board and equals to zero otherwise. 
Dual Class firm An indicator variable for firms with more than one class of 
common shares.  
Nonemployee block An indicator variable for the presence of non-employee 
blockholders on board where a blockholder is defined as 
anyone holding more than 1% of the total voting power. 
  
 CEO characteristics 
CEO Age CEO age at the time of the CEO turnover announcement. 
CEO Voting Power The percentage of votes held by the CEO as defined by 
RiskMetrics. 
Founder-heir CEO An indicator variable for CEOs who are the founders or heirs 
of founders of their firms.   
Log CEO Tenure Natural log of one plus CEO tenure in years. 
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